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Abstract
Cameroon is in the process of developing its program for reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). Two communities near the southern
portion of Korup National Park in the Southwest Region were studied to understand the
implications for REDD+ implementation in the area, in light of current forest policies
including community forestry, agro-industry, and forest conservation. Frameworks used
to understand the communities are an institutional analysis model, and the fieldinteractional perspective of community agency. I used qualitative methods of data
collection, including a questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews with villagers and NGO
(non-governmental organization) workers, and other ethnographic techniques. Various
options have been proposed as mechanisms of implementing REDD+ projects in
Cameroon. These are discussed, along with two possibilities for intra-community benefit
sharing. There was no observable animosity between demographic groups in the study
communities, but women and allogenes were less involved in decision-making.
Allogenes also had additional barriers to accessing institutional processes, as well as
forest land and resources. Youth showed higher levels of education compared to the older
population, and women had lower levels compared to men. Processes of societal
integration exist within the communities, and these could potentially aid in improving
community agency, especially through educating community members about risks,
opportunities, and their rights in relation to REDD+. The results indicated that there is a
danger of local communities being excluded from REDD+ benefits, with simultaneous
x

loss of livelihoods, using proposed mechanisms of agro-forestry or land use fees. I
recommend a payment for ecosystem services approach within community forestry, but
considerable changes are needed to improve the process of establishing community
forests, ensure participation of all segments of the population, and prevent exclusion of
marginalized groups.

xi

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Background
This study investigates relationships between the aspects of integration and
collective agency among two villages – Fabe and Mosongiseli – currently pursuing
community forest land tenure near the southern portion of Korup National Park in
Cameroon. The country is developing its REDD+ policy,1 which poses both challenges
and opportunities to these communities, due to the dependence of local people on the
forest and its resources. One challenge comes from similarities that REDD+ shares with
integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) as well as top-down measures
of forest management that have alienated local people from their customary lands and
sources of livelihood in favor of other ecological, political, and economic interests. This
loss of access to forest land and resources has occurred both globally (Blom, Sunderland,
& Murdiyarso, 2010; Chapin, 2004; Larson, 2011) as well as within the study area
(Achobang, Nguiffo, & Schwartz, 2013; Diaw & Tiani, 2010; Schmidt-Soltau, 2004).
A second challenge comes from the commoditization of forest carbon, which has
created political conflicts at different scales over control of the production of forest
carbon in other countries (Mahanty, Milne, Dressler, & Filer, 2012; Phelps, Webb, &
Agrawal, 2010). While the new commodity of forest carbon presents challenges for the

REDD+ refers to the program known as “Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”
(“REDD+”, 2014).
1

1

future, past and current phases of capitalism have created highly heterogeneous
communities within Cameroon in general, and within the study area in particular, through
the mobilization of labor to work on plantation camps (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000;
Malleson, 2001). This heterogeneity has resulted in considerable divisions within
Cameroonian society, and these divisions have been exploited in order to retain political
power by the current administration and ruling political party. Existing tensions within
the country may therefore create considerable challenges for communities to collectively
engage with REDD+ policies.
On the other hand, REDD+ also presents opportunities to these villages.
Community forestry may offer advantages for Cameroon in achieving its REDD+ goals.
Outside of Cameroon, community forestry has demonstrated its potential as an effective,
efficient, and equitable tenure regime that may be appropriate for implementing REDD+
projects (Phelps et al., 2010; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Skutsch & McCall, 2011). If the
communities in the study area have the capacity to effectively assert their agency in
Cameroon’s REDD+ development and implementation process, they will be in a better
position to prevent the loss of livelihoods, while gaining from REDD+ benefits. For its
part, Cameroon has stated that the nation’s REDD+ goals include ensuring the welfare of
local communities, and obtaining the consent of indigenous populations (Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility [FCPF], 2013a). In addition, lessons from the Korup Project ICDP
have shown that conservation measures such as REDD+ will not be effective without the
voluntary cooperation of the local populations (Diaw & Tiani, 2010; Mbile et al., 2005;
Schmidt-Soltau, 2004).

2

Agrawal and Angelsen (2009) assert that REDD+ outcomes can be enhanced by
involving communities in forest management, but parameters for the success of
community forestry need to be addressed in order to optimize the results of these
initiatives. Two of these “clusters of success factors” (Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009, Table
16.1, p. 205) include socio-political and economic user group factors such as group size
and heterogeneity, as well as institutional arrangements such as tenure security and
participation in deciding rules for forest usage. According to the authors, secure tenure
rights and access to rule-making are well known as contributing to successful community
forestry outcomes, but the effects of heterogeneity are not established, and often the
results of studies investigating this factor vary considerably under different circumstances
(Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009).2 Thus, an understanding of socially heterogeneous forest
communities in the local context can contribute to the current discussion on the
relationship between heterogeneity and institutional arrangements, and improve the
likelihood of successful outcomes for Cameroon’s REDD+ program.
Through primarily qualitative methods, this study seeks to understand how
societal integration of these heterogeneous communities could affect collective agency in
REDD+ interactions. The analysis of this potential is based on the variation in agency
between different demographic groups, and prior interactions of the community with
forest policies such as community forestry, industrial agriculture, and forest conservation.
The methods include villager surveys, semistandardized and unstandardized interviews

2

Also, see Poteete & Ostrom (2004) for a similar discussion regarding collective
action in community-based forest management.
3

with villagers and NGO workers, and other ethnographic methods such as mapping and
participant observation.
The two communities in the study area are currently interacting with forest
conservation policies. Because they exist within the peripheral zone of Korup National
Park, the communities have been affected by the Korup Project, an ICDP that began in
1986 (Schmidt-Soltau, 2004) and covers a total area of 6,600 km2, including Korup
National Park and the surrounding “Support Zone” (Egute, 2012). Moreover, the
communities are currently attempting to establish community forests, a process which
involves extensive interactions with governmental agencies, including each level of the
Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF), from the district to national levels (Yufanyi
Movuh, 2013). Understanding the basis for these interactions, and the issues faced by
local communities in their application of collective action in these instances helps to
determine the processes that connect societal integration within the community to the
outcomes of these interactions. Furthermore, the REDD+ development process has
already begun in Cameroon, and a pilot project was slated for Korup National Park
(Freudenthal, Nnah, & Kenrick, 2011). Therefore, the communities should already be
involved in the development process on the local as well as national scale, according to
the principles of free, prior and informed consent (Mahanty & McDermott, 2013), and
Cameroon’s goals for participation of local populations in the REDD+ policy
development process (FCPF, 2013a).
1.2. Problem Statement
Implementing REDD+ in Cameroon could endanger the livelihoods of forest
communities. These risks originate from two different, though complimentary, frames.

4

Some observers, for instance Blom et al. (2010), argue that REDD+ as a variation of
integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs). REDD+ will be implemented
nation-wide, but similar to ICDPs, many activities will occur at the sub-national project
level, and will involve financial compensation to communities involved (Blom et al.,
2010). The Korup Project, an ICDP that began in 1988 (Schmidt-Soltau, 2000), has been
characterized by some as a “catastrophic failure” (Mbile et al., 2005, p. 1). The Korup
Project intended, in part, to resettle the inhabitants of villages living within the park, in
addition to restricting hunting, gathering, and farming practices that are essential to the
livelihoods of the local communities (Diaw & Tiani, 2010; Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). As of
2010, only one village was ever relocated (Diaw & Tiani, 2010).3 Resettlement was
accomplished at a financial cost far higher than anticipated, while livelihood restrictions
resulted in conflicts and considerable distrust between park authorities and those living in
and around the park (Diaw & Tiani, 2010). Secondly, REDD+ threatens to recentralize
control of forest management because of the desire for states to obtain financial benefits
from the REDD+ mechanism (Phelps et al., 2010).4 In studies of REDD+ implementation
in the Philippines, Cambodia, and Papua New Guinea, Mahanty et al. (2012) observed
conflicts between national, regional, and local actors as governments tried to accrue
benefits flowing from control of the production of forest carbon.

3

This village was Ikondo Kondo, resettled near the study site community of Fabe
(Egute, 2012).
4
In fact, NGO workers stated in interviews that Cameroonian officials viewed
REDD+ as a source of development money (Organization 2 respondent), not a
conservation program, and attested to the wide-spread mismanagement of funds from
both economic development projects and conservation initiatives (Organization 2
respondent, Organization 4 respondent).
5

Past and current experiences with industrial agricultural in Cameroon have led to
migrations throughout the country. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) argue that a
fundamental characteristic of capitalism is to generate migration, followed by the
reinforcement of social divisions between newly diverse populations. This was
accomplished during the colonial era by forced and highly coercive relocations that
displaced Cameroonians throughout and between the colonies, bringing laborers to work
in plantation camps. The process was particularly strong in what is now the Southwest
Region, where Korup National Park and the study site communities are located. Vast
commercial plantations were established here during the early German colonial period.
The result was a new heterogeneity of ethnic groups in Cameroon, that were themselves
“historical constructs subject to constant change” (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000, p.427),
and largely of European fabrication. Generations later, these immigrants in some areas of
the country are still considered “strangers”, in contrast to those claiming local status as
“indigenes”. In 1990 the government opened the political system to multi-party
elections, but retained political hegemony by sewing discord between “indigenes” and
“strangers” within communities throughout the country, successfully nullifying elections
that proved not to be in the ruling party’s favor. The historical “‘freeing’ of labor”
(Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000, p. 426) during earlier phases of capitalism was thus
followed by exclusion during political liberalization.
Mahanty et al. (2012, p. 661) describe the system of carbon credits from REDD+
as a new commodity with its own “social life”. The forest carbon commodity chain flows
from production, to unitization into individual credits, to valuation on the carbon market,
“and finally its displacement from the labor and resource context in which it was
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‘produced’” (Mahanty et al., 2012, p. 661). These authors note that due to the intangible
nature of carbon credits, knowledge and access to decision-making have been especially
important factors for communities in struggles at different political scales for control of
the production of forest carbon.
With the introduction of this new commodity into the local context around Korup
National Park, will capitalist production have the same or similar effects as plantation
agriculture had for Cameroon in general, and the Southwest Region in particular? That is,
will the REDD+ mechanism promote the mobilization of workers followed by exclusion
of immigrants from power, and if so, will this exclusion reduce the ability of forest
communities to capitalize on opportunities presented by REDD+? The answers will have
considerable impacts on the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of any REDD+ projects
in the area, and of projects involving forest communities with similar socio-political,
economic, demographic, market, and macro-political factors (Agrawal & Angelsen,
2009). These are some of the questions which the present discussion attempts to address,
but the final answers will not be known until implementation has been carried out.
1.3. Need for Research
Despite the possibility of loss and violation of local rights, REDD+ also poses
opportunities to forest communities, in the form of financial benefits. Community forests
(including forest tenure arrangements known variously as “community forest
management”, “community-based natural resource management”, and the like) are
particularly well suited to benefit from REDD+. First of all, community forests in settings
throughout the world have demonstrated effectiveness in enhancing forest biomass
(Skutsch & Solis, 2011; Phelps et al., 2010; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012). Secondly, they
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have shown cost efficiency in terms of enhancing forest biomass, relative to protected
areas (Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009; Phelps et al., 2010; Skutsch & McCall, 2011).
Thirdly, community forestry can result in a more equitable distribution of forestry
benefits (Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009; Maryudi et al., 2012).
Understanding factors that promote successful community forestry can help in
successful implementation of REDD+ (Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009). These factors
include “user group” characteristics such as heterogeneity. The effects of heterogeneity
on successful outcomes of community forestry are uncertain, and the results of studies
looking at different aspects of heterogeneity have yielded different results in different
contexts (Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004), warranting further
investigation into this factor. The present study focuses on forest communities described
by Malleson (2001) as highly heterogeneous. The research has attempted to uncover
connections between integration (or lack thereof) and successful collective action, one
proposition being that heterogeneity itself is not as important in influencing the outcomes
of community forestry as is the integration of different demographic groups within a
community.
Rist (2000) discusses the need for the application of qualitative social science
methods to policy research, and defines three phases generally existing in the policy
cycle: formulation, implementation, and accountability stages. He maintains that social
research has the potential for the greatest impact during the first of these phases. Because
of Cameroon’s current position in the first phase of the REDD+ policy process (the
readiness phase, according to the UN-REDD Programme [UN-REDD, 2012]), the present
research comes at an optimal time to discover how the forest communities understand
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and are responding to REDD+. Community studies are of particular importance during
this early stage of the policy cycle (Rist, 2000). UN-REDD (2012), moreover, stresses the
importance of assessing community and environmental impacts early in the REDD+
development process.
1.4. Objectives
This study comprises two principal objectives, one theoretical and one practical.
The theoretical objective of the research is to understand connections between societal
integration and collective agency for the forest communities involved in the study. From
this understanding I hope to add to the literature on the relationships between user group
factors, such as heterogeneity, and successful outcomes of community forestry and
REDD+, particularly outcomes that are successful in terms of respecting local rights and
social safeguards. The practical objective is to contribute to the improvement of REDD+
interactions with local communities in the area. While recommendations for REDD+
implementation given in this study are specifically suited to the communities studied,
they may also be applicable to communities with similar institutional structures dealing
with similar external policies and actors.
1.5. Conceptual Framework
1.5.1. Community
This study uses two frameworks for understanding the concept of “community”
that may at first appear somewhat contradictory. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) propose an
institutional analysis model of communities, and contrast this perspective with earlier
notions advanced in the study of community-based conservation initiatives. The authors
advocate a model in which diverse actors within the community interact in ways that
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establish institutions (seen as rules and norms that constrain individual actions) through
“processes of decision-making and enforcement” (p. 639). While institutions can direct
actions, they are also in constant change as individuals and groups contest and negotiate
their terms. They claim that this contrasts with earlier discourses in which communities
were thought of as either spatially constrained territories (such as Tonnies), homogeneous
social structures, or shared norms (Ascher, for instance). While the authors acknowledge
that these three attributes can be found to some extent in many communities, taking these
characteristics as unexamined truths fosters a simplistic interpretation which can lead to
erroneous assumptions about how communities interact with their environment and
conservation policies. A better understanding of conservation outcomes is obtained
through a focus on institutions and the processes through which these rules and norms are
shaped. Moreover, they argue, community institutions often cannot be clearly isolated
from external institutions, so analyses should take into consideration interactions with
external actors.
According to Bessant (2012), Wilkinson’s field-interactional theory views
community as a “field of interaction” (p. 632) between individuals having diverse
interests. In this conceptualization, community is continually reconstructed through social
interactions as individuals negotiate and define rules and norms. The perspective is
primarily concerned with processes through which collective agency is produced. In the
field-interactional model, collective agency is thought to come about through the
empathic generalization of individual understandings to those of other individuals or
groups within the community field. As a result of social interactions, “diverse lines of
action coalesce around common interests” (Bessant, 2012, p. 629), leading to collective
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action. Despite similarities to “community as common interests and shared norms,”
critiqued by Agrawal and Gibson (1999, p. 635), these authors do not deny that certain
“community level norms” (p. 635) do often exist, and that in some cases they are
amenable to conservation goals. They also note that shared understandings can encourage
community members to work together in negotiating institutional arrangements. The
authors’ main concern is that researchers neglect the cases in which shared norms prove
detrimental to ecological outcomes. In the field-interactional model, communities
themselves are not necessarily composed of individuals having homogeneous
understandings. Rather, the extent to which understandings are shared (due to social
interactions between individuals from different groups) is theorized to result in collective
agency when individuals generalize their own interests as being synonymous with those
of others in the community. This generalization then produces collective action which is
representative of a diversity of social groups, rather than the interests of only a small
subgroup. Thus, social interactions between members of the community having diverse
interests would modulate the processes by which communities make rules, implement
them, and resolve disputes, in ways that give authority for these actions to broader
sections of the community.
The current work synthesizes these two community frameworks by examining the
demographic heterogeneity of the study communities; prevailing norms, formal
institutions, and interactions with external actors; states and processes of integration
between demographic groups; and an assessment of collective action in interactions with
external policies. The main objective is not to describe whether or not the study
communities are protecting the environment, nor to predict if they will do so under
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REDD+. The objective is, instead, to understand the nature of agency among various
actors within the community, and the implications of differences or similarities in agency
for interactions with REDD+ once it is implemented. This follows Agrawal and Gibson’s
(1999) recommendation for organizations and governments to accept the legitimacy of
decisions made by communities, even if these decisions are not helpful for immediate
conservation goals. While doing so may sacrifice ecological sustainability (at least over
the short-term), preserving social sustainability for the relevant populations could prove
more beneficial in the long-run due to the necessary role of communities as partners in
conservation policies.5
1.5.2. Research Questions
The following research questions guide the analysis of community institutions and
interactions with forest policies. The research questions should be understood as limited
to forest communities near the southern portion of Korup National Park, and specifically
the two study communities. Current forest policies include industrial agriculture, forest
conservation, and community forestry. Each of these has a particular agent carrying out
the activities that form the basis of interactions with the communities. In this study,
industrial agriculture refers to large-scale crop production other than timber. The
relevant policy is the government’s system of land rents, established by Decree 76-166 of
27 April 1976 (Assembe-Mvondo, Brockhaus, & Lescuyer, 2013). The primary agents of
these policies in the study communities are two oil palm companies, specifically SG

5

The terms ecological sustainability, economic sustainability, and social
sustainability are derived from the interview with the respondent from Organization 4.
This respondent specifically defined social sustainability as “justice in the way that locals
can continue using the forest for their livelihoods.”
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Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC, a division of the American-owned Herakles Farms
[Achobang et al., 2013]) in Fabe, and Pamol Plantations Plc (a parastatal company with
majority government ownership [Pamol Plantations Plc, n.d.]) in Mosongiseli. Forest
conservation refers to Cameroon’s system of national parks, reserves, and other
conservation projects. The Korup Project serves as the most important agent of this
policy in the study communities. Community forestry is seen in this study as both a local
institution, in that the community forest is managed locally by its executive committee
and is supposed to represent the interests of the community, but also as an external
institution with the government as its primary agent. This latter sense is due to the fact
that establishing a community forest culminates in an area of land which is formally
recognized by the government, through following an often highly politicized process
directed and mediated largely by state and commercial actors. Both forest conservation
and community forestry are guided by the 1994 Law Establishing Forestry, Wildlife and
Fisheries Regulations (hereafter referred to as the 1994 Law). With these definitions in
mind, the following are my two major research questions.


How is societal integration related to collective agency towards current forest
policies?



What are the implications of local agency for REDD+ implementation in the area?
The theoretical objective of the research is guided by the first of these research

questions. Communities around Korup National Park have been described as extremely
heterogeneous, with a variety of conflicts and power relations existing within them
(Malleson, 2001). Therefore, describing and understanding the range and qualitative
nature of each village’s heterogeneity, or diversity, comprises an important component to
13

begin an appreciation for the communities’ user group characteristics. The component of
heterogeneity examines the relative representation of members of the sample population
within nine categories: gender, age, occupation, level of education, religion, land tenure
status, place of origin, and clan group. The category place of origin includes demographic
groups of “indigenes” (locally-born natives), and “strangers” (those who trace their
identity to another location) (Malleson, 2001).6
In this study, measures of integration include a diversity-based set of three
dimensions: geographical, social, and hierarchical (Figure 1.1). The analysis focuses on
three primary demographic characteristics of age, gender, and place of origin; the
remaining six categories are secondary demographic characteristics that are used to
analyze issues of integration and agency between categories of the primary demographic
groups. I define geographical integration as the degree to which demographic groups in
each category are represented within the same physical area. This may not necessarily
coincide with the degree to which various groups actually interact with one another,
which I define as social integration. Hierarchical integration is defined as the presence
of members of diverse demographic groups within formal decision-making bodies, and
other institutions conferring status. Mbile (2005, pp. 10-11) remarks that while the
societies in the study area have been described as relatively “flat” or “acephalous,” policy
makers and others should not construe this as equivalent to being disordered.

6

In this study I have preferred the term allogene to stranger, because I believe it
carries a more neutral tone. In the course of the fieldwork, however, I frequently used the
term stranger during surveys and interviews. Another term used by respondents was
foreigner. For indigenes, respondents used the terms citizen, and native.
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After some aspects of diversity and integration are known, an examination of
collective agency for the communities and specific demographic groups is possible. The
component of agency is defined here according to three dimensions: attitudes,
understandings, and empowerment. In short, this conceptualization of agency boils down
to answering the following three questions, respectively: What does the community
believe about relevant forest policies, and REDD+ in particular? Why do they have these
beliefs? and How do they see themselves as affected by, and able to affect, the policy?
This loosely follows from the identification by Hewson (2010) of three bases of agency:
rationality, intentionality, and power. In this case, attitudes towards REDD+ policies are
seen as rationality on the part of individuals within demographic groups, and on the part
of the community as a whole, in deciding what is best for themselves. Understandings
inform the question of why community members have certain beliefs regarding REDD+
and current forest policies, based on their knowledge and experiences, thus informing the
intentionality of individuals, demographic groups, and the community. Empowerment is
likely influenced by understandings, and informed by attitudes, but is largely based on
the two key factors of decision-making and forest access, as discussed in further detail
below.

15

Figure 1.1. Concept map for the research.
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Analysis of agency for the three primary demographic categories (gender, age,
and place of origin) provides an additional dimension of integration. A low degree of
variation found in attitudes, understandings, and perceived empowerment between
different social groups implies a high level of integration in the dimension of agency,
whereas large variation between social groups suggests a low level of agency-based
integration. This provides a relationship between heterogeneity, integration, and agency
for a particular community.
The capacity for collective action in interactions with REDD+ is examined as a
specific feature of collective agency. This capacity is measured by past and current
instances in which the community has interacted with policy design and implementation,
to the extent that heterogeneous demographic and social groups (that is, the “multiple
interests and actors” of Agrawal & Gibson, 1999, p.636) have been involved in the locallevel processes of the collective action. Such interactions are characterized according to
two different criteria: the quality of the interaction in terms of approval or rejection, and
the active or passive role taken in response to the policy. This leads to four modes of
policy interaction: active approval, passive approval, active rejection, and passive
rejection.
Understanding community agency and institutions provides a basis for the
analysis of REDD+ implementation in the area, which is the focus of the second research
question. Varying levels of agency between demographic groups can have an impact on
whether their interests are included in policies. This study shows how understanding the
ways in which agency differs between these groups is important for analyzing issues of
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equitability in the REDD+ mechanism. In addition, information provided by villagers on
historical interactions of the communities with the relevant forest policies, and the
insights from interviews with employees of environmental non-profits working in
Cameroon, were used to examine how best to design REDD+ for the local context.
1.5.3. Dimensions of Agency
For this study, the dimension of collective agency referred to as attitudes is
understood as whether community members share favorable or unfavorable opinions
regarding specific environmental policies, and the intentions that community members
have towards these policies, particularly towards interacting with the REDD+ mechanism
(Figure 1.1). Respect for community attitudes is required for consent to forest policies in
accordance with community desires, and therefore free of coercion, as determined by
standards of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) in forest governance (Mahanty &
McDermott, 2013). Opinions were solicited as REDD+ was understood by the
respondents, but typically as explained to them by the research team, due to fact that very
few villagers had prior knowledge about the program. Respondents were asked to
indicate their attitudes towards the REDD+ mechanism of allocating benefits in two
different proposed scenarios: as either direct payments to individuals, or as community
benefits such as improvements in village infrastructure. Villagers who were interviewed
in-depth were asked their opinion about receiving benefits from carbon trading, to the
extent that the research team could communicate this difficult concept. In addition,
respondents were asked if they had any additional hopes or concerns in relation to their
future interactions with forest conservation and REDD+ (that is, their intentions) that
were not anticipated from the prior research.
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The dimension of understandings is relevant to why community members believe
what they do, that is, why they have certain attitudes. In this study, the two key factors of
understandings include knowledge of forest policies, and local experiences with the
forest. The factor of knowledge informs the level of community empowerment in the
context of community forestry (Maryudi et al., 2012) and is an essential component of
multi-scale interactions in the context of REDD+ (Mahanty et al., 2012). It then becomes
important to ascertain the degree to which communities comprehend REDD+, and other
forest policies that affect them. Therefore, survey questions ask how community
members have been informed about REDD+, if at all, and in the interviews villagers were
asked about their knowledge of community forestry, plantation agriculture, and Korup
Project policies. The forest land and its resources are important for local livelihoods, as
well as for meeting the needs of social and cultural values. Because policies affect the
ways that villagers can use the forest, I assume that local experiences of forest usage
shape the attitudes of community members towards forest policies. In light of this,
respondents were asked about their use and valuation of the forest in terms of livelihood
as well as for personal and cultural values.
Finally, I define the dimension of empowerment as the ability to influence
decision-making on how the forest is used, and the level of access to the forest and its
resources. Maryudi et al. (2012) discuss these two characteristics as aspects of
empowerment in community forestry that they see as an essential element in the success
of such institutions. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) describe decision-making, in terms of
institutional rule-making, as part of authority in community management of forest
resources. Regarding the REDD+ mechanism, Mahanty et al. (2012) have found that
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access to decision-making forms part of the power relations determining control of the
production of forest carbon, and that these power relations affect “access to and exclusion
from forest carbon and its underlying material resources” (p. 664). To discover which
groups have access to decision-making, the survey therefore asked respondents if they
have been involved in decision-making recently, and ways the village makes decisions on
how to use the forest.
1.6. Hypotheses
This study offers two hypotheses related to collective action. These hypotheses
follow from the field-interactional perspective that proposes that collective action is
brought about through social interactions between diverse members of a community, due
to the effect of these social interactions in generalizing understandings between
community members. The hypotheses propose that the degree of heterogeneity (in terms
of demographic diversity) itself is not as important a factor in collective action as is
integration of the community along various dimensions. Although integration could be
considered as a certain form of homogeneity, I argue that when heterogeneity is viewed
in terms of diversity, as it is here, its obverse of homogeneity is different from societal
integration.
In this research I focus on certain demographic characteristics, particularly age,
gender, and place of origin, but these could be less important than other conceivable
attributes. For instance, Poteete and Ostrom (2004) discuss the wide variety of forms that
heterogeneity can take, including factors such as differences in distance to a resource.
Collective action can also have a range of meanings, and in this study I consider
collective action to consist of the actual interactions of the community with the agent or
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agents of the forest-related policy7. This is in contrast to collective agency, which I treat
as the characteristics of potential action.
The first hypothesis is that a greater degree of societal integration results in
collective action that embodies more diverse interests and involves the perspectives of
multiple demographic groups. The reasoning for this hypothesis is that different
demographic groups within the community vary in their interests, and increased social
interactions between them contribute to their interests becoming generalized for other
members of the community. An example would be if the interests of both indigenes and
allogenes were met through the attempt to establish a community forest in Mosongiseli.
The second hypothesis is that a greater degree of integration produces stronger
responses of collective action with forest policies, indicated by more active acceptance or
rejection of the policies. The basis for this proposition is that integration, along the
dimensions described in the research framework, is associated with common goals of the
multiple actors, and impetus for collective action as they interact within the institutional
processes responsible for such actions.8 These two hypotheses together constitute modes
of collective action defined in this study (Figure 1.1). The first hypothesis addresses
qualities of acceptance or rejection on the part of the “community,” that is, the entity
consisting of diverse groups and interests. The second examines the nature of active or
passive roles the community plays in response to these policies.

7

For example, community interactions with the Korup Project as an agent of
Cameroon’s forest conservation policy.
8
Alternatively, a more segregated village (especially in the dimensions of
hierarchy or agency) could allow those groups or individuals holding more decisionmaking power to interact directly with external actors to take action quickly, and without
weakening their position through having to accommodate a diversity of competing
interests.
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Chapter 2. Literature review
2.1. Contextual Overview
2.1.1. Cameroon and its History within the Forestry Context
Cameroon is a land of vast natural resources and rich cultural heritage. Stretching
from Afromontain forests and grasslands of the Northwest to the mangrove wetlands and
volcanic Mount Buea on the Atlantic coast, to the deep tropical forests of the South and
East, to the central highlands, and the desert and Sahel regions of the Far North, the
national territory represents virtually every major type of ecosystem on the continent.
Because of this, Cameroon is frequently referred to as “Africa in Miniature” (DeLancey,
1989; Mbaku, 2005). Situated at the northwest end of the Congo Basin of Central Africa
and sharing a border with Nigeria, Cameroon lies at the intersection of Central and West
Africa. Because of this, the country shares many of the blessings and troubles of both
regions. Table 2.1 outlines some relevant population and geographic data for Cameroon.
Of note are the widely divergent estimates of the deforestation rate. The World Bank
estimate is 0.14%, while that of the FAO is closer to 1% per year.
The culture of Cameroon is highly heterogeneous, representing at least 230
languages (DeLancey, 1989), over 250 ethnic groups (Mbaku, 2005), and more than 200
ethnoliguistic groups (Topa, Karsenty, Megevand & Debroux, 2009). Mbaku (2005)
identifies five major regional-cultural groupings: western highlanders, coastal forest
peoples, southern tropical forest peoples, those of the semi-arid Sahel, and the central
highlands Kirdi people. The diversity of ethnic and tribal groups further contributes to the
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characterization of Cameroon as a microcosm of the entire continent. By virtually any
classification of African cultural groupings, a large proportion of these are represented
within the territory of Cameroon (DeLancey, 1989). Since pre-colonial times
Cameroonian ethnic groups and tribes have existed in a dynamic state of change, and this
flux of ethnic geographies and identities continues today (DeLancey, 1989; Geschiere &
Nyamnjoh, 2000). Cultural ties and their associated political, economic, and social
affiliations flow across national borders, as different groups merge, split, and return to
previous identities (DeLancey, 1989).
Table 2.1. Facts and Figures for Cameroon.
Characteristic
Value
Source
Population
16.5 million
Topa et al. (2009)
Population growth rate
2.36 percent per year
Mbaku (2005)
Birth rate
35.66 per 1,000
Mbaku (2005)
Capital
Yaoundé
Mbaku (2005)
Largest City
Douala (1.2 million people)
Mbaku (2005)
Land Area
475,440 square kilometers
Mbaku (2005)
Exports Destinations
Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands
Mbaku (2005)
Import Sources
France, Nigeria, Germany, United
Mbaku (2005)
States
Gross National Product
U.S. $8.5 billion
Mbaku (2005)
(2000)
$570 per capita
Largest Sector by GDP
Agriculture (43.5% in 1999)
Mbaku (2005)
Forest Area
20 million ha (42% of land area)
FAO (2011) a
Average Forest Biomass 135 tons per ha
FAO (2011) a
Deforestation Rate
0.9% (1990-2000)
FAO (2011) a
1.0% (2000-2005)
FAO (2011) a
0.14 % (1990-2005)
Topa et al. (2009)
a
As cited in Somorin, Visseren-Hamakers, Arts, Sonwa, and Tiani (2014).

The major religions practiced in the country include Islam (about 22% of the
population), Christianity (over 50% the country, divided roughly equally between
Protestants and Catholics), and indigenous African religions (around 25%) (DeLancey,
1989; Mbaku, 2005). While the Northern region consists of the greatest concentration of
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Muslims, many Christians live in this area as well (DeLancey, 1989). Differences in
religion between the north and south of the country have been sources of national
conflict, as have differences in language between the western Anglophone region and the
rest of the country, where the major language is French (DeLancey, 1989).
This unusual and arbitrary assemblage of linguistic and cultural groups largely
has its origins in Cameroon’s colonial history, as does the evolution of national forestry
policy up to the present. Since the middle of the 18th century, ethnic groups established
their territorial claims through the “law of status” (Mbatu, 2009). In this system,
communal rights to the land and its resources were enforced through clan associations
and by the “axe right,” whereby common use of forest resources created a territorial
identity for individual clans. In 1884, Germany officially claimed a portion of the
Cameroon River as its colony of Kamerun, and subsequently expanded its territory to
Lake Chad (Mbaku, 2005). Shortly thereafter, German rulers declared all land in the
colony to be “vacant and ownerless,” in an effort to amass as much territory as possible
from the local population (Mbatu, 2009, p. 750). This was followed by large-scale
exploitation of coastal forests for use as plantations, and explorations into the southern
forests to export logs to Europe (Mbatu, 2009).
After Germany’s defeat in World War I, the League of Nations declared
Cameroon a mandate with the western fifth controlled by Britain and the rest of the
territory controlled by France. The areas became UN Trust Territories following World
War II, with the eastern portion remaining with France, and the western portion being
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divided into British Northern Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons.9 During this
period, Cameroon’s forests continued to be heavily exploited as they were under German
occupation, particularly in the French territory. In this colony, forced labor was reinstituted and a head tax was imposed, similar to the draconian labor tax used by the
German colony to force locals into wage labor (Mbaku, 2005). Both the British and
French instituted laws reinforcing dispossession of the land from native populations. The
French declared all land as “vacant land without masters” (Mbatu, 2009, p.752), and the
British centralized ownership and control of the land under ordinances of the Land and
Native Rights Law of 1927 (Mbatu, 2009). While both colonial powers continued
exploitation of natural resources in the territories, the British took a more distant
approach, allowing German plantation owners to regain control of their former holdings,
and instituting a form of “indirect rule” by using proxy rulers such as local chiefs
(Mbaku, 2005; Mbatu, 2009). During this period, the economy of British Cameroons
generally languished (Mbaku, 2005). Meanwhile, the French made aggressive advances
into the southern forest regions, extracting vast amounts of timber for export, and
continued the intensive exploitation of coastal plantations (Mbatu, 2009). Initially the
French wanted a policy of assimilation with their colony, however this later changed
toward a policy of association, through which certain Cameroonian elites were given
privileged positions, status, and training in French culture. The French intended this

9

Different sources give various names for the French and British colonies. The
French colony is known as French Cameroons (Mbaku, 2005), French Cameroon
(DeLancey, 1989); and East Cameroon, or Cameroun (Mbatu, 2009). The literature refers
to the British portion variously as British Cameroons (Mbaku, 2005; DeLancey, 1989), or
West Cameroon (Mbatu, 2009).
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policy to create divisions between the local people and Cameroonian nationals ruling the
colony on behalf of France (Mbaku, 2005; Mbatu, 2009).
In 1960, French Cameroons gained independence, and in 1961, a plebiscite was
held in which British Southern Cameroons voted to join with the newly formed
République du Cameroun, leading to a two-state federation (Mbaku, 2005). The former
territory of British Southern Cameroons would later form the English-speaking
Southwest Region and Northwest Region. The newly formed federation was ruled by
Ahmadou Ahidjo, who led the country until 1982 when he handed power over to the
current president, Paul Biya. In 1972, the English and French speaking sections of the
federation were unified into a single state (Mbaku, 2005). During the 1970s and 1980s,
the government of Cameroon continued the colonial policies of land and resource
centralization, by attempting to claim possession of all land not in private ownership.
Moreover, Mbatu (2009, p. 755) concludes that these policies “targeted remnants of the
law of status regime on land and forests that appeared to have survived the jurisprudence
of the colonial powers.” One means of accomplishing this task was the introduction of
laws requiring a certificate of land occupancy in order to demonstrate ownership of
forestlands. Obtaining the certificate was made so burdensome, however, that few were
able to complete the bureaucratic process necessary. In this way, the government was
able to maximize the extraction of forest resources and increase profits, with the former
Department of Forests under tight control from the presidential administration.
Furthermore, forest resources played an integral role in reinforcing the system of political
patronage. Forests could be divided between supporters in proportion to political
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importance, and were used as a powerful tool to encourage backing among rural
populations (Topa et al., 2009).
Cameroon saw major changes during the 1980s and 1990s. With a sudden drop in
prices for cocoa, coffee, and petroleum on the global market, the country’s economy fell
into a severe depression, from which it has yet to fully recover (Topa et al., 2009). The
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered three structural adjustment
programs to Cameroon that would help the country out of its economic crisis, on
condition that the government adopt various reforms that focused on transforming the
forest sector (Topa et al., 2009). Further changes occurred in 1990, when the government
opened the electoral system to allow for multiparty politics, although the Cameroon
People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) of President Biya continues to dominate the
political system (Mbaku, 2005). The government is still widely regarded as
“authoritarian” (Topa et al., 2009, p.18), and has been accused of a wide range of human
rights abuses (United States Department of State, 2013).
According to the World Bank, the reforms imposed by the structural adjustment
programs were aimed at creating “a more organized, transparent, and sustainable system
that would benefit greater numbers of people and the environment” (Topa et al., 2009, p.
27). Two key provisions of these reforms were intended to benefit local communities and
improve the livelihoods of rural populations. These are embodied in 1994 Law, and
include the concept of community forestry as well as a new forestry taxation system
designed to provide tax benefits derived from logging concessions to the local people
(Djeumo, 2001; Fomété, 2001; Mbatu, 2009; Oyono, 2005; Republic of Cameroon
[RoC], 1994). Unfortunately, the outcomes of these reforms have been mixed, and the
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forestry sector continues to be plagued by problems of inefficiency, mismanagement, and
poor governance (Djeumo, 2001; Fomété, 2001; Mbatu, 2009; Oyono, 2005). Some
authors have argued that the community-minded reforms undertaken at the behest of the
structural adjustment programs have actually continued the forest management practices
of the colonial era (Mbatu, 2009; Yufanyi Movuh, 2012). In spite of such policy failures,
the implementation of community forestry has nonetheless provided recognition of the
tenure rights of rural populations to forest resources, and Cameroon remains a regional
leader in the forest management decentralization process (Djeumo, 2001; Topa et al.,
2009).
2.1.1.1. The 1994 Law. One of the primary accomplishments of the 1994 Law
was the creation of a national forest zoning plan (Figure 2.1). This scheme organized the
national forest estate (that is, all the area in the country designated as forest) into either
the permanent forest estate or the nonpermanent forest estate. Figure 2.2 provides an
illustration of the forest zoning situation in Cameroon. Areas denoted as permanent forest
estate in this figure include protected areas, forest reserves, forest management units,
hunting zones, and council forests. The areas of nonpermanent forest estate include
agricultural zones, sales of standing volume, and community forests. Currently only four
percent of the national forest estate is part of the nonpermanent domain, while the other
96% resides in the permanent forest domain.
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Figure 2.1. Divisions of Cameroon’s National Forest Estate (Egute, 2012, p. 73).
The permanent estate consists of two major divisions: state forests and council
forests. State forests comprise the bulk of the national forest estate, and include land
allocated to commercial logging operations, such as forest management units (FMUs), in
addition to various categories of protected nature areas. For instance, Korup National
Park (KNP) is a state forest within the permanent forest estate.
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Figure 2.2. Distribution of the permanent and nonpermanent forest estates in
Cameroon.
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Council forests share many similarities with community forests, despite their
different placement within the national forest zoning scheme. The nonpermanent forest
estate includes private forests, communal forests, and community forests. Privately
owned forests are those that have been planted by a natural person or corporation that
holds a land title to the forest area (RoC, 1994, Section 39). Communal forests include
lands where local communities hold customary tenure (RoC, 1994, Sections 35-36).
Community forests, described in further detail below, are legal entities established
by one or more rural villages having boundaries demarcated to encompass a maximum
area of 5,000 ha in the nonpermanent forest domain. The 1994 Law, in its
implementation decree of 1995, defines a community forest as “a forest forming part of
the non-permanent forest estate, which is covered by a management agreement between a
village community and the Forestry Administration” (cited in Yufanyi Movuh, 2013,
p.77). This definition stresses the formal institutional relationships between local and
national scales. The associated villages and their inhabitants are allowed usufruct rights
within the community forest, as well as ownership of the resources obtained within the
forest boundaries. The community forest may also engage in collective resource
management and sales of forest products (RoC, 1994, Sections 37-38).
According to the 1994 Law (Section 22), the permanent forest estate must
encompass at least 30% of the total land area of Cameroon, and “reflect the country’s
ecological diversity” (RoC, 1994). Given that current estimates of forest cover in
Cameroon provide figures around 40-42% of the national territory (Alemagi, Minang,
Feudjio, & Duguma, 2014; Somorin et al., 2014; Topa et al., 2009), this leaves little
leeway for either deforestation or the allotment of tenure in the nonpermanent domain.
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Currently permanent forests occupy roughly 96% of the national forest estate, while the
nonpermanent domain covers around 4% (Alemagi et al., 2014). This situation is
illustrated in Figure 2.2, in which outlines correspond to areas gazetted within the
national forest estate as either permanent or non-permanent forest.10
Another important aspect of the 1994 Law is that it established a decentralized
forestry taxation system. The idea was to take some of the yearly taxes charged to
logging companies, according to the area of their concession, and distribute these funds
to local communities. With this intention, the Area Forestry Fees tax (AFF, also referred
to as the RFA, or Royalties for the Forest Area tax) was designed so that 50% of the
revenue is destined for the National Treasury, 40% is allotted to the local village council
in which the logging operation takes place, and the final 10% goes to the specific village
neighboring the operation. A prime ministerial decree in 2010 changed this slightly by
splitting the council portion so that 20% of the fee goes towards the village council, but
the other 20% goes to FEICOM (the Special Equipment and Inter-municipality
Intervention Fund), which is responsible for distributing the proceeds to village councils
nationally (Yufanyi Movuh, 2013). This was in important change because it was found
that a large majority of funds from the AFF were going to certain local councils, mainly
in the East Province, prompting the call for an “inter-council equalization fund” (Fomété,
2001, p. 27).

10

The gazetting process in Cameroon results in a legally ratified border for an

area designated within a particular forest zone (Topa et al., 2009).
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The AFF, and another decentralized forest taxation scheme known as the Felling
Tax (FT), have the potential to deliver significant benefits to local populations,
particularly to local communities that take on an opportunity cost when their forest is
logged for timber. Fomété (2001) estimates that the AFF and FT could provide 1,500
FCFA (about US$2.50) per person annually, compared to the yearly allotment of 500
FCFA (about US$0.83) provided to local councils. Unfortunately, mismanagement of
funds at various levels and from various sectors, including corruption, bribery, elite
capture, and practices by the “informal” sector (essentially, illegal logging operations),
combine to prevent the benefits from reaching local people. In the end only about 20% of
the funds that should arrive from forestry taxes and contribute to local development
projects actually do so (Fomété, 2001). This trend is particularly troubling because
Cameroon is exploring the possibility of using the AFF as a model for the distribution of
REDD+ benefits to local communities (FCPF, 2013a; Fobissie, Alemagi, & Minang,
2014; Freudenthal, et al., 2011).
At this point, some further definitions of community-based forestry are warranted,
as is a brief comparison between community forests and council forests. MacDermott and
Schreckenberg (as cited in Yufanyi Movuh, 2013, p.77) discuss community forestry in
general (that is, not specific to the Cameroonian context) with an emphasis on collective
agency and the functioning of local institutions (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). They define
community forestry as “the exercise by local people of power or influence over decisions
regarding management of forests, including the rules of access and the disposition of
products.” Yufanyi Movuh (2013, p.77) also emphasizes the role of community
institutions, but stresses the importance of local-level processes in both community
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forests and council forests in Cameroon. He defines these institutions as “forestry or
forest practices which directly involve(s) local forest users in the common decision
making processes and implementation of forestry activities.” As a type of forest policy,
community forestry in this thesis refers the formal institutional arrangements recognized
by the national government.
As mentioned previously, community forests are part of the nonpermanent
domain, whereas council forests exist in the permanent forest domain. The most
important difference between the two forest types is that community forests can be
gazetted to a maximum area of 5,000 ha, whereas council forests have no limit to their
size. The area for a council forest depends on the range of villages comprising the
council, and support that the council can gain from local villages to join the council
forest. The community forest associated with the study site village of Mosongiseli, for
instance, has an area of 2,739 ha according to its Provisional Management Convention
(MINFOF, 2013). In contrast, the Mundemba council forest, which is situated just south
and east of KNP, and within kilometers to the other study site village of Fabe, consists of
35,000 ha (World Resources Institute [WRI], 2012). Other differences exist in the
management structure and processes of obtaining the formal title from the government. A
village or villages interested in establishing a community forest are required to submit a
simple management plan (SMP). This is somewhat of a misnomer, as the elaboration of
the SMP is sufficiently complex so as to require the communities to higher experts to
develop one, at a cost of roughly 5,000,000 FCFA (currently about US$10,000). To help
cover these costs, communities are allowed to establish a Provisional Management
Convention (PMC) for two years, during which an area outside of the prospective forest
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can be logged, and the proceeds used in the elaboration of the SMP. Once the SMP is
filed in Yaoundé it remains viable for only 5 years, and must be renewed every 5 years
afterwards. This can be problematic because the step of gaining authorization for the final
management convention (FMC) tends to drag on for so long that community forests have
expired before the FMC was finally signed. Once a community forest does obtain an
FMC, this contract is good for 25 years, and must be reviewed each 25 years
subsequently. In contrast, the FMC for a council forest is renewable every 30 years
(Yufanyi Movuh, 2013). In light of the difficulties in establishing community forests,
council forests maintain a significant advantage because, owing to their larger size and
population, they have a considerably larger pool of financial resources from which to
draw, including better access to loans. Establishing a community forest is nearly
impossible without outside assistance from NGOs or other development agencies. For
this reason, several international agencies have shifted their focus towards aiding the
establishment of council forests. (Yufanyi Movuh, 2013).
2.1.2. Cameroon and REDD+
Cameroon’s structural adjustment programs, known as the Economic Recovery
Credit, Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) II, and SAC III, were approved in 1994,
1996, and 1998, respectively (Topa et al., 2009). The measures contained in these
policies were implemented starting with the 1994 Law. Collaboration on forest sector
reforms has continued between the government of Cameroon and international partners,
including the World Bank, the IMF, donor countries, and international NGOs (Topa et
al., 2009). More recently, Cameroon has become interested in coordinating its forestry
policies with the international community in the sphere of climate change mitigation. The
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policy now referred to as REDD+ includes “Policy approaches and positive incentives on
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in
developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.” (United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2008, cited in Thompson,
Baruah, & Carr, 2011, p. 101).
2.1.2.1. REDD+ Overview. The concept of an international forestry policy
agreement based on compensating tropical developing countries for reducing their
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation was first introduced at the 11th
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of
the Parties (COP) in 2005 (Agrawal, Nepstad, & Chhatre, 2011). The idea was proposed
by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN), of which Cameroon is a member, with
the effort led by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea (Agrawal et al., 2011). The current
definition of REDD+, including the co-benefits of forest conservation and sustainable
forest management (SFM) were introduced at COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia in 2007
(Thompson et al., 2011), at which point the “plus” designation was added to the acronym.
REDD+ is designed as a policy instrument to compensate forested tropical developing
countries and their citizens for opportunity costs associated with avoided deforestation
(Karsenty & Ongolo, 2012). Much of the literature on REDD+, particularly that from
UN-REDD and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), promotes REDD+ for its
potential role in protecting fragile ecosystems with rich biodiversity while providing
economic benefits to poor local and indigenous peoples. REDD+ is also promoted as an
economic development mechanism for developing nations, which now have the
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opportunity to conserve their forests while receiving benefits and helping to mitigate
climate change (Dickson et al., n.d.; FCPF, 2013b; Thompson et al., 2011).
While the discussion around REDD+ frequently refers to its potential to protect
rainforests, preserve biodiversity, and promote economic development, REDD+ is
primarily a climate-change policy (Larson, 2011), hence its negotiation within the
UNFCCC. Its main goal is the sequestration of carbon from the atmosphere, although
“multiple benefits”, such as the protection of biodiversity and improvements in
livelihoods due to carbon payments, may be obtained in the process (Dickson et al., n.d.).
In order to participate in REDD+, countries must quantify the amount of carbon in their
forests, and then have these assessments checked by monitoring, reporting, and
verification (MRV) processes that assure the international community, and in particular
the carbon market sector, that the emissions reductions are real. Thus “results-based
finance” is provided for “results-based actions” (FCPF, 2013a; United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2014, Decision 10/CP.19).
While the potential for “non-market-based approaches to support actions” is
acknowledged (UNFCCC, 2014, Decision 13/CP.19), the primary aim of the readiness
process is to encourage financial investments in emissions reductions. There are three
REDD+ phases described by the UN-REDD Programme. Phase 1 is the readiness phase,
in which countries develop a framework for their REDD+ policies and outline future
directions through documents such as the Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP). In the
investment phase (Phase 2), countries pilot local to sub-regional scale carbon investment
projects. Lastly, the implementation phase (Phase 3) commences with fully functional
MRV systems and the receipt of financial benefits (Fobissie et al., 2014; UN-REDD,
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2012). Thus, investment and involvement in the carbon market is seen as central to the
REDD+ program.
To counter concerns about the potential for REDD+ to recentralize forest
management in countries where local tenure rights have only recently been recognized,
the UNFCCC adopted social safeguards at the COP16 held in Cancun in 2010. These
safeguards acknowledge the rights of traditional and indigenous peoples, and specifically
call on countries to respect the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2011,
Decision 1/CP.16), of which Cameroon is a signatory. The same agreement adopts
ecological safeguards to protect the natural environment.
International negotiations for REDD+ take place yearly at the UNFCCC,
including side events organized by member nations to address issues of particular
concern to their interests. Decisions adopted during the forum frequently call on the
Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to elaborate specific
methods of implementation, such as establishing guidelines for national adaptation plans
(UNFCCC, 2011, Decision 1/CP.16). While negotiation at the UNFCCC sets the
framework for the REDD+ process, the implementation process is carried out primarily
by two associated organizations, UN-REDD, and the FCPF (Thompson et al., 2011). UNREDD is coordinated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). UN-REDD provides capacity and financial assistance to countries for the
development of technical provisions for their REDD+ readiness, such as developing
MRV mechanisms. The FCPF is overseen by the World Bank, and aids countries in
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developing the financial and economic ends of their REDD+ program. Other
organizations that provide capacity and financial assistance include international NGOs,
such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), World Resources Institute (WRI), the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the Center for
International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Moreover, several developed nations provide
assistance through their own international development agencies. Significant
international development partners include the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands. These agencies provide funding
and capacity assistance to REDD+ countries in developing their national programs as
well as funding local scale pilot projects (Thompson et al., 2011).
Despite the potential for considerable benefits to natural ecosystems, local
livelihoods, and climate change mitigation, civil society organizations and academics
have voiced concerns regarding REDD+ development and implementation. Early
critiques centered on carbon issues such as additionality, permanence, and leakage.
Additionality occurs when benefits are paid above those actually earned for a given
amount of carbon sequestered. The issue of permanence revolves around the question of
how long gains will last. Even if a country or local scale project demonstrates negative
carbon losses over a short time period there is the possibility of a reversal of these gains
in future years. Finally, leakage is the potential for conserving forest carbon stocks in one
area, but doing so by displacing the emissions to areas or forests that are not covered by
the REDD+ program or project (Agrawal et al., 2011). A related concern is that highcarbon density forests may be conserved to the detriment of areas with ecologies having
lower carbon densities, such as savanna ecosystems (Miles & Kapos, 2008).
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Some other concerns put forward regarding REDD+ implementation include the
need to address what Agrawal and Angelsen (2009) term the “3Es+”, of Efficiency,
Effectiveness, and Equity. Equity in particular will remain an important issue as REDD+
implementation has already shown numerous instances where tenure, livelihoods, and
local rights concerns were ignored or violated, to the detriment of indigenous peoples and
local forest-dependent communities (Freudenthal et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2011).
2.1.2.2. REDD+ in the Regional Context. Currently, there are 6 countries in
Africa receiving financial assistance from the UN-REDD Programme, although
Cameroon is not included in this list. UN-REDD also includes 17 African “partner
countries,” one of which is Cameroon. In addition to this limited involvement with UNREDD, Cameroon receives UN-REDD assistance through the Support to National
REDD+ Action program (UN-REDD Programme – Africa, n.d.). Cameroon is considered
a “REDD+ country” by the FCPF, along with 17 other African nations (Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility – REDD+ Countries, n.d.). Other multinational affiliations include
CfRN, as well as the Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC) (Alemagi et al.,
2014; Fobissie et al., 2014; Somorin et al., 2014).
Nigeria’s REDD+ demonstration state is the Cross River State that not only
borders the Southwest Region of Cameroon but is also home to Cross River National
Park which lies adjacent to Korup National Park (Astaras, Muhlenberg, & Waltert, 2007).
UN-REDD has praised Nigeria for “applying safeguards and multiple benefits thinking”
(Dickson, et al., n.d., p. 2). Moreover, Nigeria held a workshop in 2011 to review its
REDD+ implementation plans, which put forward the necessity of early identification of
benefits and risks in the REDD+ process (UN-REDD, 2012).
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In terms of REDD+, Cameroon is most closely affiliated with countries of the
Congo Basin. This region is the second largest area of dense tropical rainforest, next to
the Amazon Basin. It covers 227 million ha across 6 countries, and represents 18% of the
world’s tropical forests (Fobissie et al., 2014). Overall, the deforestation rate in the region
is modest, at 0.26%, compared to Cameroon’s deforestation rate that currently hovers
around 1% per year (Somorin et al., 2014). The region is united in its REDD+ policy
efforts through COMIFAC, which has 10 member nations, 9 of which are involved in the
REDD+ process. The four COMIFAC nations that are most advanced in their pursuit of
REDD+ readiness include Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), and the Republic of Congo. Cameroon is the host to COMIFAC, and
therefore has significant leverage within the organization (Fobissie et al., 2014).
However, DRC has taken several initiatives both within COMIFAC and in UNFCCC
negotiations to advance its presence. DRC is Chair of the COMIFAC Climate Working
Group, and from 2009-2012 assumed the position of Chair and President of COMIFAC.
It is important to note that COMIFAC works closely with, and maintains similar positions
to, the CfRN, though lack of technical capacity restrains the organization to a certain
extent in promoting its agenda in the negotiations (Fobissie et al., 2014).
Although Cameroon does not share a border with DRC, the two countries provide
a useful case to compare in terms of the REDD+ readiness process (Fobissie et al., 2014).
Both countries are FCPF “REDD+ countries,” they are signatories to the REDD+ Congo
Declaration, as well as members of both CfRN and COMIFAC (Fobissie et al., 2014).
Both countries still require significant work in promoting participation by civil society,
elaboration of carbon rights, and adoption of a REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism
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(Fobissie et al., 2014). Significant differences also exist between the two nations in the
status of REDD+ readiness, and in the ways that each country has pursued their REDD+
program. DRC is objectively further along in the REDD+ process. Beginning to elaborate
its Emissions Removals Program Idea Note (ER-PIN), DRC is on its way to pass from
the readiness phase into the investment phase. Meanwhile the readiness process in
Cameroon appears to be stalled by comparison. The country’s Readiness Preparation Idea
Note (R-PIN) was submitted to the FCPF in 2008. The R-PP was not submitted until
2012, and finally accepted by the FCPF in 2013. In contrast to DRC, however, Cameroon
enjoys a strong sense of ownership of the document. While the R-PP developed by DRC
was prepared primarily by outside experts, Cameroon’s R-PP was elaborated almost
entirely by Cameroonian nationals. Moreover, the use of Cameroonian experts involved
the agencies that will later implement REDD+. It is hoped that this will help these
ministries and officials to have a high level of knowledge about the plan, improving the
effectiveness of those tasked with carrying out the activities specified in the document
(Fobissie et al., 2014). Another significant difference between the two countries in their
REDD+ development process is that DRC has managed to obtain significantly larger
sources of funding, in large part through their work with international aid agencies during
the elaboration of their R-PP (Fobissie et al., 2014). DRC has also sent several times the
number of delegates to UNFCCC negotiations, relative to Cameroon, and has proactively
organized and participated in side events to discuss and promote their own interests.
Despite this, Cameroon still maintains two advantages regarding the development of their
REDD+ program. For one, Cameroon is a bi-lingual nation, and has the ability to send
English-speaking representatives to the UNFCCC negotiations, whereas DRC has
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difficulty pushing its agenda in the Anglophone-dominated COP meetings (Fobissie et
al., 2014). Secondly, Cameroon was an early pioneer in reforming its forest sector, and
therefore it has decades of experience and years of lessons learned that it can use to build
off of, as well as to share with its neighbors (Somorin et al., 2014).
2.1.2.3. Status of REDD+ in Cameroon. Cameroon has been involved in
REDD+ negotiations within the UNFCCC since the idea was first proposed by the CfRN
in 2005 (Alemagi et al., 2014). The country is currently in Phase 1 (readiness phase), but
has completed several milestones in its readiness process. The country’s R-PP was
accepted by the FCPF in 2013, and was a significant step in Cameroon’s REDD+
process. The R-PP lays out the structure of its national REDD+ organization, identifies
key drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, requests budgets for future readiness
processes, and analyzes future work for Cameroon to address in its REDD+ program
development. It is notable that this document states unequivocally that “for Cameroon,
REDD+ is a development tool” (FCPF, 2013a, p.1). While Cameroon acknowledges
other benefits of forest conservation and the role in mitigating climate change, the
country sees economic development as a primary goal of its REDD+ program.
Cameroon’s progress on significant milestones in REDD+ readiness is summarized in
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 (Alemagi et al., 2014; Fobissie et al., 2014; Somorin et al.,
2014).
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Table 2.2. Initiatives and Institutions in Cameroon’s REDD+ Readiness Process.
Activity

Complete

R-PIN (Readiness Plan Idea Note), 2008



R-PP (Readiness Preparation Proposal), 2013



National REDD+ Steering Committee
Including Technical Secretariat



Procedural Manual for REDD+



Begun Not begun

National REDD+ Strategy
FPIC Guidelines formulated in R-PP



ONACC (National Observatory on Climate
Change) established 2009, not yet operationalized




ER-PIN (Emissions Reduction Programme Idea
Note)

Note: The data are adapted from Alemagi et al. (2014), FCPF (2013a), and Fobissie et al.
(2014).
Table 2.3. Steps in Cameroon’s REDD+ Development Process.
Activity

Status

REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms

Proposed, mostly unelaborated

National REDD+ Regional Consultations

5 held

National REDD+ Sensitization Workshops

35 held

REDD+ pilot projects conducted or ongoing

31

MRV processes and procedures

Largely established

Carbon rights

Mostly unelaborated

Conflict resolution mechanisms

Proposed, mostly unelaborated

Note: The data are adapted from Alemagi et al. (2014) and FCPF (2013a).
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The organizational structure of Cameroon’s REDD+ institutions is described in its
R-PP and diagrammed in Figure 2.3 (FCPF, 2013a, p. 7). In Cameroon’s national
REDD+ organization, the Ministry of the Environment, Nature Protection, and
Sustainable Development (MINEPDED), hosts the UNFCCC REDD+ Focal Point. The
National REDD+ Steering Committee is composed of members from each other
Ministry. In addition, members of the Steering Committee include one representative
from the REDD and Climate Change Platform, one representative of indigenous peoples,
one representative of the private sector, as well as two additional elected representatives
(FCPF, 2013a). The Technical Secretariat is composed of the UNFCCC Focal Point, the
National Coordinator, and a representative of the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife
(MINFOF). The tasks of the Technical Secretariat include coordinating meetings,
preparing documents, as well as monitoring and assessment of activities conducted by the
Steering Committee. Moreover, the Technical Secretariat is composed of four separate
units in charge of, respectively: information, education and communication (IEC);
strategic environmental and social assessment (EESS); reference scenarios and MRV
systems; and implementing REDD+ projects and programs. The Technical Secretariat
also coordinates with departmental technical committees by way of Regional
Coordination Structures. Further duties of the Technical Secretariat are to coordinate with
the National Observatory on Climate Change (ONACC), the Forest Law, Governance
and Trade (FLEGT) unit within MINFOF, as well as with conflict resolution bodies.
(FCPF, 2013a).
Despite certain efforts to engage civil society and hold open participatory
workshops, Cameroon’s REDD+ process still requires significant improvements in terms
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of creating a means of incorporating participatory input (Alemagi et al., 2014). While
Cameroon has formulated guidelines in the R-PP on issues related to free, prior, and
informed consent (FPIC), numerous violations of this principle were reported in the
implementation of REDD+ pilot projects before 2011 (Freudenthal et al., 2011).
Moreover, the benefit distribution mechanisms proposed in the R-PP are based on forest
taxation systems that have been troubled in the past with considerable misuse and
mismanagement of funds. Cameroon has therefore made significant progress in its
REDD+ program development, but a great deal of work remains (Mbatu, 2015) in order
to tackle these and other technical issues as the country moves forwards into the
investment stage.

Figure 2.3. Organization of Cameroon’s REDD+ Institutional Bodies. (FCPF, 2013a,
p.7).
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2.2. Analysis at multiple societal scales
The societal scale extends from fine to coarse levels (Leemans, 2006). In the
present study, individual beliefs, experiences, and actions are considered to coalesce into
those of the various social groups to which the individual belongs. Heterogeneous actors
with varying interests then create formal and informal institutions governed by local-level
processes (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). This forms the basis for local collective agency, as
these actors, institutions, and processes interact with those at the extra-local scale in the
area around the southern portion of Korup National Park, and sub-national scale of the
Korup Project Support Zone.11 According to Cameroon’s R-PP, local communities are
meant to take an active participatory role in REDD+ development and implementation,
with their recommendations being heard by the REDD & Climate Change Platform, to
“ensure that the process is truly bottom-up,” as part of the decentralized governance
structure (FCPF, 2013a, p. 14). The government of Cameroon interacts on the regional
scale with members of COMIFAC, and globally in negotiations at the UNFCCC
Conference of the Parties. In turn, the REDD+ development processes in Cameroon
(Freudenthal et al., 2011; Somorin et al., 2014) and at global institutions such as the UNREDD Program (Thompson et al., 2011) need to consider the livelihoods, participation,
and tenure status of local communities and forest-dependent peoples.
At the same time that national and multinational institutions continue interacting
with one another in developing REDD+ policies, local communities distributed on a
global spatial scale are engaging with, and being affected by, REDD+ pilot projects and

11

In terms of political boundaries, extra-local institutions and government
administrations include those within the Ndian Division and Mundemba Subdivision;
sub-national ones extending to the area of the Southwest Region.
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participation in the carbon market (Mahanty et al., 2012). Similarly, countries across the
world are implementing community-based paradigms of forest management (Maryudi et
al., 2012), a policy that is inherently local in nature. There are also clear interactions
between scales. For instance, Yufanyi Movuh and Schusser (2012) document ways in
which German international development agencies and Cameroon’s Ministry of Forests
and Wildlife (MINFOF) have collaborated since 2004 in the Southwest Region. The goal
of this partnership has ostensibly been to promote the devolution of forest management
from centralized state control to local communities through the implementation of
community forestry. Contrary to this aim, the authors claim that the actual result has been
recentralization, and greater control over forest communities by both state and non-state
actors.
The literature identifies certain threats to and opportunities for local communities.
Impacts on the livelihoods of people who live in these communities are the subject of
debate, and in some cases the very existence of the community itself, at least in its
original form or location, is at stake. Sometimes the difference between risks and
opportunities does not exist as distinguishable or separate policies, as in the case of
community forestry itself. Some authors describe community forestry as an effective
management system for increasing local stocks of forest carbon (Phelps et al., 2010;
Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Skutsch & McCall, 2011). This suggests that community
forests could also provide an equitable source of monetary benefits to local communities,
provided REDD+ institutions are designed to compensate for the relatively small
amounts of carbon stored (Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009; Blom et al., 2010; Skutsch &
McCall, 2011). Meanwhile, others suggest the practice, particularly as it exists in
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Cameroon, has led to disenfranchisement and a loss of power to these same peoples
(Oyono, 2005; Yufanyi Movuh, 2012). Both community forestry and REDD+ have the
potential to affect local livelihoods and ways of life when they come into contact with the
area, resources, or social functioning of a local community. These risks and opportunities
are therefore each accompanied by a potential occasion for the expression of collective
agency as the community choses to accept or reject the given policy and pursue its wishes
through collective action.
2.2.1. Community forestry and REDD+
Community forestry has been theorized to work in a complimentary manner with
REDD+ initiatives, because in many cases the acceptance of conservation measures on
the part of people living in and around the site is necessary for success. Indeed, the origin
of community forestry lies in the failure of top-down national forestry practices that did
not involve local people in their establishment, decision-making, or management (Mbatu,
2009; Buchenrieder & Balgah, 2013). Such policies have been shown to cause resentment
among local populations, which is counterproductive to conservation goals (Agrawal &
Angelsen, 2009; Larson, 2011; Phelps et al., 2010). Agrawal and Angelsen (2009)
describe ways in which REDD+ could make use of community forestry to achieve its
goals of carbon sequestration through effective design of community forest initiatives, as
well as appropriate community forest site selection. They identify four major categories
associated with the success of community forests, and elaborate on specific elements that
can affect outcomes. These categories include factors related to the resource system, the
user group, institutional arrangements, and contextual characteristics such as the stability
of demographic, market, and political conditions. The authors further recommend that
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when locations or communities having unfavorable characteristics for community forest
initiatives are selected, care must be taken to address potential difficulties, and resources
should be allocated to provide assistance in monitoring and enforcement capacity.
Skutsch and McCall (2011) maintain that community forestry is more appropriate
for sites experiencing forest degradation due to unsustainable local use of forest
resources, as opposed to intensive degradation by commercial activities, or complete
deforestation. The authors defend the compatibility of REDD+ and community forestry.
In their study of the Kyoto: Think Global, Act Local Programme, which looked at 30
community forests in 8 countries, community forestry was associated with enhancements
in forest biomass, although exceptions were observed where illegal exploitation of the
forest had occurred. Moreover, community forestry potentially links the climate change
measures of both mitigation and adaptation, through the participation of local people
(Awono, Somorin, Eba’a Atyi, & Levang, 2014; Skutsch & McCall, 2011).
Despite these potential synergies, concerns have been raised regarding the future
effects of REDD+ on the current trend of forest management decentralization. Phelps et
al. (2010) claim that decentralized forest management has brought about improvements
such as increasing rights and livelihood benefits, protecting biodiversity, and increasing
carbon sequestration, while reducing forest management costs. Meanwhile,
recentralization could increase costs, generate counter-productive resentment among
local stakeholders, and is limited to the boundaries of protected areas. Moreover, carbon
commodification could create incentives for recentralization in which unreasonable
requirements are placed on communities, or that result in evictions from carbon rich
areas, in order to prevent loss of carbon stocks that now would provide income to the
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state or actors in the private sector. Phelps et al. (2010) maintain that certain technical
factors may promote recentralization. For instance, issues of leakage and permanence, as
well as monitoring, reporting, and verification, are better handled on the national scale.
Economic factors could also create pressures for recentralization. The costs of entering
the carbon market directly could be too great for small community forest projects,
whereas centralized institutions benefit from economies of scale. On the other hand, it
should be noted that Skutsch and McCall (2011) contend that the receipt of financial
benefits from REDD+ could provide an incentive to further promote decentralized
community forest management if it is effective in enhancing carbon stocks.
Similar concerns regarding centralized policies that have negatively affected local
populations in the past are discussed by Larson (2011). This study looked at recent tenure
reforms at sites across 10 countries, including Cameroon, and analyzed recurring issues
in granting statutory forms of tenure, implementation of reforms, and obtaining access to
benefits. For instance, in Cameroon, communities seeking to establish a community
forest can face costs of up to US$55,000 just to create a simple management plan,
followed by restrictions on impacts from forest usage, whereas private logging
concessions do not require a management plan and are less regulated (Larson, 2011).
Regarding the implementation of community forestry in Cameroon, Djeumo
(2001) discusses problems that surfaced after implementation of the 1994 Law, which
ostensibly sought to bring communities into the forest management process. Many issues
were encountered, particularly related to a lack of information available to communities,
capacity and funding problems, as well as regular conflicts with logging interests. The
distribution of financial benefits that will result from REDD+ projects could mirror the
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current distribution of decentralized forest taxes that was introduced in the 1994 Law.
Therefore, this situation must be studied in order to understand potential obstacles to the
responsible and equitable distribution of benefits. Fomété (2001) reported that the
decentralized forestry taxation system at the time resulted in dissolution of local relations
and traditional power structures, as well as conflicts over ownership and logging rights. A
fundamental issue was a persistent lack of transparency that allowed corruption and
mismanagement of funds, preventing much of the revenue from ever reaching the
intended communities. To address these issues, Fomété makes several recommendations,
including an increased role for NGOs, a national assessment of the taxation system, and
an inter-council equalization fund. These same recommendations may prove useful in
designing funding distribution mechanisms for REDD+ payments.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
3.1 Study Site
The location for this study focuses on two villages around the southern end of
Korup National Park, Southwest Region, Cameroon. Understanding the characteristics of
this place and the people who live there is important to understand what makes this such
an appropriate location to study the interrelationships between collective identities,
collective agency, and collective action with respect to environmental policies, such as
REDD+. The area has had a rich but troubled history stemming from both current and
colonial area policies of plantation agriculture. It has also been subject to attempts,
widely regarded as unsuccessful, that sought to impose Western ideas of conservation on
populations that are in many regards unwilling and unable to make the drastic livelihood
changes required to satisfy these demands. The societies living in the area have been
characterized as simultaneously having non-hierarchical decision-making institutions
(Mbile et al., 2005), but also as being quite heterogeneous, with conflicts over power and
resources existing between different demographic groups, depending in large part on the
characteristics and location of the village (Malleson, 2001).
3.1.1. Southwest Region
The Southwest Region of Cameroon is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and
Nigeria to the west, and to the east by the Littoral, West, and Northwest Regions. The
region falls under the coastal agro-ecological zone characterized by Cameroon’s R-PP as
having monomodal rainfall averaging between 2,500 to 4,000 mm per year (FCPF,
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2013a). Precipitation peaks from June through September, while there is a distinct dry
period from December to February. The agro-ecological zone covers 45,658 km2 along
the coastal part of the country. Daily temperatures average 25°C, with little variation
throughout the year (Molua, 2002). The Southwest Region occupies approximately
25,000 km2 (WRI, 2012), with soil that varies from marshy along the coast to volcanic
rocky soils in the center of the region (FCPF, 2013a).
Large-scale commercial agriculture has played an important part in the economy
of the region since the German colonial occupation. During German rule, and continuing
under French and British control, massive migrations took place within Cameroon in
order to find work in the plantations of the Southwest, due to strongly coercive measures
employed by the colonial governments (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000). Food production
continues to be the most significant portion of the regional economy, with approximately
80% of the population involved in farming or plantation agriculture (Molua, 2002). In
addition to the vast complex of plantations around Mt. Buea, the Ndian Division of the
Southwest Region is home to the Pamol oil palm plantation. In addition, the company
Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC), a subsidiary of the American-owned
Herakles Farms, is in negotiations with the national government to establish a 20,000 ha
oil palm plantation to the immediate south and east of KNP (Achobang, et al., 2013).
These plantation camps continue to draw agricultural workers from other parts of the
country, especially from the Northwest Region (Malleson, 2001). The ruling government
has meanwhile capitalized on the migration of laborers to promote social divisions and
sew discord among citizens in the Southwest Region, and in the country as a whole, for
political gain (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000).
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A wide variety of crops are grown in the region, on commercial plantations as
well as for subsistence. These include various tubers, cereals, legumes, and fruit trees, in
addition to important commercial crops such as bananas, rubber, palm oil, sugar cane,
cacao, coffee, and plantains (FCPF, 2013a; Molua, 2002). In addition, goats and sheep
are commonly raised as livestock in the region (Molua, 2002). The population receives
on average 1980 Calories per day, but climate change is threatening food security largely
due to shorter but more intense periods of precipitation. This is having negative effects on
soil characteristics, such as compaction and erosion, as well as making it more difficult
for farmers to anticipate the weather in order to adapt their farming practices (Molua,
2002).
According to Cameroon’s National Institute of Statistics (NIS) (2014), the total
population of the Southwest Region was 1,316,000 in 2005, and projected to rise to
1,534,000 in 2015. In 2005 over half the population was rural, at 757,000 people. The
average and median age was, respectively, 22.3 and 19 years old. The NIS counts 27
cities within the Southwest Region. Mbaku (2005, p. 2) classifies the inhabitants of this
region as “coastal tropical forest people” who comprise a number of ethnic groups.
English is the primary language in the Southwest, where a dialect known as Pidgin
English, or Kamtok, is common (Ngefac, 2011).
In the Southwest Region, at least eight community forests exist or are in the
application process, and two council forests are in the later stages of establishment
(Yufanyi Movuh, 2013). The R-PP identifies several causes of deforestation and
degradation in the region’s agro-ecological zone, with the most significant being
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industrial agriculture, cash crop farming, and infrastructural development (FCPF, 2013a,
p. 41).
3.1.2. Korup National Park and Surrounding Area
The highest point in KNP is Mt. Yuhan, at 1079 m, however most of the area lies
between 30 and 500 m above sea level, with some remote areas having steep-sided
valleys (Malleson, 2001; Mbile et al., 2005). The park itself, sharing a border with
Nigeria to the west, occupies an area of 1,250 km2 and is located between the coordinates
of 4°54’N to 5°28’N and 8°42’E to 9°16’E (Astaras et al., 2007; Mbile et al., 2005). The
monomodal climate is similar to the rest of the region, though having higher annual
precipitation averaging over 5,000 mm (Astaras et al., 2007; Mbile et al., 2005). Average
annual temperatures in the southern portion range between 24-30°C, with an annual mean
maximum of 30.6°C (Astaras et al., 2007; Moyersoen, Fitter, & Alexander, 1998).
Although the soils are generally sandy and low in organic content, the area enjoys a high
degree of endemism and rich biodiversity (Moyersoen, et al., 1998; Mbile et al., 2005),
likely due in part to its location in the middle of the Guinea Congolean refugium of the
last ice age (Mbile et al., 2005). The ecology is composed of dense moist tropical forest
of the Atlantic Biafran coastal region (Astaras et al., 2007).
The area currently designated as Korup National Park has a complex history. As
its protected status evolved through the years, changes in tenure rights have accompanied
changes in the interactions between local communities and park authorities. KNP began
as a forest reserve in 1937, during which time three legally-recognized enclaves were
allotted to the villages of Bera, Esukutan, and Bakumba within the reserve. The village of
Bakumba has since become abandoned, however the village of Erat was later provided
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the same status as a legal enclave. With a 1986 presidential decree, the reserve became a
national park. This decree extended the borders of the park to include two additional
villages, Ikenge and Bareka Batanga (Mbile et al., 2005). The park is surrounded by a
4700 km2 Support Zone (Schmidt-Soltau, 2004) and a 3km Peripheral Zone (Egute,
2012). The Korup Project began by attempting to restrict virtually all livelihood activities
within the park, along with the intention to resettle park inhabitants to locations within
the support zone (Diaw & Tiani, 2010; Mbile et al., 2005). This situation was formalized
in the management plan of 1989, known as the Master Plan, and further solidified by
parts of the 1994 Law, despite the intention of the law as a legal mechanism to promote
decentralization processes in the forest sector (Diaw & Tiani, 2010). However, by the
early to mid-1990s, following expensive, unsuccessful, and conflict-ridden resettlement
efforts, the strict policy of removing the park’s inhabitants gave way to implicit tolerance
of those populations and their activities, despite their continued illegal status. This has
itself resulted in conflicts between park management and local inhabitants, as the laws are
arbitrarily enforced, creating confusion and distrust on the part of both the local people
and park management (Diaw & Tiani, 2010).
Currently five villages, with a total population of 1,500 people, exist within the
borders of KNP. The 3 km Peripheral Zone encompasses 23 villages having a population
of 2,700 individuals (Egute, 2012). It is worth noting that, according to Mbile et al.
(2005, p. 2) “very little human disturbance has occurred in the past,” despite the presence
of these populations within and immediately surrounding the park. The major indigenous
ethnicity around the southern portion of KNP is the Oroko ethnic group, a classification
that Mbile et al. (2005, p.6) characterizes as “a somewhat artificially created entity
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grouping a wide range of culturally similar groups.” Below this designation exists
identities strongly affiliated with the individual’s particular Oroko clan and the specific
village community (Mbile et al., 2005).
The communities in and around the southern portion of KNP are characterized
into four major types according to Malleson (2001). These are remote settlements, creek
settlements, roadside settlements, and plantation camps. Remote settlements are further
characterized as being either high forest edge settlements of abandoned forest frontier.
The former of these remote settlements contain rich stocks of non-timber forest products
(NTFPs), but the latter are characterized by areas that have recently been exploited, and
valuable timber products have been removed, often along with important NTFPs. This
has left the abandoned forest frontier settlements consisting of primarily secondary
forests low in natural resources useful for subsistence or trade (Malleson, 2001). Some
prominent livelihood activities that do take place within the KNP area include the local
exploitation of NTFPs, especially the collection of bush mango and njansanga, as well as
bushmeat hunting. In roadside settlements, commercial crop farming is becoming
increasingly prevalent, and is the major economic activity within the plantation camps. In
addition, selective logging of the most valuable timber products occurs, often under the
direction of wealthy elites or “strangers” (Malleson, 2001).
Malleson (2001) comments that villages in this area are characterized by a
striking degree of heterogeneity. In particular, major socio-economic differences and
power relationships exist between indigenes on the one hand and strangers on the other.
Those who are regarded as strangers, or allogenes (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000), have
in many cases lived in their current village for generations. In fact, throughout the

58

Southwest Region in particular, many now known as strangers are the descendants of
those who migrated to plantation labor camps during the German, and later the British,
colonial periods (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000). But even now, there are influxes and
out-migrations, particularly among youths looking for work elsewhere, often returning to
their original village after finding few opportunities in the cities. Aside from the indigene
/ allogene split there also exist socio-economic and political divisions within these
communities. One of these divisions involves elders and wealthy elites on the one hand,
and generally disenfranchised youths and strangers on the other. Despite these
differences, Mbile et al. (2005, p. 6) claim, at least for the Batanga clan, which also falls
under the Okoro grouping, that it, “like most forest societies, does not have a hierarchical
decision-making structure but a complex one built on egalitarian principles, checks and
balances.”
3.1.3. Study Villages
The two villages that comprise the focus of this study are Mosongiseli and Fabe
(Figure 3.1). Official information about community forests is difficult to obtain, however,
due in part to a lack of institutional capacity. Moreover, according to Yufanyi Movuh
(2012, p. 73), “There are conflicting figures concerning number and areas of CFs already
approved and this is at times political.” Even information from the World Resources
Institute, arguably the most comprehensive source of information regarding the status and
boundaries of forest zoning for Cameroon, is therefore not always accurate, and the
actual situation requires confirmation by local residents and observations in the field.
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Figure 3.1. Approximate locations of the study site villages Fabe and Mosongiseli.

Fabe Village is situated to the northeast of Mundemba. This community mainly
consists of individuals from the Bima clan, and the major occupation is farming.
According to Malleson’s (2001) typology, Fabe would probably fall within the roadside
settlement classification. The community has generally good relations with KNP and the
Korup Project. The major source of conflict has been the Herakles Farms oil palm
plantation, which established a palm nursery on the village’s lands without a consensus of
the community. There also appears to be a community forest in the early planning stages,
but few members of the community are aware of it.
Mosongiseli Village lies to the southwest of Mundemba, just outside the most
southern end of KNP, and has a majority belonging to the Balondo Badiko clan.
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Mosongiseli could be considered a creek settlement, enjoying rich natural resources
(Yufanyi Movuh, 2013, p. 80). The categorization of roadside settlement also applies to
the village, which now even shares some characteristics of plantation camps. A parastatal
oil palm company known as Pamol began establishing a plantation in the village less than
a year before we undertook fieldwork in the village. The community is also in the process
of trying to establish a community forest, consisting of 2,739 ha (MINFOF, 2013) to the
east of the village (Figure 3.2). Recently, the community wrote a letter to the Korup
Project over the park’s new stricter enforcement of the 3 km Peripheral Zone, which
community members say interferes with farming and other livelihood activities.

Figure 3.2. Location of Mosongiseli’s community forest according to its Provisional
Management Convention. The PMC gives the area as 2,739 ha.
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3.2. Field Research Methods
The primary research methods for this study included a survey consisting of
closed- and open-ended questions, interviews, and other ethnographic methods such as
mapping and participant observation. With the exception of the survey, which included a
quantitative coding component, these methods emphasize the collection of qualitative
data. The primary means of triangulation within the study was the use of several different
methods for data collection (Figure 3.3). Triangulation provides one mechanism to
address validity threats, and involves the use of “multiple lines of action” (Berg & Lune,
2012, p. 6), in which several approaches to the study are used simultaneously in order to
fill gaps in knowledge left by one approach while providing any counter-examples to take
into consideration that could invalidate the theories or claims of the study.

Figure 3.3. Illustration of triangulation using multiple qualitative data gathering
methods.
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While quantitative data can be useful to incorporate into anthropological studies
(Maxwell, 2013), qualitative data have the ability to increase the depth of understanding
necessary in order to ground the theories and claims of the research in the complex
situations and subjective experiences of the study subjects (Berg & Lune, 2012; DeWalt
& DeWalt, 2011; Maxwell, 2013). Part of the strength of such methods relies on the
ability to understand both the explicit and tacit characteristics of the human subjects and
the society in which they live. While data pertaining to certain explicit aspects, in other
words those qualities that are clearly observable, may be collected using both quantitative
and qualitative methods, data about the tacit aspects can only be gained through
qualitative fieldwork. Tacit features include those that are understood through inference,
intuition, and subjective experience (DeWalt, 2011; Maxwell, 2013). Understanding the
tacit qualities of a society can lead to better interpretation of the data, as well as the
development of theories and claims that reflect a more accurate picture of the actual
situation than that presented only by explicit data (DeWalt, 2011; Maxwell, 2013).
Furthermore, an understanding of the tacit provides one means of achieving an emic
approach to a study, in which the issue under investigation is viewed from the perspective
of the members of the society itself. This contrasts with the etic approach, where the
problem is framed according to the perspective of the researcher (DeWalt, 2011).
Analyzing the situation from both perspectives can provide a fuller understanding of the
issues (DeWalt, 2011), and create what Denzin refers to as “theory triangulation” – the
use of multiple perspectives in the research design (as cited in Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 6).
One benefit of using qualitative methods in this study lies in the ability to obtain
comprehensive data about the issues under investigation and members of the society from
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several different perspectives. The collection of such “rich data” involves analyzing the
entire text of interviews and taking thorough notes on observations (Maxwell, 2013). This
allows validity threats to be tested because the presence of multiple instances of the same
account from different respondents, or the repeated observation of a phenomenon, can
provide checks on these accounts and on researcher bias. Moreover, a detailed description
of the situation provides data to ground the theory in the particular case study (Maxwell,
2013).
Qualitative methods are also well suited for understanding situations, as in the
present study, for which the cases are complex and probability sampling is not viable.
While quantitative research seeks to define statistical correlations between different
variables, qualitative methods allow an understanding of the connections between people,
events, settings, and phenomena in the given context. Maxwell (2013) argues that, “the
generalizability of qualitative studies is usually based not on explicit sampling of some
defined population to which the results can be extended, but on the development of a
theory of the processes operating in the case studied, one that may well operate in other
cases, but that may produce different outcomes in different circumstances” (p. 138,
emphasis in original). Assuming the validity of this argument, processes underlying the
connections uncovered in my study could allow for further generalization to other
community settings as well as future interactions with environmental policies. As Haynes
(1991, p. 5) has noted, “if we are to leave behind the notion that change is the inexorable
result of anonymous historical forces and view [it] instead as a product of specific men
and women in specific historical environments, constantly construing the meanings of
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their social actions as they seek power and struggle for justice, then it is only through
studies concentrating on particular places or groups that we can capture these processes.”
3.2.1. Field Research Schedule
The timeline for the fieldwork (Table 3.1) began with my arrival on August 8,
2015, in Douala, the largest city in Cameroon, and the closest city to the study site with
an international airport. From here I travelled to Mundemba, a small town towards the
southern end of Korup National Park (KNP). The next day I traveled northeast to Fabe
Village, where I spent four days (August 10 – August 13) conducting fieldwork.
Following a brief return to Mundemba to resupply, I traveled southwest to Mosongiseli
Village and spent an additional four days there (August 15 – August 18) on fieldwork.
Three people were involved in collecting data in Fabe and Mosongiseli. These included
my thesis advisor, Dr. Richard Mbatu, Chief Ngwese Adolf Ekokola of Esukutan Village,
and myself. Dr. Mbatu and Chief Ngwese helped in both the selection of respondents and
in translating responses into standard English when necessary. Another four days were
spent in Yaoundé interviewing NGO workers from August 24 – August 27.
In Fabe there were 45 survey respondents, and four in-depth interviews were
conducted with villagers (Table 3.2). Thirty-six surveys were administered in
Mosongiseli, along with three in-depth interviews. Fieldwork in Yaoundé consisted of
interviews with four employees of NGOs involved in environmental governance who
were knowledgeable about one or both issues of (1) forest policies in the Southwest
Region and (2) the REDD+ process in Cameroon.
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Table 3.1. Field Research Schedule.
Location
10

11

12

13

14

15

16

August, 2015
17 18 19 20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Fabe
Mosongiseli
Yaoundé

Table 3.2. Summary of data collected.
Site
Surveys
Semistandardized Participant
interviews
observation
45
4
villagers
Korup Project
Fabe
meeting
36
3 villagers
Apostolic
Mosongiseli
church service
N/A
4 NGO workers
N/A
Yaoundé

Field notes and
unstandardized interviews


N/A
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3.2.2. Survey Methods
The survey sampling was a combination of purposive and convenience sampling,
using the snowball technique of acquiring new respondents from the suggestions of
previously sampled individuals (Berg & Lune, 2012; Maxwell, 2013). Responses were
sought, in particular, from women, youth, and allogenes in order to obtain the views of
villagers who could be more reluctant to share their views, as was the case with youth in
Fabe, some allogenes in Mosongiseli, and some women in both villages. These segments
of the population were also anticipated to be less involved in traditional power structures
(Malleson, 2001), while their views have been emphasized as important for participation
in REDD+ (Fobissie, Essomba, Sonne, Ndobe, & Retana, 2012). Much of the sampling
process involved simply greeting people in their homes while walking through each
village as systematically as possible.
Selecting respondents generally began up-village (the side of each village closer
to the road), and proceeded generally towards the down-village side (Figures 3.4 and
3.5). In Fabe this meant we started in Becheke quarter, and moved down village towards
Makpara, however on the first day one survey was administered at the Council House in
Becheke and then several surveys were administered in Green City. The next two days
we walked from Becheke to Makpara, and finally returned to the entrance of the village
where we surveyed respondents in what they called Njoh and GRA quarters along the
main road.
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100 m
Figure 3.4. Diagram of Fabe Village.
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100 m

Figure 3.5. Diagram of Mosongiseli Village.

The first day of fieldwork in Mosongiseli, we met the Chief Councilor, who
granted us an interview. We then began administering surveys in the Church Quarter,
followed by some houses in the School Yard area. In order to get an idea of the village
layout, we then walked to the other end of the village, where the street ends, becoming a
stream. We then picked up in this quarter, called Mbenge, and worked our way back
towards the road. The next day we began in Becheke and continued until we reached the
intersection with Genie Street. Here we sampled respondents by first walking down the
connecting east-west portion, then the few houses southwards on the north-south stretch.
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Most of the houses on the north-south part of Genie Street were close to the intersection.
There was also a multi-unit housing bloc across from these houses where several
allogenes were staying, but they refused to participate in our research without approval of
the Pamol head office. From there we picked back up in Mbenge, south of the
intersection with Genie Street, and continued until we reached where we had left off
before.
On several occasions a node-based procedure was used to gather multiple
respondents together at once. This method was employed with three main variants. At
times, each of the three members of the research team were assigned to record the
responses of one respondent in a small group, for instance inside a person’s home. I read
the question, which was subsequently translated into Pidgin by Dr. Mbatu, or if the
respondent spoke only a local dialect the translation was provided by Chief Ekokola.
Each respondent heard my original survey question, the translation, and then responses
and clarifying questions were generally audible to all respondents. The script for
obtaining verbal informed consent was read to the respondents and translated into the
local language or dialect before the survey was administered, so all respondents
understood that they had the option not to respond or to respond only to the extent that
they felt comfortable. At other times a second, more private method was used, in which
each member of the research team was assigned to administer the survey individually to
one villager. This was possible mainly when one or more of the respondents in a given
location (such as a family’s home) could understand standard English, which allowed me
administer the survey to that person separately, without the need for continual translation
and clarification. Meanwhile the other two members of the team could administer the
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survey to separate individual respondents. On other occasions, it was assessed that the
respondents were literate enough to write their own responses to the survey. These
respondents wrote their answers on the paper survey as I read each question, which was
then clarified and translated into concepts more appropriate to the local context, as
needed. For instance, this third approach was taken in Mosongiseli while obtaining
responses from the men at the youth association meeting.
The survey instrument contained 30 questions including both open and closedended questions (Appendix A). The first 11 were demographics questions. The intention
of these questions was to gain information about the basic demographic makeup of the
village and the survey sample (for instance, gender and age), characteristics related to the
respondents’ social identity (religion, place of origin, clan group), and characteristics
more directly related to agency (such as occupation, level of education, land tenure status,
and languages spoken; see Figure 1.1). Questions 12-21 were related to the respondent’s
agency in terms of understandings of the forest (how forest land and resources are used
culturally and for respondents’ livelihoods), and perceived empowerment (in terms of
access to decision-making). Questions 22-29 ask about the respondent’s current
knowledge of REDD+, and their attitudes towards the program. These questions
specifically sought to understand respondents’ opinions about how REDD+ might affect
the community and the forest, and their intentions towards two proposed mechanisms of
REDD+ benefit distribution. A final question asked about the respondents’ experiences
with forest conservation. This open-ended question allowed them to voice any other
opinions about REDD+, community forestry, or the Korup Project, the latter of which
was expected to have been an important issue to many villagers.
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3.2.3. Interview Methods
Interviews were conducted with villagers who were encountered during the
survey sampling process. These respondents were chosen more selectively, however, in
an effort to obtain responses from individuals who would be highly knowledgeable about
the village and its governance, or who were from potentially disadvantaged social groups
(i.e., women, youth, and allogenes). Ideally the interview respondents shared both
characteristics, that is, a high degree of knowledge about the village in addition to being a
woman, youth, or allogene. Interviews from allogenes (such as a retired teacher in Fabe),
and the interview of a woman in Mosongiseli (whose interview was taken over by her
husband when he entered the home towards the end of the questions about village
characteristics) did allow a broader understanding of the socio-cultural characteristics of
the communities. Of note, this split interview in Mosongiseli was very fruitful because
the woman’s husband was a member of the community forest executive committee, so he
was extremely knowledgeable about this governance institution, while she did not know
much about the community forest but was able to give her perspective as a woman on the
roles of various segments of the community. While valuable responses were obtained for
both major sections of this particular interview, this example illustrates the often
unstructured nature of the survey and interview processes, as well as a rather dramatic
example of the role of some women in the village communities. Some characteristics of
villager interview respondents are given in Table 3.3.

72

Table 3.3. Some characteristics of villager interview respondents.
Fabe
Respondent 1
 55-year-old man
 Farmer
 Was very active in Herakles issue

Mosongiseli
Respondent 5
 55-year-old man
 Farmer
 Chief councilor and MBABCIG
member

Respondent 2
 49-year-old man
 Farmer
 Currently on village council

Respondent 6
 28-year-old woman
 Tailor
 Allogene

Respondent 3
 55-year-old man
 Teacher (retired)
 Allogene

Respondent 7
 Man (age unknown)
 Farmer
 Member of MBABCIG

Respondent 4
 32-year-old man
 Farmer
 Involved in youth association

Respondent 8
 35-year-old man
 Farmer
 Member of MBABCIG

The in-depth interviews in Fabe lasted between 30 minutes and 1 hour. Two of
the interviews in Mosongiseli had a duration of about 90 minutes, although there was no
recording for the third interview, requiring reliance on interview notes. The interviews
were designed to achieve two main objectives. First, they were intended to obtain more
detailed and personal information about topics covered in the survey, by providing a
longer time-frame and the opportunity for probing and follow-up questions. Several of
the interviews were administered to members of the community who were better
informed about forest policy interactions, for instance the first respondent in Fabe was
very knowledgeable about the community’s interaction with SGSOC, and in Mosongiseli
three respondents were quite well-informed about community forestry in that village.
This was particularly valuable because the surveys did not indicate a high degree of
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knowledge about community forestry among most respondents in either Mosongiseli or
Fabe. The second objective of the in-depth interviews was to have the opportunity to ask
questions that may have been too sensitive to ask every villager. The interviews were
divided into four sections, beginning with the demographics of the respondent. This was
followed by the respondent’s assessment of the community, its culture, as well as formal
and informal governance structures. The third section asked about the respondent’s
knowledge of current and prior interactions of the community with forest policies,
particularly industrial agriculture, community forestry, the Korup Project, and the AFF
tax on logging. The fourth section allowed for a more detailed examination of villagers’
views on REDD+.
The interviews with NGO workers in Yaoundé lasted between about 45 minutes
and 90 minutes. The interview guide inquired about four main topics, and sought to
obtain information from the respondents’ first-hand experiences working in the field and
interacting with village community members, industries, and government agencies,
especially in the Southwest Region. These interviews were intended to obtain the
perspective of experts on the policies shaping the situation on the ground, and having a
larger-scale perspective compared to individual villagers. Interviews with these
respondents also provided another data set in order to further triangulate the information
collected directly from community members. The first topic was whether the respondent
or their organization had worked in the Korup area. This set of questions was designed to
inquire into their first-hand knowledge of community interactions with the Korup Project,
in particular. Another section asked about their understanding of the SGSOC/Herakles
Farms issue, and also allowed for further discussion about other industrial agriculture
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projects, such as Pamol. A third set of questions examined the organization’s
involvement in community forestry. Finally, respondents were asked about their
understanding of REDD+, how their organization is involved in the process, and how the
program is being developed and implemented in Cameroon. Table 3.4 provides
information on the organizations that respondents worked for, which are being kept
anonymous to honor respondent concerns.
Table 3.4. Summary of NGOs interviewed.
Organization 1
The organization works as a facilitator for
partnerships between smallholders and
agro-industry. Activities are mainly
focused in the South and East regions, but
has had some recent involvement in the
Southwest.
Organization 3
An international conservation NGO. The
organization works to establish a
collaborative framework between various
stakeholders and has been heavily
involved in Cameroon’s REDD+ process.

Organization 2
Technically not an NGO but a state
development bank and bilateral donor.
The organization is responsible for
funding its technical branch and NGOs
involved in community forestry, as well
as conservation and development projects.
Organization 4
A Cameroonian NGO working on a range
of issues concerning forests of the Congo
Basin.

3.2.4. Ethnographic Methods
There were two opportunities for participant observation, other than routine
observations that I jotted in my fieldnotes during the course of the research in Fabe and
Mosongiseli. The first occasion occurred on the last day in Fabe, and involved a meeting
between the villagers and Korup Project staff, including a representative of the
Conservator of KNP. The meeting lasted for approximately 2 hours, of which I had the
opportunity to observe about 60 to 90 minutes. It included a participatory rating of the
park by the villagers, and of the village by the park, on various aspects of the
Conservation and Development Agreement between the park and the community. From a
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laptop projected onto a screen in a room big enough for about 50 to 70 attendees, the
Korup staff marked the ratings of the men, women, and youth in attendance, and
averaged their ratings of the park’s performance. In Mosongiseli I had the opportunity to
participate in the Sunday service of an Apostolic church that was worshipping in the
older wood-frame schoolhouse next to the newer schoolhouse where the research team
was given lodging.
The day after we arrived back to Mundemba from Mosongiseli I was able to
speak with the Conservator of KNP at the park’s headquarters. This was largely an
unstandardized interview in which he gave his perspective on the functioning of the park
and the Korup Project. On the way out we were stopped by another park official who
requested to speak with us about our research, and this became a second unstandardized
interview with a Korup Project staff member.
3.3. Methods of Analysis
To conduct the statistical analyses, SAS was used to find the proportions of the
three primary demographic groups and six secondary demographic characteristics
examined in this study. Chi-square tests for independence of variables, Fisher’s exact
tests, and measures of association were also calculated using SAS. Following the method
of Healey (2007), the contingency tables were arranged with the independent variables in
columns and the dependent variables in rows. Significance was generally regarded to be
at the level of alpha = 0.05, however significance at alpha = 0.10 was considered in some
of the results, particularly when supported by other sources of data such as field notes and
interviews.
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The independent variables were regarded to be the three primary demographic
characteristics of gender, age, and place of origin. The dependent variables included six
secondary demographic characteristics: occupation, level of education, land tenure status,
location of residence within the village, religion, and clan group. The phi measure of
association was used to quantify the strength of association between variables. Phi is a
chi-square based measure of association that is often used for 2 by 2 tables (Healey,
2007). The lambda measure of association is useful because it can be interpreted as a
percentage increase in the ability to predict the frequencies of one variable given
frequencies of the other variable,12 but it has the significant disadvantage that it tends to
calculate an association of 0 when the total number of responses for one row is much
larger than another, even when an association exists (Berman, 2002; Healey, 2007). For
this reason, phi was preferred over lambda.
Like other measures of association, phi provides an indication of the strength of
the relationship between the two variables, whereas the chi-square test itself only
specifies whether or not the relationship is statistically significant. Sirkin (2006)
illustrates this point using phi and chi-square values to show how statistical significance
can be highly dependent on sample size, as increasing sample size tends to result in
greater statistical significance, though the measure of association between the two
variables can remain small. Healey (2007) states that the values of phi lack a meaningful
interpretation, in contrast to the proportional reduction in error interpretation for lambda,
and provides three ranges of values that have been developed as rules of thumb in

12

This is referred to as proportional reduction in error (Berman, 2002; Healey,
2007) or proportionate reduction in error (Sirkin, 2006).
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interpreting the strength of association from values of phi. The ranges of phi are given as
(Healey, 2007, p. 263):
0.00 – 0.10

(weak)

0.11 to 0.30

(moderate)

0.30 – 1.00

(strong).

In the chi-square test for independence, the null hypothesis maintains that there is
no relationship between the two variables being compared. To meet the standards for
validity of the chi-square test, two commonly cited conditions must be met, based on the
expected frequency in each cell of the contingency table (Healey, 2007; Sirkin, 2006).
The expected frequencies are determined by calculating the number of respondents (often
an unrealistic fractional number) that would be expected to have the particular
combination of characteristics according to the total number of respondents for each
combination of categories of the two variables. The total numbers are presented on the
right side and bottom of the contingency table, and are therefore known as the row and
column marginals, respectively. For the chi-square test to be considered valid, no
expected frequency can be less than 1, and no more than 20% of expected frequencies
can be less than 5. This presents a challenge for 2 by 2 tables, because if even a single
expected frequency (25% of the total) is less than 5, then the entire test can be considered
invalid (Sirkin, 2006). In these cases, the sample size may be too small to accurately
approximate the chi-square distribution that is used to calculate the probability of error
from the chi-square test statistic. Healey (2007) recommends using the continuity
corrected chi-square test (otherwise known as Yate’s correction) in these circumstances.
Another option with small sample sizes is Fisher’s exact test, which is used for 2 by 2
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tables derived from small samples that may not meet the assumptions for validity of the
chi-square test. It compares the probability of the given table with the probability of all
other possible tables having the same row and column marginals (Berman, 2002; Sirkin,
2006). The chi-square test relies on an approximation to the chi-square distribution, and
therefore Fisher’s exact test may be more reliable for small sample sizes (Berman, 2002;
Sirkin, 2006) because it does not rely on a test statistic but calculates a p-value directly
(SAS, 2011, p.2334).
In addition to the drawback that small sample sizes can produce results with
questionable validity due to low expected frequencies, the chi-square test assumes
independent random samples. The samples in this study were independent but cannot be
considered random because purposive selection of respondents was used in order to
obtain the perspectives of various demographic groups, as explained in Section 4.2.2
above. Therefore, a degree of caution is warranted in interpreting the statistical results,
which should be considered more as a guide to trends in the sample population, rather
than definitive findings that precisely represent the nature of the study communities.
Teachman (1980) describes two measures of qualitative variation, H and D, given
proportions for I categories. He notes that preference for one or the other is largely a
subjective choice, so both have been included in this analysis. The measure H is an
entropy-based descriptor of heterogeneity (Theil, 1972), defined as 𝐻 =
∑Ii=1 pi ln(1⁄pi ). There is a useful interpretation of D as the probability that two
individuals from the sample population chosen at random will belong to different
categories of the particular characteristic being measured. It is defined as
𝐷 = 1 − ∑Ii=1 pi 2 . Teachman (1980) further defines normalized versions of H and D,
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denoted H′ and D′, for which the minimum value of each is 0 and the maximum is 1.
These measures are defined as 𝐻 ′ = 𝐻/ ln 𝐼, and 𝐷′ = 𝐷[𝐼 ⁄(𝐼 − 1)]. It is important to
note that D′ and H′ typically have different values given the same set of data, despite each
having a range from 0 to 1, where 0 is complete homogeneity (all responses fall within
only one category), and 1 is complete heterogeneity (each category has the same number
of respondents). Moreover, these measures are based on non-random sampling of the
population, so they are used here to illustrate possible trends in diversity for the two
communities, rather than rigorous statistical description.
All survey data was first entered into an Excel spreadsheet, then codes were
assigned to responses. The choice of codes is described for several demographic
characteristics in the Results chapter. Data reduction for villager interviews involved
creating an outline of indexes based on concepts that originated from the literature and
research design. This list was fairly exhaustive, so few additional themes arose in the
course of reviewing interview transcripts and survey data, although several indexes were
elaborated and given more nuanced understanding following fieldwork and data analysis.
I have considered my social positionality during the field work, and later in the
course of data analysis. Particularly while in the field, it is possible that villagers’
understandings of Americans could have influenced responses, either through perceptions
of unequal power relations or distrust. For example, some respondents could have
mistaken the explanation of infrastructure and monetary benefits as items that I or the
research team might bring them depending on their responses. To counter this possibility,
all participants were read the informed consent document that specifically promised no
benefits from involvement in the research. Other respondents could have been skeptical
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of our work, particularly those who have been negatively impacted by the Americanowned Herakles Farms. It was also difficult if not impossible to explain the stated goals
of REDD+, possible risks and benefits of the program, and what was meant by terms
used in the survey questions, without potentially introducing some degree of bias for or
against these notions. I have therefore tried to consider these issues in the course of
analysis.
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Chapter 4. Results
When I visited Fabe Village it was during the rainy season. The trip took about an
hour to an hour and a half, traveling by motorbike in the direction northeast relative to
Mundemba. The road leading to the village, which was constructed within the last 20
years using funds from the Korup Project (Respondent 1), consisted of red clay earth, and
for most of its stretch appeared to exist between two walls of forest on either side. During
the four days of fieldwork in Fabe, I estimated a 40% chance of rain, by which I mean
that at any given point in time there was approximately a 40% chance that it was raining.
The precipitation ranged from an almost imperceptible sprinkle to rather heavy
downpours, interrupted on occasion by beaming sunshine. On one night the clouds
completely dissipated and I saw the truly amazing spectacle of the entire Milky Way
visible in the skies above the rural Southwest Region.
At the entrance of the village there was a signboard along the road, already moldy
and becoming shrouded in new vegetation, announcing the presence of the Fabe Solar
Power Plant, a project that the signboard stated was sponsored by SunErgy Cameroon.
This is a Norwegian company whose website claims it has support from organizations
including Norad (the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) and a host of
private partnerships (SunErgy, n.d.). No central electricity currently exists in Fabe. In
talking about Herakles Farms/SGSOC, Respondent 3 commented on the electricity
situation:
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“Well, SGSOC. See, when they came by here there were lots and lots of promises.
They even constructed a borehole down there. The borehole worked for a short while and
ceased. . .. And there was a time that I passed here and saw poles, with small cables. I
thought that by now Fabe would have been completely electrified, but I don’t know what
happened.” I asked if the company said they would bring electricity. “Of course, they
said they would be providing them electricity.” He continued with a little laughter, “But I
guess it will still come.”
There are two boreholes in Fabe. One was constructed by the Korup Project,
while the other one was the malfunctioning tap from Herakles. Respondents I talked to
early in the fieldwork considered Herakles to have stolen their land by claiming that the
project was only to be temporary, when the company in fact had no such intention. The
respondents asserted that the gendarmes had even harassed the community by walking
around in an attempt to pressure them to accept the company (fieldnotes). Respondent 4
pointed out that Herakles was the only major source of disagreement within the village.
Most of the residents lived along either side of the main street that goes down the
center of the village. Towards the entrance was Becheke quarter (Figure 3.4). A little
further down was Mbenge, and the street ended in Makpara quarter, becoming a small
footpath leading into the forest. A few houses have also sprouted up along the road in
recent years. Njoh quarter contains just one house and is named after the stream that runs
behind it. Two residences joined into one building made up the GRA quarter, a tonguein-cheek reference to the Government Residential Areas in Cameroonian cities where
government employees live and typically enjoy a relatively high standard of living.
Respondent 4 said that Njoh and GRA could also be considered part of Becheke. Down
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the road and up a hill about a 10-minute walk in the direction leading towards Mundemba
was an area known by the community as “newly out”. More recently, the people in the
house here have named it Green City, “Because,” explained Respondent 1, “if you look
around you’ll see all green pastures.” Across the road are two recently-built classrooms,
and a farming school financed by MINFOF and PSMNR-SWR (Programme for the
Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Southwest Region). I was informed
by Dr. Mbatu that the area will be the future seat of the district administration, making
this an advantageous place to relocate. Having an administration in the village will help
the community obtain funds because they will then have representation with the
government, so the community is apparently supportive of the idea. In all, there are three
to six quarters in the village, depending on the particular respondent’s classification of
the sections. “But,” Respondent 2 wanted to emphasize to me, “we are one village.”
Ailments seem to be common in Fabe, including one woman who asked us for
medicine that unfortunately we were unable to give her. Another respondent confirmed
that she wanted to participate in the survey, but complained of abdominal pain; the
practically sullen look on her face said as much, to the point that I worried she was angry.
I noticed a nearly ubiquitous odor of fermentation in the village. Some houses smelled to
me like gasoline, and others had fires that burned inside with no smoke ventilation – a
cloud slowly seeping out through the thatched roof. There was a mixture of houses made
of earth or timber, having thatched or zinc roofs, with a greater number of the more
desirable zinc-roofed homes present in the village.
Obtaining a zinc roof appears to be an important issue in Mosongiseli Village.
Respondent 5 said that some of the young people have been refusing to honor a local
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tradition he says goes back a hundred years. When someone upgrades to a zinc roof it
shows that they have moved up in prosperity and status, so they are required to give a
large goat and food to the village. At that point in time, five people had refused to donate
these things, even when confronted in the village council. The situation had caused a
controversy, and they were waiting for the chief of Mosongiseli to return and resolve the
dispute. If he could not settle the matter, then the village authorities would take it to the
administration in Mundemba. According to Respondent 7, one reason why the
community signed an agreement with Herakles three years earlier was that the company
had promised that each house in the village would get 50 sheets of zinc.
I met the chief of Mosongiseli in Mundemba, where he was resting after returning
from Douala where he needed treatment for an acute illness. In Mosongiseli, I met a man
who had a small foot wound but he was not able to get first aid supplies for it. Overall,
though, the people in Mosongiseli appeared to be happier than those in Fabe. On more
than one occasion I noticed a contented couple walking and holding hands. Kids gleefully
played football on a field with simple goal posts in front of the school where we were
staying. Several times I noticed a smell like incense. Part of the cheerful atmosphere
could have been due to the celebration they were having. Unfortunately, I was unable to
observe the festivities because we arrived on the last day it was being held. According to
Respondent 5, the occasion was a death celebration in honor of an elderly person (a
similar event had recently been held in Fabe for a woman who had died). I asked
Respondent 6 what the celebration was like. She explained that they dance, the family
brings food, and the women are very sad. Despite their sadness, that night it sounded like
a party, with joyful sounds filling the village as I wrote my fieldnotes.
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We had to travel into Mosongiseli from Mundemba on motorbikes because the
bridge over a small river was out, preventing access by the Korup Project SUVs that we
were able to take on the way back from Fabe. The road to Mosongiseli takes a path
through KNP. The first third of the trip was fairly smooth, but until we came out of the
park it was nearly unpassable, requiring us to stop over and over again to get off the bikes
so they would not get stuck in the mud. On the positive side, this allowed me to observe
the interesting geology here. The deep red soil contrasted remarkably with the green of
the forest. In it were granite pebbles mixed with black and gray clay stones that were soft
enough I could squish them between my fingers. The pebbles sat atop little towers a few
centimeters high where the rain had evidently eroded the earth around them. Leaving the
park, the soil became noticeably sandier, and with it came a relatively uneventful final
stretch.
The quarter that the villagers called Public was on the right side as we arrived
near the entrance to Mosongiseli (Figure 3.5). About 100 meters further down the road
from Public was the Church quarter. The School Yard quarter consisted of a small area
near the entrance of the village in front of the primary school. Mosongiseli had Becheke
(up-village) and Mbenge (down-village) quarters, as in Fabe, and in both villages the
chief lived in Mbenge. There was no Makpara quarter in Mosongiseli, but there was a
road built by Cameroon’s Génie Militaire that ran roughly parallel to the main street in
the village. The community members facetiously called this area Genie Street. I found a
small nursery at the end of Genie Street, with hundreds of tiny potted oil palms.
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Compared to Fabe, there were longer breaks in the rain at Mosongiseli, but the
sky almost never became completely sunny. There always seemed to be a thin overcast
that never quite reached direct sunlight. When the rain came it could be almost torrential,
which I suppose is why the thatched roofs here came down surprisingly low in front of
most houses – so low that I kept hitting my head on them, not quite expecting the fourfoot clearance. Overall, though, the buildings in Mosongiseli appeared to my untrained
eye as generally more sturdy. As in Fabe, many were constructed from timber and capped
with zinc roofs. The chief councilor’s house was under construction using cinderblocks.
Interestingly, two satellite dishes were being installed in front of a housing block in
Mbenge, even though the village did not currently have electricity.
Some of the first people who took the survey were allogenes living in the Church
quarter. One of these was a man who wore a Pamol employees’ union t-shirt, so I asked
him about the union. He said it fights for their pay sometimes, such as ensuring a
seniority bonus. The union also fights for discounts at the Pamol hospital for workers,
and to improve working conditions. He explained that not everybody is part of the union,
but there are no dues. Personally, the man believed he had benefited from the union. In
terms of the union being involved in Pamol’s decision-making, he told us that in cases
like the decision to establish in Mosongiseli they had not been part of the initial
discussion. The union was informed of the decision after it had been made, but then they
did go along with it.
On Sunday, 16 August, I had the opportunity to attend an Apostolic church
service. This choice was largely out of convenience, being the closest of three
congregations holding services that day. It took place in the older wooden-frame
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schoolhouse built by the Korup Project (Respondent 7). Just a few meters to the east of
the cinder-block schoolhouse that the research team was staying in, I assumed it was a
barn or stables at first. The congregation was very warm and inviting, at one point saying
in unison to me, “Welcome broda Adam.” Most of the time the pastor stood in the middle
of the congregation, while a man and a woman beat drums at the front of the partially
enclosed room. Behind them was a chalkboard with some Christian writings in Pidgin
that I could only get the gist of. The drums were often played in a hemiola rhythm, and
the beats lent themselves to moving slightly side-to-side while singing and clapping. The
pastor gave a sermon in mostly standard English about “divine connections.” He
explained these as connections from God to people, and illustrated the idea using the
example of Cornelius from the Bible. During the sermon I could hear another church
playing their Western-style drum set at times.
On the final day of fieldwork, I came down with a strong cold. While unpleasant,
it did give me the opportunity to use some traditional medicine. Chief Ekokola pointed
out some bunches of lemon grass growing next to the house in the Public quarter. He told
me that Cameroonians use the plant to sooth a cold, and showed me how to grind up
several leaves in my hand and breath in the aromatic oils. My cold came back later that
day, but I was relieved that it helped during the long motorbike trip back to Mundemba.
Both villages left me with a relatively cozy impression very different from the
sterile suburban environment with which I am most familiar. In Mosongiseli, people
tended to socialize frequently, walking around and talking with one another. In Fabe
there was a house under construction, part of which was being used as a little store, while
the other part served as a gathering place where people socialized. Especially youths
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hung out here, playing checkers and drinking afofo (locally made crude whisky). Yet
along with the welcoming and relaxed atmosphere in these communities there was an
observable and expressed need for improvements in living conditions.
4.1. Heterogeneity and Integration
4.1.1. Roles of the Major Demographic Groups as Actors within Each Community
4.1.1.1. Gender. Both men and women in Fabe are typically farmers (Respondent
1), possibly indicating social integration between the genders while working in their
occupation. Both genders are also on the village council, so they are represented in this
formal community decision-making body. Women and men each have their own secret,
or elite, societies. In Fabe, the women’s society is called Ekpa, and the men’s is called
Motamo.
The women in Fabe appear to have a cooperative approach in which they
socialize together and work toward common goals. Women have their own social hall
and society, both of which are known as Diyala, where all the women in the village come
together to socialize and educate themselves (Respondent 2, Respondent 4). Other sociocultural activities include decorating the village at the end of the year to appease the
ancestors (Respondent 4). This is a benefit to the whole community because the villagers
believe that this tradition brings peace to the village. Women in Fabe also organize to
clean the village, particularly the roads and water points, such as the boreholes and
catchment areas (Respondent 2, Respondent 4). Moreover, Respondent 4 stated that the
women have a common initiative and bought a grinding machine that they all use.13
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This did not appear to be a formal common initiative group, although the
activities are carried out cooperatively by the women.
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Women in Fabe also carry out day-to-day activities of farming and gathering
NTFPs such as njansanga and bush mango. They can then sell these products to help
finance their children’s education. Because of this importance of the forest to their
livelihoods, Respondent 1 says that many of the women were extremely upset when
Herakles began its operations. He declared that, “In fact, some of them were even about
to collapse where they stand!”
In Mosongiseli, both men and women (along with youths) come together every
first Friday to do “community labor” – a cleanup campaign focusing on maintaining the
streets, bore holes, and the creek – similar to the work respondents described as being
done by women, as a group, in Fabe.14 As in Fabe, both men and women were involved
in decision-making in Mosongiseli. Women are included on MBABCIG (Mosongiseli’s
community forest executive committee), and were involved in writing the letter to the
Korup Project about the peripheral zone issue (where the community has recently been
told they cannot farm in the 3km peripheral zone around the park). Moreover, when
Pamol first came to Mosongiseli they did not follow the procedures normally expected
for establishing a project in the village. Typically, companies that seek to use the
community’s forest land are supposed to talk to members of the community, bring
offerings, and see the village, but Pamol bypassed these local protocols and some of the
villagers were unhappy with this. Respondent 6 and Respondent 8 said that women and
youths were the main demographic groups that complained, and the situation was
eventually settled after the DO (Divisional Officer) appealed to the villagers to accept
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It is possible that this work is done by both men and women in Fabe as well,
but no respondents mentioned this kind of community cleanup campaign for both genders
taking place in that village.
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Pamol. While women are involved in many aspects of decision-making and were
involved in collective action in the Pamol issue, the youth association in Mosongiseli
appears to be completely segregated in terms of gender, only including men.15 This was
observed during their meeting, after which we were able to administer surveys to several
of the youths, and confirmed in the interview with Respondent 6.
Interview respondents replied that the role of women included similar activities to
those of women in Fabe. Respondent 5 stated that women were responsible for keeping
drinking points clean, and Respondent 8 indicated that their role is to provide hospitality
to guests by preparing food. Respondents also identified subsistence as a major role of
women in Mosongiseli. These subsistence activities include catching aquatic animals,
farming, and collecting food from the forest (Respondent 5, Respondent 6). They are also
expected to use money from selling these products to pay for their children’s education,
and raising their children is generally another aspect of their role in the community
(Respondent 6, Respondent 8).
While Respondent 1 in Fabe seemed to have a gendered perspective on the future
of Cameroon – framing his hopes as reflecting the moral strength of young men – during
this interview a woman who was familiar to the respondent interjected her own thoughts
into the interview several times, which suggests she did not believe her opinions took a
second place to the respondent’s. This appears to differ strongly with the case of an
interview in Mosongiseli during which the husband of a woman I was interviewing came
in, and this abruptly shifted the conversation so that he was the only one who answered
any further questions. This second framing of the placement of women in the local
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It is not certain if the youth association in Fabe is also only composed of men.
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society was observed in both villages while administering the surveys. In both Fabe and
Mosongiseli, women respondents were often hesitant to give their own opinions, and
frequently their responses were heavily supplemented by the input of their children (even
if their children were women themselves) or other family members. This effect was
particularly apparent when a woman’s husband was present, and at times women did not
want to give their own opinions without their husband’s permission.
4.1.1.2. Age group. Both youths and elders are represented on the village council,
and therefore have a significant role in Fabe’s decision-making. The way that these two
demographic groups assert their agency appears to vary greatly, however. The youth are
very well organized as the Bima Youth Association, and this organization has frequent
meetings. In these meetings they discuss issues such as the best ways for the village to be
developed, as well as maintaining the association’s motivation and focus. In the discord
concerning Herakles Farms, the youth actively intervened in the issue when they
discovered that, according to Respondent 2, Herakles wanted to “enter by force”, it
became clear that their project was not temporary as the company had claimed, and that
promises of development benefits for the community would not come to fruition.
According to Respondent 1 and Respondent 2, the elders who were in favor of Herakles
made decisions with the company largely without consulting the rest of the community,
relying on their pre-established positions of power within the hierarchy of the village
social structure.
According to respondents, youth in Fabe are involved to a large extent in both
livelihood activities and community development. While Respondent 1 maintains that the
youth are concerned about preserving the forest, he said that at the moment their
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livelihood requires them to clear land to grow cocoa, which is the basis of the local
economy. Some youths are students, and on their break they help by working on their
parents’ cocoa farms. They are also involved in construction projects and development
activities like digging wells and fixing bridges. Culturally, one respondent (Respondent
3) observed that the youth are becoming less active in traditional activities, such as
involvement in elite societies, because they are adopting Christianity.
Respondents in Fabe considered the role of elders to involve cultural matters and
arbitrating disputes. Respondent 2 understood elders to act in the capacity of resolving
conflicts such as those between two different families. Respondent 4 held that elders
served the principal role of passing traditions down to the younger generation so that they
can learn the culture of their community.
Compared to Fabe, where the recent issue over Herakles Farms seemed to divide
youth and elders, at least one interview respondent in Mosongiseli (Respondent 8) stated
that there generally are no substantial disputes between these two groups in his
community. There have only been small differences in opinion over things like exactly
what timber revenues should be used for. Regarding access to decision-making on issues
of forest usage, both youth and elders are represented on MBABCIG (the community
forest executive committee), and the two groups were involved in writing the letter to the
conservator regarding the Peripheral Zone issue. Moreover, youth and women were the
main groups who complained about the way in which Pamol tried to establish in the
community, and Respondent 8 expressed that these two groups (youth and women) were
“very active” in community issues.
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During the monthly community labor in Mosongiseli, men, women, and youths
participate, but the elderly do not take part. Thus, one respondent (Respondent 5) stated
that the role of youth in the village is to maintain “the cleanliness of the community.”
According to Respondent 8, this includes both men and women youths, in contrast to the
local youth association, which apparently only includes men. Respondent 5 also
identified youth as the community’s labor force, helping to construct houses, build
bridges, and do other repairs, which is very similar to the role of Fabe’s youth in
community development.
As in Fabe, elders serve an important function in maintaining the village’s
cultural traditions and in settling disagreements within the community. Respondent 5
emphasized the role of elders as providing guidance to the youth, and in teaching them
the history and boundaries of their community as a means of protecting against
encroachment after the elders pass on. He joked, “If you don’t know the history,
neighboring villages can take right up to your toilet! They claim the land.” As part of the
elders’ cultural responsibilities they are also responsible for handing traditional powers to
the youth.
4.1.1.3. Place of origin. According to interview respondents, Fabe was
established by people who originally migrated from Isangele, and consists mainly of
villagers belonging to the Bima clan. Other clans represented significantly include Ngolo
and Batanga, in addition to Grafi (people from the Northwest Region), Balue, and Ikondo
Kondo. In addition to the diversity mentioned by respondents, there are several processes
of integration and examples of cohesion between indigenes and allogenes in Fabe.
Respondent 2 asserted that there was harmony in the village. Respondent 3, who is an
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allogene and not of Bima ethnicity, remarked that “the people here are very open,” in
describing that he would be allowed to attend a village assembly meeting and believed
his opinion would be respected by the community. This same respondent commented that
there is a farmer’s field school where villagers are trained on modern methods of growing
cocoa, and he supposed that both Bima people and allogenes worked together there once
a week. Also, a recent death celebration in honor of a woman who got lost in the forest
brought in people from a few neighboring Bima villages, according to Respondent 3. In
another example of camaraderie, Respondent 4 explained that at the end of the year all
the people in Mbenge quarter celebrate together.
Despite these illustrations of solidarity, in some respects allogenes are excluded
from access to the forest and decision-making in Fabe. For instance, while allogenes can
participate in the general assembly they are not included on the village council. In
accessing forest land, indigenes are allowed to claim any piece of virgin forest and begin
farming it. But Respondent 4 explained that for allogenes, the chief and the village
council decide whether to simply give the land to the person, or, if they determine that the
allogene may cause problems for the community they will let them have the land but will
take money for it. Similarly, for allogenes to collect NTFPs from the forest they must pay
a fee, whereas Respondent 4 stated that “citizens” of Fabe are not required to pay for
access to these resources.
One fascinating note about Fabe is that Chief Philip Wangwe, the current chief of
that village, is apparently both a Muslim and partially a “foreigner” himself. The story
was related to me by Chief Ekokola. According to him, Chief Wangwe’s father was a
Muslim who followed a young lady who lived in Fabe. The two had children there, but a
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dowry was never paid. The man who was chief of Fabe at the time only had one son, but
he was irresponsible. However, the Muslim’s son was “dynamic, loveable, and good.” So
when it was time to decide on a new chief, the son of the previous chief suggested that
Wangwe be crowned instead, and the king makers (who come from secret societies)
agreed. In the local tradition, if you have a love affair without paying a dowry then the
child belongs to the mother’s side. So even though Chief Wangwe’s father was from
outside the village and was a Muslim, the king makers considered his son to be enough of
a native because his father never paid a dowry.
Mosongiseli was settled about 300 years ago (Respondent 5, Respondent 8), by
people who came from the Ngolo area (Respondent 5). Interview respondents estimated
that about 5 – 10% of the village inhabitants were allogenes until Pamol established its
plantation in the village. Respondent 5 and Respondent 8 maintained that quite a large
number of allogenes came in with Pamol. In fact, Respondent 5 went so far as to say the
influx of people “is almost changing the status from a village to a semi-town,” and
laments that with it the local traditions are disappearing. This same respondent remarked
that the new allogenes are mixing with indigenes. When asked if different groups of
people (including allogenes or youth) lived in different quarters, both Respondent 6 and
Respondent 8 responded that these groups were spread throughout the village, although it
is not clear if this includes the new arrivals who were brought in by Pamol. Interview
respondents upheld the view that allogenes in Mosongiseli are upstanding members of the
community who simply go about their farming and live their lives. Respondent 8 stated
that most allogenes that were established here before the arrival of Pamol belong to the
Ibibio clan of neighboring Nigeria. According to Respondent 5, the workers brought in
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by the company come from both within Ndian Division (including Bima, Batanga,
Ngolo, and Bakoko clans), and outside of the division. Similar to Fabe, respondents also
stated that one of the last major cultural activities in the village was a death celebration,
here in honor of an elderly person. These occasions bring in people from neighboring
villages, including those from Isangele, Ikassa, and Ngumu, with everyone in the village
participating in the festivities.
There was no apparent ill-will towards allogenes in Mosongiseli, whether
Nigerian migrants nor Pamol workers. But as in Fabe, allogenes are not generally
involved in community decision-making, and they have additional hurdles in acquiring
access to forest land compared to indigenes. One respondent (Respondent 6) affirmed
that allogenes do participate in the village assembly. But she acknowledged that
allogenes are not represented on the community forest executive committee, and when
the village wrote the letter to KNP regarding the peripheral zone issue allogenes were
not part of that process. According to Respondent 5, indigenes are free to farm in any
virgin forest of Mosongiseli unless they have not been living in the village for a long
time. In the latter case these individuals are required to pay a token to the community
before they can begin farming. Similar to Fabe, allogenes must pay per hectare of land
and give a certain amount of food to the community.
4.1.2. Heterogeneity
The proportions given in Table 4.1 summarize the consolidation of demographic
categories into dichotomous codes. Although the consolidation resulted in very coarse
categorizations, this was necessary in order to achieve results for the chi-square tests of
independence having some degree of statistical validity. Condensing the demographic
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characteristics into two categories per variable also obtains 2 by 2 contingency tables that
make the use of Fisher’s exact test possible in cases where the distribution of the sample
population limits the usefulness of chi-square tests. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 give percentages
of the sample population in finer detail. In each of Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, the columns
for n and percent for each village refer to the number and proportion of respondents,
respectively, in the sample population for that village. For some variables the number and
proportion of respondents does not add to the total for each village due to question
nonresponse and responses that were not intelligible. Diversity distributions (Table 4.4)
are used here to illustrate trends in heterogeneity for characteristics having more than two
categories, where responses were mutually exclusive and could be consolidated into a
reasonable number of categories, and that were deemed most relevant to respondents’
social identity. These criteria left age group, religion, and clan group as the most
appropriate characteristics for these measures of diversity. H is not included in the
analysis because the measure does not have an interpretation relevant to this study, and is
not normalized for purposes of comparison with D. The quantitative and statistical results
presented here are supported with data from field notes and interviews, as well as detailed
responses to the survey.
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Table 4.1. Proportions for dichotomous consolidation of demographic variables. The
columns for n give the number of responses for each variable category, separately for
each village, and combined in the Sample Total column. Percent is the proportion of
responses in each category divided by the total number of responses for that question.
Characteristic Category
Village

Gender
Age group
Origin
Occupation
Education
Land tenure
Location
Religion
Clan

Fabe

Mosongiseli

Sample Total

n

%

n

%

n

%

Fabe
Mosongiseli
Women

45
0
21

100
0
47.7

0
36
9

0
100
25.0

45
36
30

55.6
44.4
37.5

Men

23

52.3

27

75.0

50

62.5

18-30

14

31.1

13

36.1

27

33.3

>30

31

68.9

23

63.9

54

66.7

Indigene

24

53.3

23

63.9

47

58.0

Allogene

21

46.7

13

36.1

34

42.0

Farmer

34

79.1

18

50.0

52

65.8

Non-farmer

9

20.9

18

50.0

27

34.2

Below FSLC

13

30.2

14

38.9

27

37.2

FSLC or above

30

69.8

22

61.1

52

65.8

No land

6

13.3

6

16.7

12

14.8

Formal or customary

39

86.7

30

83.3

69

85.2

Inner village

39

88.6

29

85.3

68

87.2

Other quarter

5

11.4

5

14.7

10

12.8

Christian

38

86.4

35

97.2

73

91.3

Non-Christian

6

13.6

1

2.8

7

8.8

Majority clan

31

68.9

24

66.7

55

67.9

Minority clan

14

31.1

12

33.3

26

32.1
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Table 4.2. Proportions for finer detailed consolidation of demographic variables.
Variable

Category

Women
Men
18-30
31-45
Age group
46-65
>65
Indigene
Origin
Allogene
Farmer
Student
Occupation
Industrial Ag.
Other
Below FSLC
FSLC
Education
O-Level
A-Level
University
Formal
Land
No land
tenure
Customary
Becheke
Mbenge
Location
Makpara or Genie St.
Other/peripheral
Christian
Religion
Muslim
Traditional
Bima
Bamileke
Ngolo
Batanga
Manu-Bayangi
Bakundu
Clan
Korup
Bikom
Balondo Badiko
Grassfield
Oron
Ibibio
Efik
Gender

Fabe
n
21
23
14
13
11
7
24
21
34
3
0
6
13
24
2
2
2
5
6
34
27
4
8
5
38
3
3
31
1
7
3
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

%
47.7
52.3
31.1
28.9
24.4
15.6
53.3
46.7
79.1
7.0
0
13.9
30.2
55.8
4.7
4.7
4.7
11.1
13.3
75.6
61.4
9.1
18.2
11.4
86.4
6.8
6.8
68.9
2.2
15.6
6.7
2.2
2.2
2.2
0
0
0
0
0
0

Mosongiseli
n
%
9
25.0
27
75.0
13
36.1
13
36.1
8
22.2
2
5.6
23
63.9
13
36.1
18
50.0
9
25.0
5
13.9
4
11.1
14
38.9
11
30.6
4
11.1
5
13.9
2
5.6
1
2.8
6
16.7
29
80.6
10
29.4
13
38.2
6
17.7
5
14.7
35
97.2
0
0
1
2.8
2
5.6
0
0
2
5.6
0
0
0
0
1
2.8
2
5.6
1
2.8
24
66.7
1
2.8
1
2.8
1
2.8
1
2.8

Sample Total
n
%
30
37.5
50
62.5
27
33.3
26
32.1
19
23.5
9
11.1
47
58.0
34
42.0
52
65.8
12
15.2
5
6.3
10
12.7
27
34.2
35
44.3
6
7.6
7
8.9
4
5.1
6
7.4
12
14.8
63
77.8
37
47.4
17
21.8
14
18.0
10
12.8
73
91.3
3
3.8
4
5.0
33
40.7
1
1.2
9
11.1
3
3.7
1
1.2
2
2.5
3
3.7
1
1.2
24
29.6
1
1.2
1
1.2
1
1.2
1
1.2
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Table 4.3. Proportions for finest detailed consolidation of demographic variables. All
other demographic variables are presented in the finest detail in Table 4.2.
Variable

Occupation

Land
tenure

Location

Category
Farmer
Student
Industrial Ag.
Teacher
Pastor
Business person
Other
Title
Certificate
Rent
No land
Customary
Becheke
Mbenge
Makpara
Genie Street
Green City
Njoh
GRA
Church Quarter
School Yard

Fabe
n
34
3
0
0
1
2
3
1
3
1
6
34
27
4
8
N/A
2
1
2
N/A
N/A

%
79.1
7.0
0
0
2.3
4.7
7.0
2.2
6.7
2.2
13.3
75.6
61.4
9.1
18.2
N/A
4.6
2.3
4.6
N/A
N/A

Mosongiseli
n
%
18
50.0
9
25.0
5
13.9
2
5.6
1
2.8
0
0
1
2.8
0
0
0
0
1
2.8
6
16.7
29
80.6
10
29.4
13
76.5
N/A
N/A
6
17.7
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2
5.9
3
8.8

Sample Total
n
%
52
65.8
12
15.2
5
6.3
2
2.5
2
2.5
2
2.5
4
5.1
1
1.2
3
3.7
2
2.5
12
14.8
63
77.8
37
47.4
17
21.8
8
10.3
6
7.7
2
2.6
1
1.3
2
2.6
2
2.6
3
3.9

Table 4.4. Some measures of heterogeneity for relevant demographic
variables. Numbers in parentheses refer to I, the number of
demographic categories for each variable. Variables used the coding
consolidation illustrated in Table 4.2
Variable

Age
group

Religion

Clan
group

Heterogeneity
measure
D,
D′
H′
D,
D′
H′
D,
D′
H′

Fabe
0.74 (4)
0.98 (4)
0.98 (4)
0.24 (3)
0.37 (3)
0.45 (3)
0.49 (7)
0.58 (7)
0.55 (7)

Mosongiseli
0.69 (4)
0.92 (4)
0.89 (4)
0.05 (2)
0.11 (2)
0.18 (2)
0.54 (8)
0.60 (8)
0.59 (8)

Total
0.72 (4)
0.96 (4)
0.95 (4)
0.16 (3)
0.25 (3)
0.32 (3)
0.73 (13)
0.79 (13)
0.66 (13)
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4.1.2.1. Gender. Overall, one third of those sampled were women and two thirds
were men. The sample population in Fabe had a somewhat more equal representation of
genders, compared to Mosongiseli where 75% of respondents were men. This could be
partly due to the sampling procedure, because on at least three occasions we were able to
administer surveys to groups of several respondents at a time, however all of the
respondents in these instances were men. In one of these occasions we were able to
survey a number of individuals after they concluded their youth association meeting. At
this meeting it appeared that all the members who were active in the discussion were men
(field notes). This suggests that the primary organization for collective action of the youth
in Mosongiseli is segregated in terms of genders, and is almost exclusively dominated by
males.
4.1.2.2. Age group. About a third of the sample population from each village
were youth (considered here as those who are from 18 to 30 years old). Table 4.4 shows
that the proportions were distributed quite evenly across the four age groups defined in
the study, with D′ and H′ near 0.9 or above in each village. In Fabe, each measure
approaches its theoretical normed maximum of unity with scores of 0.98 for both D′ and
H′. These results suggest that the sample population in Mosongiseli has a slightly less
even distribution of age groups, and analysis of Table 4.2 shows that the sample is more
heavily weighted in the two youngest age groups.
4.1.2.3. Place of origin. In terms of the proportions of indigenes versus allogenes,
the Mosongiseli sample population was about two thirds natives and one third allogenes.
The distribution of respondents in Fabe was somewhat more even, with a native to
allogene ratio of 53% to 47%. It is interesting that with this high proportion of allogenes
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in the sample, Fabe’s chief gave a brief address at the beginning of a Korup Project
meeting with the community in which he talked proudly that Fabe was not a village
“over-run with strangers” (field notes). This might indicate that the sample was biased
towards responses from allogenes in an attempt to obtain their views and experiences in
the survey and interviews. The statement could also reflect an ideological position that
the chief desired to portray in speaking about his village.
In Monsongiseli, the indigene-allogene situation is currently very complicated.
According to Respondent 5, Pamol only began operations near their village in the last six
months (before the fieldwork was conducted), and the company brought with them a
large number of workers from outside of the village. Respondents 5, 6, and 8, in
Mosongiseli estimated that not including Pamol workers only about 5 to 10% of villagers
in Mosongiseli were allogenes, but when including those who came in with Pamol that
number is far higher. Therefore, assessing the actual proportion of allogenes in the village
at this time is particularly problematic, especially as many of the Pamol workers will
soon be moved out of the village and into a newly constructed plantation camp nearby
(field notes). Given the temporary residential nature of many of the allogenes in
Mosongiseli, the proportions from the survey data likely represent a mixture of temporary
and settled allogenes in Mosongiseli Village.
The proportion of those survey respondents belonging to a majority or a minority
clan group are given in Table 4.2. I initially expected that the two variables would be
almost entirely redundant, under the assumption that indigenes will belong to the
majority clan in that particular village, while allogenes will all belong to any other,
minority, clan. A slight difference in proportions exists between the clan group variable
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(as majority or minority clan) and the place of origin variable (as indigene or allogene)
(Table 4.1). In the samples from both villages there was a somewhat larger proportion of
individuals from the majority clan, and a smaller proportion belonging to a minority clan,
compared to the proportions of indigenes and allogenes, respectively. In Fabe there were
16% more Bima respondents than indigenes, and in Mosongiseli there were 4% more
Balondo Badiko respondents than indigenes. This suggests that a certain number of
allogenes have migrated within the geographic range of their traditional clan to live in
their current village.
4.1.2.4. Occupation. Farming is the main occupation in each of the two villages,
with at least half of respondents in each community identifying as a farmer. In Fabe,
nearly four fifths of respondents were farmers, compared to one half of those in
Mosongiseli. In viewing the data in greater detail (Table 4.2), those occupations with the
second and third highest representation were students and people working in industrial
agriculture. Mosongiseli had three times the number of respondents who identified as
students. Only respondents in Mosongiseli stated that they worked in industrial
agriculture, and these five people either worked as field headmen (three respondents) or
general labor (two respondents) for Pamol. Other occupations reported in the survey
(Table 4.3) include teachers (two in Mosongiseli), business women (two in Fabe,
specifically engaged in petty trading), and pastors (one in each village); four respondents
identified as having a miscellaneous occupation, including a nurse, tailor’s apprentice,
and welder.
4.1.2.5. Education. The First School Leaving Certificate (FSLC) certifies that a
Cameroonian student has attained a primary school education (Mbaku, 2005). In order to
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improve the validity of the results, the variable of education needed to be condensed into
two categories, comprising those with some education (FSLC or higher) or those with
essentially no education (below an FSLC). Table 4.1 shows that overall, approximately
two thirds of respondents had attained at least the FSLC level, with Mosongiseli having a
slightly lower percentage (61%) with no education, relative to respondents in Fabe
(70%). As illustrated in Table 4.2, this coarse consolidation of responses does not do
justice to the number of individuals in each community having attained levels of
education above an FSLC. Mosongiseli, while having proportionally more respondents
with no education, had higher proportions of those with O-Level, A-Level, and even
university degrees of some kind, with 31% of the sample population having above an
FSLC. Villagers in Fabe also possessed these higher levels of education, but only14%
had attained above an FSLC.
4.1.2.6. Land tenure. To achieve meaningful dichotomous categories for the
variable of land tenure status, I chose to organize the responses into categories of formal
or customary ownership of land, or no land ownership at all. The survey instrument gave
respondents the option of three types of formal land ownership,16 in addition to the choice
of “no land ownership”. However, it became evident at the beginning of the fieldwork
that most of the respondents held some form of customary land tenure. For these
respondents, members of the research team made a note in the margin of the survey
instrument indicating customary ownership, and respondents who wrote their answers on
the survey themselves were instructed to do the same. Nevertheless, the possibility exists

16

Formal land ownership is defined here as forms of land tenure recognized by
the Cameroonian government, and operationalized as the following categories: ownership
of a land title, ownership of a land certificate, or renting land.
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that some of the responses indicating formal ownership or no land ownership should have
actually been coded as customary ownership.
Two options existed for condensing the responses for this variable into
dichotomous categories: either consolidating no land ownership together with customary
ownership, or formal with customary. The latter was chosen in the present analysis
because it emphasizes the conditions for agency of the various demographic groups
within the village community, specifically access to land. The other option would
emphasize the agency of demographic groups later on, in their interactions with REDD+,
as formal land tenure will give villagers a stronger legal basis to demand compensation
for REDD+ benefits, relative to customary tenure or no land ownership. Nonetheless, in
terms of heterogeneity and integration of the village community, those with no land
ownership hold the lowest degree of security in terms of both access to resources and
potential REDD+ benefits. That being the case, reasons for lack of land ownership vary,
and it is not clear form the survey whether a given respondent does not own land because
of their disadvantaged status within the community or simply because they do not choose
to own any land. For instance, in Mosongiseli, two respondents who marked “no land
ownership” also commented “(stranger)” in the margin, indicating that they did not own
land because they were either not from that village or they were only there temporarily.
One of these respondents was a field headman for Pamol, and the other was a student.
Both of these respondents also had an A-Level of education or above, as did two other
respondents from Mosongiseli who did not own any land, including a Nigerian pastor
with a Diploma in Theology and a teacher with an M. Ed. degree. Those respondents
without any land in Mosongiseli therefore tend to be those who are better educated and
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perhaps choose not to own land because their occupation as a non-farmer brings income
that allows them to sustain their livelihood without owning land that they would have to
spend time and energy cultivating.
A large majority of respondents in both villages (78% overall) indicated that they
held customary ownership of land (Table 4.2). Several respondents noted that this land
was specifically passed down to them from previous generations. Interestingly, one
female respondent from Fabe stated that her customary land was under the ownership of
her husband, and in Mosongiseli a male allogene indicated that his customary ownership
was due to being married to a native woman. In contrast to the large proportion of those
with customary tenure, only five respondents in Fabe and one in Mosongiseli enjoyed
formal land ownership. Of those with formal land tenure status, the most common form
was a land certificate, which was held by three respondents in Fabe, two of whom
identified as business women in terms of their occupation. As previously stated, those in
Mosongiseli who owned no land tended to be well educated, while in Fabe, non-land
owners almost all had an FSLC, indicating some level of education, but not a clear
educational advantage or disadvantage compared to land owners.
4.1.2.7. Location within the village. Given the number of quarters in each village
(Table 4.3, variable Location), several ways of consolidating the responses into
dichotomies was possible, however the only meaningful option appeared to be grouping
respondents living in the center part of each village compared to those living in peripheral
quarters. The center of both Fabe and Mosongiseli consisted of Mbenge and Becheke
quarters, also called by respondents “down village” and “up village”, respectively, with
Becheke lying closer towards the road near the entrance to the village (Figures 3.4 and
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3.5). In Fabe, a quarter known as Makpara continued after Mbenge, further away from
the road. Mosongiseli had a section that villagers called Genie Street, named after the
Génie Militaire, the government agency that constructed the street, which runs down the
middle of this quarter, forming an H-shape with the Mbenge and Becheke sections. These
three sections, then (Becheke, Mbenge, and Makpara in Fabe; Becheke, Mbenge, and
Genie Street in Mosongiseli), formed the inner part of their respective village. Several
smaller quarters existed in each village that were somewhat separated from the main
quarters, however. In Fabe these included parts of the village that respondents called
Njoh, GRA, and Green City, while those in Mosongiseli were known as Public, School
Yard, and Church Quarter.
Table 4.2 shows that most of the villagers in the sample (over 80% in each case)
lived in one of the three inner quarters. From Table 4.3, a majority of the respondents in
Fabe (61%) lived in Becheke, while most of those in Mosongiseli (76%) lived in Mbenge
quarter. Assuming this distribution is not simply an artifact of the sampling procedure,
the result indicates that there is a greater proportion of villagers living near the road
towards the entrance of the village in Fabe, whereas residents of Mosongiseli tend to live
further away from the road. This could be for reasons of access, as Respondent 1 in Fabe
mentioned the vital importance of the road for the community. In contrast, the
conservator of KNP said that many residents of Mosongiseli are fishermen. This
occupation was never indicated in the survey, although it is possible that farmers and
those with other occupations engage in fishing in addition to their main source of
livelihood. In this case, it would therefore make sense for some members of this
community to live further down village in Mbenge, which terminates at a stream leading
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to a larger river, which itself flows to the ocean after about a two-hour trip by canoe (field
notes).
4.1.2.8. Religion. Table 4.1 shows that the vast majority of respondents in both
villages were Christian. The non-Christian category includes Muslims and those who
observe traditional views and practices (animist beliefs). In Fabe, three respondents
identified as Muslims and three as observing traditional religion (Table 4.2), while in
Mosongiseli only a single person identified as traditional religion, and none as Muslim.
Respondent 8 confirmed this finding, stating that there are no Muslims in Mosongiseli.
The measures of heterogeneity given by D, D′ and H′ help reveal the varying degrees of
religious diversity between the two village sample populations (Table 4.4). In each
community, H′ is slightly higher relative to D′, and both indices are considerably higher
in Fabe than in Mosongiseli. Interpreting D as the theoretical probability that two
randomly selected individuals from the community will observe different religions, the
probability is nearly one quarter (24%) in the Fabe sample population, compared to only
one twentieth (5%) for Mosongiseli. The greater degree of religious heterogeneity for
respondents in Fabe is apparent from Table 4.2, which reveals that not only are the
minority religions both represented in this sample, but in equal proportions to one another
as well.
4.1.2.9. Clan group. The clans identified from the survey are listed in Table 4.2.
Because clan groups are strongly linked to geographic location, a particular village will
have a clan that is traditionally associated with that village (for instance, Fabe-Bima
within the Bima clan group), and the members of that clan will typically form a majority,
relative to members of any other clan group. In Fabe, the majority clan was taken as
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Bima, and in Mosongiseli the majority clan was Balondo Badiko. In each village, over
two thirds of respondents were from their respective village’s majority clan group,
however a significant number of respondents identified as members of another clan. In
Fabe, seven respondents (over 15%) identified as belonging to the Ngolo clan group, and
the Batanga clan group was also fairly well represented with three individuals (nearly 7%
of respondents). The rest of the population, according to the sample, included Bamiléké,
Manu-Bayangi, Bakundu, and Korup people (one respondent each, or 2.2% of the Fabe
sample population). There were no minority clan groups in Mosongiseli that were
represented with a clearly larger proportion than other minority groups (as was the case
of the Ngolo clan in Fabe). Instead, two respondents each (5.6% of the Mosongiseli
sample population) identified as Bima, Ngolo, or Korup, while one respondent each
(2.8%) identified as Bakundu, Bikom, Grassfielder, Oron, Ibibio, or Efik. In all, one
respondent in Fabe and five in Mosongiseli came from clan groups that originate outside
of the Southwest Region. Specifically, the Bamiléké respondent in Fabe said he was
originally from the West Region. In Mosongiseli, the Bikom and Grassfielder
respondents came from the Northwest Region, while the remaining three respondents
from Mosongiseli were of Nigerian origin, and identified as belonging to the Oron,
Ibibio, and Efik clans. The number of respondents from outside the Southwest Region
illustrates the fluid nature of migration patterns in the study area, not just within
Cameroon itself, but even between Cameroon and neighboring areas of Nigeria. Of note,
the two respondents from the Northwest Region are both relatively well educated (one
has achieved O-Level certification, and the other A-Level), and work as field headmen
for Pamol. This suggests that Pamol is recruiting workers from other parts of Cameroon
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to work on palm oil plantations. Of the three Nigerian respondents in Mosongiseli, two
were farmers (one had an FSLC; the other had no education), and the third was a pastor
who holds a diploma in theology. Thus, Nigerians living in Mosongiseli do not appear to
be involved in the industrial agriculture sector, and live by similar means of livelihood as
the majority of the community.
Also present in Mosongiseli were six respondents who were not Nigerian, and in
fact belong to the majority Balondo Badiko clan, but speak a Nigerian dialect,
specifically Ibibio or Efik, the latter of which is itself a dialect of Ibibio (field notes). This
suggests that there is significant communication between Balondo Badiko and
traditionally Nigerian peoples. Another interesting feature the data reveal is that two
Bima respondents lived in Mosongiseli, whereas no Balondo Badiko respondents were
found in the Fabe sample. This could be due to people from within the division coming in
to work for Pamol, as discussed by Respondent 5, although the two Bima respondents in
Mosongiseli did not specify that as their occupation. On the other hand, given
Mosongiseli’s higher level of prosperity and standard of living observed by myself and
others on the research team (and also acknowledged by the conservator), it is possible
that this village simply attracts more people from other locations, whereas the native
Balondo Badiko people have less of an incentive to find other places to settle. Another
possibility is that there are simply more people of Bima ethnicity, so these individuals
tend to be more dispersed throughout the area.
The D′ and H′ measures of heterogeneity illustrated in Table 4.4 suggest a
moderate degree of heterogeneity within each community in terms of clan diversity. The
slightly higher values for Mosongiseli reflect the greater number of clan groups indicated
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by respondents there (Table 4.2). Under an assumption of perfect integration within the
community, (un-normalized) D can be interpreted as the probability that two individuals
of the sample population coming in contact with each other belong to a different clan
group. This is around 50% for each village (49% in Fabe; 54% in Mosongiseli).
4.1.3. Integration and Segregation
This section contains an analysis of segregation and integration derived from the
results of chi-square tests of independence and Fisher’s exact tests (Table 4.5),
incorporating details from the survey and data provided by interview respondents to
further qualify and add depth to the statistical results. The chi-square and Fisher’s exact
tests yield p-values that indicate whether a statistically significant relationship exists
between the two characteristics being compared. The chi-square test assumes a null
hypothesis of independence between the variables. This means that there is no
statistically significant difference between demographic groups, and is interpreted as
indicating societal integration among these groups in terms of the secondary demographic
characteristics (considered in this study to be the dependent variables). Dependence
indicates that there is a relationship between the demographic characteristics (that is, one
variable depends on the other variable), and suggests a lack of integration among
demographic groups that is interpreted as segregation. Statistical significance does not
explain integration and segregation in all cases, so the results are further qualified by
detailed analysis of the survey responses and inclusion of data from other sources. The
phi measure of association is used to provide an indication of the strength of the
relationship between the characteristics, while the principal means of analyzing the
patterns of association comes from observing how the column percents change from one
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category of each primary demographic characteristic to the other (Healey, 2007). Because
the chi-square tests are used here as a guide to analysis, where the p-values and strength
of association have suggested characteristics that warrant detailed analysis of the data,
some of the chi-square tests have been identified as “nearly valid” in terms of meeting the
minimum requirements for expected frequencies. These refer to cases in which only one
of the four expected frequencies in the 2 by 2 contingency table is less than 5 and this
expected frequency is at least 3.
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Table 4.5. Statistical measures of integration. Chi-square (Χ 2 ) results that met the validity criterion of having no expected
frequencies less than 5 are denoted with two asterisks (**); those with only one expected frequency less than 5, but at least 3,
have one asterisk (*). Fisher’s Exact p-values are for the 2-sided test. Chi-square and Fisher’s Exact p-values less than alpha =
0.05 are in bold for clarity.
Variable

Measure of
Integration

Statistical
Measure

Χ 2 statistic
Χ 2 p-value
Social
Farmer
Phi
Non-farmer
Fisher's Exact
Χ 2 statistic
Education
Χ 2 p-value
Agency
Below FSLC
Phi
FSLC or above
Fisher's Exact
Χ 2 statistic
Land tenure
Χ 2 p-value
Agency
No land
Phi
Formal or customary
Fisher's Exact
Χ 2 statistic
Location
Χ 2 p-value
Geographical
Inner village
Phi
Peripheral quarter
Fisher's Exact
Χ 2 statistic
Religion
Χ 2 p-value
Social
Christian
Phi
Non-Christian
Fisher's Exact
Χ 2 statistic
Clan
Χ 2 p-value
Social
Minority clan
Phi
Majority clan
Fisher's Exact
Occupation

Gender
(Male or Female)
Fabe
Mosongiseli
0.0879
0.1481
0.7669
0.7003

Age group
Origin
(18-30 or >30)
(Indigene or Allogene)
Fabe
Mosongiseli
Fabe
Mosongiseli
6.0307* 14.5686**
1.4481
1.0836**
0.2288
0.2979
0.0141
0.0001

0.0452

-0.0642

-0.3745

-0.6361

0.1835

0.1735

1
3.1015**
0.0782

1
0.1558*
0.693

0.0398
4.4883*
0.0341

0.0003
4.7301**
0.0296

0.2806
3.8659**
0.0493

0.4887
2.1406**
0.1434

0.2686

0.0658

-0.3231

-0.3625

-0.2998

0.2438

0.104
2.6866
0.1012

0.7115
0.2667
0.6056

0.0675
1.1525
0.283

0.039
0.602
0.4378

0.0943
0.0309
0.8604

0.175
2.9137
0.0878

-0.2471

-0.0861

0.1600

0.1293

-0.0262

-0.2845

0.1884
2.199
0.1381

1
0.1261
0.7225

0.3564
2.5134
0.1129

0.6454
0.6004
0.4384

1
0.0677
0.7947

0.1608
6.0808
0.0137

-0.2261

0.0609

-0.2390

0.1329

-0.0392

0.4229

0.1853
2.6866
0.1012

1
0.3429
0.5582

0.1441
3.2421
0.0718

0.6347
0.5814
0.4458

1
6.3432
0.0118

0.0289
0.5814
0.4458

0.2471

0.0976

0.2714

0.1271

-0.3797

-0.1271

0.1884
7.8300**
0.0051

1
0.0000*
1

0.1547
0.8890*
0.3458

1
0.0602*
0.8062

0.022
23.2258**
< 0.0001

1
31.8462*
< 0.0001

-0.4218

0.0000

0.1406

0.0409

0.7184

0.9405

0.0088

1

0.4921

1

< 0.0001

< 0.0001
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4.1.3.1. Occupation and level of education. The chi-square test for occupation
by age in Mosongiseli met the expected frequency requirement for statistical validity and
gave a statistically significant p-value of 0.0001 from a chi-square test statistic of
14.5686 (Table 4.5). The p-value from Fisher’s exact test was 0.0003, which also
supports rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, there is evidence of a relationship
between the primary demographic characteristic of age and the secondary demographic
characteristic of occupation. The phi value of 0.6361 suggests that this association is
quite strong (Healey, 2007). Examination of the column percents in Table 4.6 reveals that
there was a much greater percentage of respondents who were youth that did not identify
as farmers (92%), while for those respondents older than youths, a large majority (74%)
are farmers. Of the 12 youths who identified as having an occupation other than farming,
nine were students, two worked for Pamol (including one field headman), and one was a
teacher. It is possible that the nine students also are farmers but consider their primary
occupation to be furthering their education. This result suggests that the sample
population may be segregated in terms of occupation, with youth and older populations
spending less time working together in their occupation. In terms of agency, the results
suggest that youth in the sample population may have a more diverse skill set, while the
older respondents could be more limited in their livelihood options, because of their
dependence on farming. Moreover, older segments of the population could be affected to
a greater extent by REDD+ if the program adopts the approach of limiting the size of
farms in the forest in exchange for benefits. This means that under this mechanism, the
older age groups have the potential to gain more in terms of benefits, particularly if
benefits are distributed as individual financial compensation, but also more to lose in a
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scenario where they are required to scale back their farm more than would allow them to
maintain their livelihood.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.6. Occupation by age in Mosongiseli.
Age group
Primary
occupation
18-30
>30
Total
1
17
18
6.5
11.5
Farmer
2.78
47.22
50.00
7.69
73.91
12
6
18
6.5
11.5
Non-farmer
33.33
16.67
50.00
92.31
26.09
13
23
36
Total
36.11
63.89
100.00

The chi-square test of education by age in Mosongiseli gave a test statistic of
4.7301, with a p-value of 0.0296, and Fisher’s exact test p-value of 0.039 (Table 4.5).
From this, there is evidence to reject the null hypothesis and to support the conclusion
that there is a relationship between age and level of education for the sample population
in Mosongiseli. Table 4.7 shows that for youth in the sample population only 15% had
below an FSLC, while for older age groups over half (52%) of respondents had not
attained an FSLC. The value of phi was 0.3625, which indicates a moderately strong
association between the two characteristics. The youth respondents in Mosongiseli who
identified as students had a broad range of educational levels, from below FSLC to above
A-Level, so the fact that these respondents were in the process of increasing their level of
education suggests that the youth demographic group may have considerably greater
capacity in understanding and negotiating formal and written agreements under REDD+.
One respondent from Mosongiseli (Respondent 6) stated that youth and women were the
main demographic groups who complained against Pamol not following the traditional
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processes of gaining access to use a village’s land, and it is not unreasonable to
hypothesize that a higher educational level of the youth could have been a factor for
taking part in this action. While the statistical results suggest that within the sample
population older age groups have a disadvantage in terms of educational capacity, if the
youth are able to share their knowledge and skills then they could help create a more
meaningfully participatory relationship with the REDD+ process and its implementation.
Table 4.7. Education by age in Mosongiseli.
Highest
Age group
level of education
18-30
>30
Total
attained
2
12
14
Frequency
5.0556 8.9444
Below FSLC
Expected
5.56
33.33
38.89
Percent
15.38
52.17
Col Pct
11
11
22
7.9444 14.056
FSLC or above
30.56
30.56
61.11
84.62
47.83
13
23
36
Total
36.11
63.89
100.00

Similarly to the case in Mosongiseli, there is evidence that the characteristics of
occupation and age are not independent of one another in the Fabe sample population.
While the chi-square test did not meet the requirements for validity, the continuity
adjusted chi-square (Yate’s correction) test statistic was 5.7088, giving a p-value of
0.0398. The p-value from Fisher’s exact test yielded the same value of 0.0398 (Table
4.5), which is statistically significant for alpha at 0.05. Moreover, the value of phi was
0.3745, which indicates a moderately strong association within the sample population.
Viewing Table 4.8, it can be seen that there is a greater percentage of youth who identify
as farmers rather than non-farmers in Fabe (57% compared to 43%). This contrasts with
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the case in Mosongiseli where respondents who were youth almost exclusively identified
as non-farmers. For older respondents, however, the trend in Fabe resembled that in
Mosongiseli, with a much higher percentage of non-youths in the sample population in
Fabe identifying as farmers (90%) compared to non-farmers (10%). As in Mosongiseli, a
large proportion of youths who did not identify as farmers stated their occupation as
being a student, but only half of these non-farmer youths in Fabe were students,
compared to three quarters in Mosongiseli. The three respondents in Fabe who identified
as students had a broad range of current educational attainment, including one having an
FSLC, another having completed A-Levels, and one with a Higher National Diploma, but
in Mosongiseli students also included one respondent who had not yet attained an FSLC,
and several who had completed O-Levels, suggesting a higher diversity of educational
levels in Mosongiseli. In the same vein, it is interesting to note (Table 4.1) that in Fabe
there was a higher proportion of respondents having an FSLC or above (70%), relative to
the proportion in Mosongiseli (61%), yet more respondents in Mosongiseli identified as
students, and these individuals were in a wider range of educational advancement.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.8. Occupation by age in Fabe.
Age group
Primary
occupation 18-30
>30
Total
8
26
34
11.07
22.93
Farmer
18.60
60.47
79.07
57.14
89.66
6
3
9
2.9302 6.0698
Non-farmer
13.95
6.98
20.93
42.86
10.34
14
29
43
Total
32.56
67.44
100.00
Frequency Missing = 2
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While the chi-square test for education by age in Fabe (Table 4.9) did not meet
the expected frequency requirement for statistical validity, the continuity adjusted chisquare test statistic was 3.0873 with a p-value of 0.0789. Fisher’s exact test gave a pvalue of 0.0675 (Table 4.5), so both tests provided evidence for a relationship between
education and age group in Fabe, but only at the level of alpha at 0.10, and therefore this
significance should be considered with caution. The value of phi was 0.3231, which
suggests a moderately strong association between the two demographic variables,
similarly to that found in Mosongiseli. The association compares those with essentially
no education to those with at least an FSLC. In Fabe this association is due to many
educated youth-aged respondents having an FSLC (9 out of a total of 12), whereas in
Mosongiseli the binary division into those with no FSLC or those with an FSLC or above
obscures the much larger proportion of educated youth in the sample who have above an
FSLC (7 out of a total of 11). Moreover, a higher proportion of youth respondents in
Mosongiseli were in the process of advancing their level of education, whereas in Fabe
only one respondent below the A-Level identified as a student.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.9. Education by age in Fabe.
Highest
Age group
level of education
18-30
>30
Total
attained
1
12
13
3.9302 9.0698
Below FSLC
2.33
27.91
30.23
7.69
40.00
12
18
30
9.0698 20.93
FSLC or above
27.91
41.86
69.77
92.31
60.00
13
30
43
Total
30.23
69.77
100.00
Frequency Missing = 2
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In my experience of administering surveys to respondents, an FSLC did not
typically provide a sufficient level of education for those individuals to read documents
or converse proficiently in standard English. There is the danger, then, that they could
lack the ability to read and negotiate potentially complex government documents about
REDD+ policy, provided these documents are even written in English rather than in
French. Under the assumption that the sample population is representative of the
educational level in each village as a whole, this would suggest that the villagers in
Mosongiseli have a greater capacity for directly understanding and negotiating the
conditions of REDD+, compared to those in Fabe, who may require a greater degree of
cooperation between youth and older age groups to facilitate knowledge of REDD+
policies that would affect them both. In light of the potential mechanism of rewarding or
imposing restrictions on the area of individuals’ farms in exchange for REDD+ benefits,
this cooperation may be particularly important in Fabe because of the overall higher
proportion of farmers in this village, relative to Mosongiseli, according to the sample
population. Significantly, one interview respondent (Respondent 2) stated that it was the
youth of Fabe who were the primary agents who intervened against Herakles Farms when
the company began to make it clear that they would not allow the villagers to decide
whether or not the plantation could continue. The sample population of youth in Fabe
indicates a more consistent, though generally lower, level of education compared to
Mosongiseli. Nevertheless, more youth in Fabe identified as farmers, and it is possible
that their understanding of, and reliance on, the forest and cropland may have been as
much a motivation for their action than knowledge of formal laws from written
documents.
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In contrast to the chi-square results for level of education by age group (Tables
4.7 and 4.9), which provide cautious evidence for a relationship between these two
variables for both communities, the two chi-square tests of education by gender and
education by place of origin indicate differing statistical significance between the two
villages’ sample populations. The chi-square test of education by gender in Fabe (Table
4.10) met the expected frequency requirement for statistical validity. It gave a test
statistic of 3.1015, so with one degree of freedom this gives a p-value of 0.0782 (Table
4.5), which is statistically significant but only at the level of alpha at 0.10. Thus there is
evidence that the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected, with a degree of
caution, particularly as the p-value from Fisher’s exact test (0.1040) is greater than alpha
at 0.10. The value of phi is 0.2686, which suggests a moderate association between the
variables. Examining the column percents in Table 4.10 shows that for women there is a
slightly higher proportion (57%) of respondents who had an FSLC or above, relative to
those women without an FSLC. For men, the column percents show that a much higher
proportion (82%) have at least an FSLC. From detailed analysis of the survey, the
disparity in educational level in Fabe is found both as a higher proportion of women with
essentially no education, and as a greater proportion of men having degrees more
advanced than an FSLC. Only one woman in Fabe stated she had an O-Level
certification, while for men, respondents included one with an O-Level certification, two
with an A-Level, and two with degrees above A-Level.
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Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.10. Education by gender in Fabe.
Highest
Gender
level of education
Female Male
Total
attained
9
4
13
6.3488 6.6512
Below FSLC
20.93
9.30
30.23
42.86
18.18
12
18
30
14.651 15.349
FSLC or above
27.91
41.86
69.77
57.14
81.82
21
22
43
Total
48.84
51.16
100.00
Frequency Missing = 2

For the test of education by gender in Mosongiseli (Table 4.11), the expected
frequency requirements for statistical validity were not quite met, with one cell having an
expected frequency of 3.5 (the minimum expected frequencies must be at least 5 for all
cells in a 2 by 2 table). Taking this fact into consideration, the continuity adjusted chisquare test statistic was found to be 0.0000, giving a p-value of 1.000. In addition,
Fisher’s exact test produced a p-value of 0.7115 (Table 4.5), providing no evidence to
reject the null hypothesis. The phi value of 0.0658 indicates a week association between
these characteristics, and suggests that there is very little if any difference in the level of
education between men and women in the Mosongiseli sample population. Observing the
column percents in Table 4.11, both men and women have a similar majority of
respondents with at least an FSLC, although the proportion was slightly higher for men
(63%) compared to women (56%). Yet on examination of the detailed results from the
survey, women in the Mosongiseli sample population had a much lower level of
educational attainment compared to men. As was the case in Fabe, only one woman in
Mosongiseli had an O-Level certification, and no women in that community stated that
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they had any degree higher than O-Level. In contrast, three men in the Mosongiseli
sample had attained O-Level certification, four had attained A-Level, and two had
degrees above A-Level. Some of the discrepancy could be due to the sample size (which
is also responsible, in part, for the validity issue of the chi-square test). For a larger
sample of women there is the possibility that more women with higher levels of
education would have been surveyed, whereas in the current sample almost all women
had attained only the minimum level of education, which, as noted earlier, is likely
insufficient to provide the capacity for reading complex documents in standard English.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.11. Education by gender in Mosongiseli.
Highest
Gender
level of education
Female Male
Total
attained
4
10
14
3.5
10.5
Below FSLC
11.11
27.78 38.89
44.44
37.04
5
17
22
5.5
16.5
FSLC or above
13.89
47.22 61.11
55.56
62.96
9
27
36
Total
25.00
75.00 100.00

Comparing the results of the tests for education by gender between the two
villages, it appears that the major difference is not necessarily a much more equitable
distribution of educational attainment in Mosongiseli. Rather, there was simply a higher
proportion of men in Mosongiseli, compared to Fabe, who had essentially no education at
all. Meanwhile, women respondents in Fabe, as well as both men and women respondents
in Mosongiseli, had a relatively high proportion of individuals who had not attained even
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an FSLC. In both villages, however, the samples showed higher levels of educational
attainment for men.
The chi-square test of education by origin in Fabe (Table 4.12) both met the
expected frequency requirements for statistical validity and produced a test statistic of
3.8659, which gives a p-value of 0.0493 (Table 4.5) that is significant at the level of
alpha at 0.05. The p-value from Fisher’s exact test (0.0943) was found to be significant
only at the level of alpha at 0.10, which suggests caution in rejecting the null and
presuming a difference in educational attainment between indigenes and allogenes in
Fabe. The value for phi is 0.2998, suggesting a moderate degree of association between
these two characteristics. Table 4.12 shows that while a majority of both indigenes and
allogenes in the sample have at least an FSLC level of education, a much smaller
percentage of indigenes have below an FSLC (17% for indigenes compared to 45% for
allogenes). Looking at the details of the survey responses, it appears that allogenes do
seem to have an educational disadvantage among the Fabe sample population, in large
degree because of the greater proportion of these respondents with essentially no
education at all. For levels of education above the FSLC, both indigenes and allogenes
included one respondent each having attained an O-Level and A-Level certification, but
indigenes also included two respondents with degrees higher than A-Level, whereas no
allogenes sampled in Fabe had higher than an A-Level certification. In summary,
allogenes in the Fabe sample population had a higher proportion of respondents with no
education, and fewer individuals with advanced levels of education. This result could be
due to the farmer’s field school, which Respondent 3 stated was established by Korup to
educate the villagers on cocoa farming practices. It is possible that allogenes did not have
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the advantage of this educational institution, although the data are not clear on whether
this school provides general education, such as that which could lead to an FSLC, or only
vocational training to improve farming techniques. Nonetheless, while this interview
respondent was an allogene and cautioned about the certainty of his assessment of the
Fabe community, he guessed that the farmers educated there included both indigenes and
allogenes, who then work together accomplishing their farming tasks. Thus, while there
is evidence for a disparity in educational levels between indigenes and allogenes in Fabe,
it may be that the occupational-educational system itself brings integration between these
two demographic groups, both of which consist of farmers in relatively equal proportions
(Table 4.13).

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.12. Education by origin in Fabe.
Origin as indigene or
Highest
allogene
level of education
attained
Indigene Allogene Total
4
9
13
6.9535
6.0465
Below FSLC
9.30
20.93
30.23
17.39
45.00
19
11
30
16.047
13.953
FSLC or above
44.19
25.58
69.77
82.61
55.00
23
20
43
Total
53.49
46.51
100.00
Frequency Missing = 2
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Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.13. Occupation by origin in Fabe.
Origin as indigene or
Primary
allogene
occupation
Indigene Allogene
Total
19
15
34
17.395
16.605
Farmer
44.19
34.88
79.07
86.36
71.43
3
6
9
4.6047
4.3953
Non-farmer
6.98
13.95
20.93
13.64
28.57
22
21
43
Total
51.16
48.84
100.00
Frequency Missing = 2

The chi-square test of education by origin for Mosongiseli (Table 4.14) met the
expected frequency criterion for validity, as was the case for the Fabe sample. The results
diverged in terms of statistical significance, however, with the chi-square test statistic
from the Mosongiseli sample having a value of 2.1406, giving a p-value of 0.1434 (Table
4.5), which does not provide evidence that there is a difference in the level of education
between indigenes and allogenes in the sample population. In this case, the value of phi
was a moderate 0.2438. Interestingly, the association was due to a smaller proportion of
allogenes with no education (23%) relative to the proportion for indigenes (48%) (Table
4.14). Examining the survey responses in more detail, the number of allogenes with
educational attainment above the level of FSLC was also very similar to that for
indigenes. For allogenes, one respondent had an O-Level certification, three had A-Level
certification, and one had a degree above A-Level. For indigenes, there were three
respondents having O-Level certification, two with A-Level certification, and one with a
degree above A-Level. These data support the results of the chi-square test, and the
conclusion that, according to the sample population in Mosongiseli, there is no evidence
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that either indigenes or allogenes are disadvantaged educationally. Therefore, to the
extent that the sample population is representative of the total population of the
community, both demographic groups likely have about the same capacity for
understanding and communicating any REDD+ information in standard English.
Moreover, if both groups are involved in participatory decision-making they could
increase their capacity by combining their educational assets, and indigenes could have
more to gain from this given their greater proportion with no education.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.14. Education by origin in Mosongiseli.
Origin as indigene or
Highest
allogene
level of education
attained
Indigene Allogene Total
11
3
14
8.9444
5.0556
Below FSLC
30.56
8.33
38.89
47.83
23.08
12
10
22
14.056
7.9444
FSLC or above
33.33
27.78
61.11
52.17
76.92
23
13
36
Total
63.89
36.11
100.00

4.1.3.2. Land tenure, within-village location, and religious identification.
None of the chi-square tests of independence for the demographic characteristics of land
tenure status, location of residence within the village, or religion met the expected
frequency requirement for statistical validity (Table 4.5). This was largely because of the
need to condense each of the secondary demographic characteristics into only two
categories, constrained by the requirement of maintaining some form of meaning in the
categorization. This tended to result in one of the two categories containing a large
number of respondents, leaving the other category with few respondents to distribute into
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each of the two categories of the primary demographic characteristic. As an example, for
the characteristic of land tenure status, the dichotomy was chosen to have one category of
respondents with either formal or customary ownership of land, and the other category to
consist of respondents with no land ownership at all. From Table 4.1 it can be seen that a
much larger proportion of the sample population in both communities indicated that they
had either formal or customary ownership of land, relative to those with no land. In the
case of land tenure status by origin in Mosongiseli (Table 4.15), only six respondents
indicated that they owned no land, whether formal or customary. In the chi-square
analysis, this meant that these six respondents would be distributed according to the
proportion of respondents who identified as indigenes or allogenes. The result is an
expected frequency of 3.8333 indigenes with no land, and 2.1667 allogenes with no land.
Therefore, the results run the risk of not fitting an approximation to the chi-square
distribution required for statistical validity of the test. Because of this, the analysis for
these three secondary demographic characteristics – land tenure, location in village, and
religion – relies on the p-value given by Fisher’s exact test to determine statistical
significance.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.15. Land tenure by origin in Mosongiseli.
Origin as indigene or
allogene
Land tenure status
Indigene Allogene Total
2
4
6
3.8333
2.1667
No land
5.56
11.11
16.67
8.70
30.77
21
9
30
19.167
10.833
Formal or customary
58.33
25.00
83.33
91.30
69.23
23
13
36
Total
63.89
36.11
100.00
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As stated earlier, for the demographic characteristic of land tenure status, no chisquare tests of independence met the expected frequency requirement for statistical
validity, necessitating reliance on Fisher’s exact test to determine statistical significance.
For land tenure status none of the p-values from Fisher’s exact test were less than either
alpha at 0.05 nor alpha at 0.10, providing no evidence of an association between land
ownership and gender, age group, or place of origin in the sample population of either
community. This suggests that there is no disparity in land ownership between men and
women, youth and older respondents, nor indigenes and allogenes. The finding is
significant to the research particularly because according to both interview and survey
respondents there can be considerable hurdles to allogenes obtaining land. For instance,
Respondent 4 stated that in Fabe some allogenes are free to claim land that they would
like to farm, whereas others whom the chief and chief council believe will create conflict
in the community are required to pay for the land. In Mosongiseli, Respondent 5 said that
all allogenes are required to pay FCFA 50,000 to 60,000 to claim farmland in the village,
and must additionally feed the community with a pig and other food and drinks. Notably,
only two of the respondents who stated they did not own land also did not grow crops in
the forest. One of these respondents was a forester who lives in Fabe only part of the
time, and the other was a pastor visiting Mosongiseli from Nigeria. Thus, it appears that
those who do not own land are still dependent on growing crops on land in the forest, but
may not see direct benefits from changing the size of their farm under REDD+.
For the secondary demographic characteristic of place of residence within the
village (variable Location), the only statistical test that gave a significant p-value was
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Fisher's exact test for location by origin in Mosongiseli (Table 4.16), which was 0.0289
(Table 4.5) and therefore significant at the level of alpha at 0.05. The value of phi was
0.4229, which suggests a strong association between place of residence within the village
and place of origin for respondents in the sample population. Both indigene and allogene
respondents lived in inner parts of the village (Becheke, Genie Street, and Mbenge) in
greater proportions than in peripheral quarters (Church Quarter, School Yard, and
Public). But examining the column percentages in Table 4.16 shows that over a third of
respondents who identified as allogenes lived in one of the peripheral quarters, whereas
this was the case for less than 5% of indigenes in the sample population. If the sample is
representative of the total population of Mosongiseli, this result suggests there may be a
certain degree of geographical segregation in Mosongiseli. All three interview
respondents in Mosongiseli stated that there are many new allogenes in the community
since Pamol established their plantation in the village, which, according to Respondent 5
only began six months ago. In this short time, these allogenes may not have had time to
integrate into the geographical space of the community.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.16. Village location by origin in Mosongiseli.
Origin as indigene or
Where respondent
allogene
lives within village
Indigene Allogene Total
22
7
29
19.618
9.3824
Inner village
64.71
20.59
85.29
95.65
63.64
1
4
5
3.3824
1.6176
Other quarter
2.94
11.76
14.71
4.35
36.36
23
11
34
Total
67.65
32.35
100.00
Frequency Missing = 2
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However, in looking at the survey details only one of the four allogenes who lived
in a peripheral quarter specifically stated that their occupation was working for Pamol.
The result is also in contradiction with Respondent 6 who stated that allogenes are mixed
together in the different quarters of the village.17 Because of the modest sample size and
uneven breakdown of the geographical categories between inner village and peripheral
quarter, further caution should be placed on using the statistical results to infer
segregation within the community. Nonetheless, if the conclusion of geographical
segregation were sound for the population of the community as a whole, this finding
would be important because it could impact the degree to which allogenes tend to
socialize and communicate with indigenes, simply because they would spend less time in
the same geographical location. Despite this, the result does not necessarily mean that
allogenes are disadvantaged because of where they live in the community, especially
because the peripheral quarters are closer to the main road, which provides access to
markets and other population centers. Yet if social segregation follows geographical
segregation this process could limit the capacity of allogenes to participate in decisionmaking and any negotiations for benefits from REDD+.
The secondary demographic characteristic of religion did not meet the minimum
expected values needed to produce statistically valid chi-square results in any of the tests,
suggesting that little weight should be given to their statistical findings. In Mosongiseli,

17

Notably, this respondent herself lived in a peripheral quarter of Mosongiseli
and was originally from another village, although she identified as belonging to the
majority Balondo Badiko clan.
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only one survey respondent was non-Christian, so the results in that community suggest a
lack of religious heterogeneity more than integration of different religious demographic
groups within the sample population. For the community in Fabe, the only statistically
significant finding was for the test of religion by place of origin. In this case, Fisher’s
exact test gave a p-value of 0.022 (Table 4.5), which is significant at the level of alpha at
0.05, and the value of phi was 0.3797, possibly indicating a strong association between
religious affiliation and place of origin. Table 4.17 shows that among the sample
population only indigenes were non-Christians. This included all three Muslims and all
three respondents who observed traditional religion. Because a large proportion of the
sample population in Fabe were Christians (86%), this could mean that during times of
worship the Christian population is very integrated according to other demographic
characteristics such as place of origin and clan group. In fact, the row percents in Table
4.17 show that a slight majority (55%) of Christian respondents were allogenes. On the
other hand, the survey did not ask the respondents to specify which denomination they
considered themselves to belong, so there is still the possibility that the Christian
populations are segregated by denomination according to place of origin. Because all
non-Christians in the sample population are natives, they are less likely to be excluded
from decision-making in Fabe, where, according to Respondent 1, allogenes are
prevented from serving on the village council. Aside from the Village Forest
Management Committee, which was established to coordinate with the Korup Project, the
village council is the main body that decides how the community uses the forest, both in
terms of forest usage, such as the distribution of logging revenues, and in deciding
whether individuals have access to forest land for growing crops (Respondent 2,
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Respondent 4). Consequently, there is no evidence to indicate that non-Christians in Fabe
will be disadvantaged in access to benefits from the forest, nor in local decision-making
and benefit distribution from REDD+.

Frequency
Expected
Percent
Col Pct

Table 4.17. Religion by origin in Fabe.
Origin as indigene or
allogene
Religion
Indigene Allogene Total
17
21
38
19.864
18.136
Christian
38.64
47.73
86.36
73.91
100.00
6
0
6
3.1364
2.8636
Non-Christian
13.64
0.00
13.64
26.09
0.00
23
21
44
Total
52.27
47.73
100.00
Frequency Missing = 1

4.2. Agency and REDD+
This section analyzes the agency of respondents according to dimensions of
attitudes, understandings, and empowerment (Figure 1.1). The extent to which a diversity
of shared perspectives exists within each community indicates a stronger potential for
collective action according to the Wilkinson’s field-interactional theory (Bessant, 2012).
The section begins with an examination of understandings of the forest and policies. I
propose that these understandings inform the opinions and intentions of the community
members, which are analyzed next. Finally, access to decision-making and access to
forest land and resources are investigated as factors of empowerment.
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Table 4.18. Responses to questions about agency and REDD+. Percentages are given as
percentage of responses for each question, as in Tables 4.1 to 4.3. Several questions in
this table were dependent on responses to earlier questions, therefore some response rates
are lower because respondents were directed to skip the question if it did not apply to
them.
Question
Category Context
Total
Context
Fabe
Mosongiseli
Sample
Responses
Responses
Responses
n
%
n
% n
%
Fabe
45
100
0
0 45
55.6
Village
Mosongiseli
0
0
36
100 36
44.4
Total responses
45
100
36
100 81
100
Culture & religion
25
55.6
14
38.9 39
48.1
Recreation
18
40.0
24
66.7 42
51.9
Learning
22
48.9
22
61.1 44
54.3
Forest
importance
Social cohesion
16
35.6
20
55.6 36
44.4
Beauty
23
51.1
28
77.8 51
63.0
Food
44
97.8
35
97.2 79
97.5
Other
9
20.0
2
5.6 11
13.6
Total responses
45
100
36
100 81
100
37
82.2
35
97.2 72
88.9
Used NTFPs Yes
No
8
17.8
1
2.8 9
11.1
Total responses
37
100
35
100 72
100
Food or drink
35
94.6
31
88.6 66
91.7
Medicine
29
78.4
32
91.4 61
84.7
Construction material
33
89.2
34
97.1 67
93.1
Tools
33
89.2
32
91.4 65
90.3
32
86.5
32
91.4 64
88.9
NTFP Usage Fragrances
Livestock food
27
73.0
30
85.7 57
79.2
Ornaments
27
73.0
33
94.3 60
83.3
Fuel wood
37
100
33
94.3 70
97.2
Other fuels
24
64.9
29
82.9 53
73.6
Other uses
2
5.4
1
2.9 3
4.2
Total responses
37
100
35
100 72
100
Subsistence
33
89.2
35
100 68
94.4
NTFPs
Trade by barter
12
32.4
29
82.9 41
56.9
livelihood
To sell
34
91.9
30
85.7 64
88.9
Other livelihood uses
4
10.8
1
2.9 5
6.9
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Table 4.18 Continued
Total responses
Crops in
Yes
forest
No
Total responses
Subsistence
Crops
Trade by barter
livelihood
To sell
Other livelihood uses
Total responses
Decision
Yes
involvement
No
Total responses
Involvement
Yes
change
No
Total responses
REDD
Yes
sensitization
No
Total responses
Very likely
Community
Likely
benefits
Somewhat likely
Not at all likely
Total responses
Very likely
Financial
Likely
benefits
Somewhat likely
Not at all likely

45
40
5
40
37
10
36
3
44
31
12
43
9
34
44
3
41
36
20
5
4
7
37
17
6
8
6

100
88.9
11.1
100
92.5
25.0
90.0
7.5
100
70.5
27.3
100
20.9
79.1
100
6.8
93.2
100
55.6
13.9
11.1
19.4
100
45.9
16.2
21.6
16.2

36
33
3
33
32
26
30
1
31
17
14
32
7
25
29
4
25
33
16
6
4
6
31
17
6
6
2

100
91.7
8.33
100
97.0
78.8
90.9
3.0
100
54.8
45.2
100
21.9
78.1
100
13.8
86.2
100
48.5
18.2
12.1
18.2
100
54.8
19.4
19.4
6.5

81
73
8
73
69
36
66
4
75
48
26
75
16
59
73
7
66
69
36
11
8
13
68
34
12
14
8

100
90.1
9.9
100
94.5
49.3
90.4
5.5
100
64.0
34.7
100
21.3
78.7
100
9.6
90.4
100
52.2
15.9
11.6
18.8
100
50.0
17.6
20.6
11.8

4.2.1. Understandings
4.2.1.1. Understandings of the forest. To understand how community members
experience the forest, respondents were first asked to indicate the forest’s importance to
them for various sociocultural purposes. The answer choices (Table 4.18) were drawn
from Ngwatung and Roger’s (2013) investigation of uses for NTFPs among communities
north of KNP, and Wilson’s (1993) biophilia hypothesis. In both villages all but one
respondent (over 97%) said that the forest was important to them for food, indicating a
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basic reliance on the forest for practical subsistence uses. On the other hand, the more
abstract concept of beauty of the forest ranked second (in Mosongiseli) and third (in
Fabe). Interestingly, cultural and religious practices were second most important among
respondents in Fabe, but of least importance to those in Mosongiseli. This might be
attributable to the lower degree of religious heterogeneity, and to more of the allogene
respondents in Mosongiseli being recent arrivals to the village with less attachment to
place. Indeed, the three Pamol headmen surveyed did not indicate this as an important
value of the forest to them. Moreover, in Fabe two thirds of respondents who were
Muslim or observed tradition religion (2 out of 3 for each religious category) stated that
the forest was important to them for cultural and religious practices, which was above the
56% proportion for the Fabe sample as a whole. No aspect was valued by less than one
third of respondents, indicating a fairly broad diversity of shared sociocultural
understandings of the forest.
During the surveys and interviews, some respondents attributed religious
understandings to the forest and land. Regarding forest conservation, Respondent 1
conceptualized his village of Fabe as the Garden of Eden, and Herakles as the serpent
telling them lies to drive them out of it. When asked about his experiences with forest
conservation, one survey respondent in Mosongiseli likened the forest to an ark for
preserving species for future generations. A Nigerian pastor in Mosongiseli stated that he
was in favor of development, because “God is God of development”. He was therefore
hopeful that REDD+ would bring these kinds of changes, although skeptical that the
program would be truthful. This view was due to his experience that Pamol had made
many promises to the village that they would bring light, employment, and hospitals. But
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the company did not deliver these benefits, and instead brought in the gendarmes (a paramilitary wing of the Cameroon armed forces) to quell down their protest.
In both villages almost all respondents had used forest resources, specifically
plant and animal products from the forest, in the last year. A somewhat greater
percentage of respondents in Mosongiseli (97%) replied that they had used NTFPs,
compared to those in Fabe (82%). Among those who had used NTFPs, all of the purposes
given as answer choices were indicated by at least 73% of respondents in both villages
(Table 4.18). These were drawn from Ngwatung and Roger (2013), and included both
practical uses like tools, and fuelwood, as well as for cultural practices such as making
ornaments or decorations.
The overwhelming majority (over 85%) of respondents who used NTFPs in each
village both sold them and used them directly for subsistence (Table 4.18). All
respondents in Mosongiseli who obtained NTFPs from the forest used them for
subsistence, and nearly 90% of those in Fabe used them in this way. Among those
surveyed in Fabe, only about a third engaged in trade by barter with NTFPs, while in
Mosongiseli this means of livelihood was almost as prevalent as selling them. The results
suggest that NTFPs constitute an important part of local people’s livelihoods in both
direct subsistence as well as monetary sale. Two interesting uses indicated in Fabe
included NTFPs as gifts, and as part of studies.18
As for understandings of the forest land, nearly all respondents (around 90% in
each village) made use of forest land in order to grow crops. Most of the respondents in

18

A student surveyed said he had found an electric fish in local waterways and
this became part of a class report.
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each village (72% in Fabe, 76% in Mosongiseli) grew cocoa on these farms. Other crops
included a variety of root vegetables such as cassava and yams, as well as various fruits
and other vegetables. Roughly the same proportion of respondents in each village used
crops for the three means of livelihood as for NTFPs. Thus crops grown on farms in the
forest also appear to comprise an important part of livelihood needs and play an
important role in the local economy. This corroborates what Respondent 1 said regarding
cocoa, a crop that he maintained was the basis of the local economy. In addition, one
respondent each in Fabe stated that they had used crops grown in the forest for shelter or
as gifts.
It is important to note that in both villages interviewees (Respondent 3 in Fabe
and Respondent 5 in Mosongiseli) stated that most of the forest land is understood to be
held communally as a common resource. Whatever an individual has cleared and has
begun working is considered the person’s property, however. So there exists two major
regimes of land ownership, and possibly two different levels of decision-making
(community-wide and individual) that would be necessary for the effective
implementation of REDD+.
The widely held reliance on both NTFPs, as well as crops grown in the forest,
suggests a shared understanding of the forest as a means of livelihood that could lead to
collective agency, and also explains conflicting views about development, conservation,
and uses of the forest for industrial agriculture. As Respondent 3 stated, acknowledging a
hint of irony,
If they really come up, [REDD+] will help to conserve the forest.
But all the same, when we talk of conservation - naturally, I hear
that there can never be construction without destruction. People

138

here have to live. And they only can live through farming. And no
effective farming can take place without deforestation.

To solve this contradiction, two survey respondents in Fabe and Respondent 7 in
Mosongiseli suggested having separate areas of the forest. Some areas would be for
REDD+, while other areas would allow for cultivation or development activities.
4.2.1.2. Knowledge and understandings of forest policies.
Community forestry. In speaking with interview respondents in Fabe there
appears to be a great deal of confusion over community forestry in that village. Some
respondents were not really aware that there was a community forest, and, for instance,
Respondent 1 only knew that a signboard reading “government land” had been erected
along the main road. The signboard was installed during the Herakles issue without the
knowledge of most of the community. Respondent 2 believed that Fabe was only part of
Mundemba Council Forest, and despite being a member of the Village Council did not
seem to know that a community forest was in the making. Respondent 4, who is probably
a member of the Bima Youth Association, stated that the community had established a
community forest in response to Herakles, as an effort to set aside a portion of forest that
could be leased out to commercial interests such as industrial agriculture. This
community forest was going to be carved out of the Mundemba Council Forest, with
assistance from the local NGO known as SEFE (Struggle to Economize Future
Environment), but paperwork for it had not yet begun. This narrative was confirmed by
Chief Ekokola who had the same understanding of the issue as Respondent 4.
In contrast, interview respondents in Mosongiseli had a good deal of knowledge
of the community forest situation, although it should be noted that three of these
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respondents were members of MBABCIG (Mosongiseli Balondo Badiko Common
Initiative Group – the name of the executive committee for Mosongiseli’s community
forest). Here the status of the community forest was clear. It currently has a provisional
management convention (PMC) that was obtained after the German-funded organization
PSMNR-SWR provided additional funds for its elaboration and “pushed the community
forest right to the level of Yaoundé” (Respondent 5) over 11 years after the process
began. The MBABCIG members were worried that after their now 14-year struggle to
formalize the community forest the entire process might be reversed before they are able
to secure a final management convention (FMC). The PMC expires after three years, by
which time the community must elaborate a simple management plan to obtain its FMC.
Because the elaboration costs around 5 million FCFA (about US$10,000), they need to
acquire a timber exploiter that will advance them the money to conduct the inventory
over the entire community forest area. The community found a company, Cawadel, to
exploit their forest and fund the elaboration, but in the meantime the director of the
company died and passed the company to his wife, who may have been involved in
mishandling money for the elaboration. This has caused a controversy within the
company and the community is now without an exploiter to fund the next stage of the
process before the PMC expires.
Industrial agriculture. Oil palm is the major agro-industry that the communities
have interacted with, and these interactions have been quite different for the two
communities. When Herakles Farms came into Fabe they made a number of promises to
the community that were never borne out. According to interview respondents there,
these promises included that the company would bring electricity to the community. The
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borehole was constructed, but is no longer functional. Because of these false promises,
much of the community other than the chief and some elders turned against the company.
With the help of several NGOs (SEFE, Greenpeace, Nature Cameroon, and Center for
Environment and Development [CED], according to Respondent 1) the company has
essentially left the village, although the nursery remains and is currently selling the
remaining palms.19
Meanwhile, the parastatal company Pamol recently established a plantation in
Mosongiseli. According to interview respondents the company did not follow the
ordinary procedures for establishing in the community, and as stated above this was
briefly met by resistance from youth and women. Since that time there does not appear to
have been much conflict between the community and the company, although Respondent
5 stated that Pamol refused to provide them any rent for use of their communal lands,
instead offering a 50-hectare oil palm plantation to the community. He also stated that the
community was approached by SGSOC about three years earlier. The community signed
a contract with the company after it promised to bring water, electricity, and a modern
zinc roof to every villager. In the meantime, the national government decided that the
company’s paperwork was not up to par, and subsequently Pamol was allowed to
establish its plantation on the village’s lands.
Forest conservation. The community in Fabe has generally good relations with
the Korup Project and park staff. While conducting fieldwork in the village the park staff
held a meeting with the community during which they discussed Fabe’s Conservation and
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Interestingly, Respondent 5 mentioned that the nursery in Fabe was selling their
palms to some individuals in his Mosongiseli Village.
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Development Agreement (CDA). The staff brought a projector and a laptop that they
projected onto a screen in the hall where the meeting was being held. The park rated the
community on a scale from 0 to 5 on its obligations under the CDA, and the village rated
the park, with youth, women, and men each giving a score, then averaging the three.
Evidently the same kind of meetings are held from time to time in Mosongiseli as well.
Most of the ratings from the park were a 4, and those from the community were generally
similar, although sometimes the scores from one group or another were substantially
lower. For instance, the women in attendance gave a 0 to the park in relation to CDA
aspect of “Community ensure transparent use of conservation initiatives,” and the park
also gave a low score of 2.5 for the village. Respondents maintained that Fabe has
received a large amount of support from the Korup Project, and they only experienced
minor disagreements. Korup, with financial assistance from GIZ, has given them two
classrooms, a functioning borehole, and less than 20 years earlier had provided
significant support for the road that Respondent 1 states is vital to their economy. The
Korup Project also operates a farmer’s field school in the village that teaches villagers
sustainable cocoa farming methods. One interviewee (Respondent 3, an allogene), stated
that Korup was also very important in deciding how the village uses its forest, in that the
project had established eight-member Village Forest Management Committees (VFMCs).
Respondent 5 in Mosongiseli is a member of that community’s VFMC, and as the
Cluster Facilitator, he serves as the head of the committee and provides a monthly report
to the conservator of the park. It was in this capacity that he wrote down and sent the
letter that his community composed regarding the peripheral zone issue. According to the
conservator, the peripheral zone has always existed since the park was established. In
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talking to respondents in the village they appear to believe that it is a new development;
that before there had been a smaller buffer zone, but now KNP is expanding its range up
to the middle of their village because of the Peripheral Zone. The Peripheral Zone also
happens to be where the village carries out its farming activities, so after receiving no
response from the Conservator they have continued farming in the area. Despite this
issue, there does not seem to be strong conflict with the park or the Korup Project. This
sentiment was stated by Respondent 7 and the peripheral zone issue did not come up
when survey respondents were asked about their experiences with forest conservation,
including KNP. The villagers here do not see Korup as providing many benefits to them,
however. Korup built a small wooden schoolhouse in 1990, and has given a scholarship
to a primary school student, but generally the benefits from the project have been
minimal. More substantial infrastructure has come from FEICOM, which financed a new
and much more durable schoolhouse, and from a rural development project called
Rumpi,20 which provided two new boreholes.
REDD+. While Freudenthal et al. (2011) note that KNP was in the planning
stages as a REDD+ pilot project, and an employee at the Korup Head Office in
Mundemba had recently been solicited by the representative of a German/British carbon
market company, the survey and interviews with villagers found that very few had heard
of the program. Specifically, three respondents (about 7%) in Fabe, and seven in
Mosongiseli (about 14%) had heard of REDD+. These numbers may even be slightly
over-estimated because some respondents initially confused REDD+ with the Red Cross,
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According to Chief Ekokola, Rumpi was part of SOWEDA, the Southwest
Development Association, in collaboration with the territorial administration.
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although members of the research team attempted to address this misunderstanding once
it became apparent early in the fieldwork. In Fabe the main source of REDD+
information was NGO workers, while respondents in Mosongiseli gave various media
sources as the most prevalent. Out of the seven interview respondents only one was
familiar with REDD+, and this was Respondent 5, who is the community’s chief
councilor and cluster facilitator of the VFMC. That few villagers had been informed
about REDD+ is not particularly surprising given that the program has not officially
begun in the area, and in fact the online resource, The REDD Desk (2016), lists the
project cited by Freudenthal et al. (2011) as having been put on hold as of 2013. Ideally
some sensitization process would have begun by this point, nonetheless, since the area
has been earmarked as a future REDD+ project site for some time.
4.2.2. Attitudes.
4.2.2.1. Community forestry. In Fabe, the intention to form a community forest
was not known by all respondents, with Respondent 1 believing that the government had
put the signboard up without consulting the community, and expressing resentment that
this action was taken in such a manner. Curiously, Respondent 4 stated that the
establishment of a community forest there was being aided by SEFE, which was the same
NGO that Respondent 1 understood as being helpful to the efforts he supported in
opposition to Herakles. In Mosongiseli, Respondent 5 and Respondent 7 expressed
frustration with the process of establishing their community forest. After 14 years, at least
1 million FCFA spent, and nearly abandoning the effort before obtaining their PMC,
MBABCIC is faced with the possibility that the government will now cancel the
community forest if they cannot find an exploiter to finance the next stage of the process.
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They are therefore looking for another exploiter, following the debacle with Cawadel, but
Respondent 7 expressed that they are happy that at least they have finally obtained their
PMC.
4.2.2.2. Industrial agriculture. According to interview respondents in Fabe, the
issue with Herakles Farms is the only major point of disagreement within the community
(Respondent 1, Respondent 4). Respondent 1 and Respondent 3 believed that the chief
and certain community elders were the significant social groups in favor of the company.
Respondent 2 stated that the youth association organized against it, although Respondent
4 (who was likely a member of the youth association) stated that opinions on the issue did
not vary according to demographic characteristics, with some villagers approving and
some not, based on their personal preference. According to Respondent 2 there are also
some villagers who remain undecided about the issue. Respondent 1 indicated that more
people in the community were against the company than for it. In describing why these
villagers were not happy about the plantation he conveyed that some women were upset
because it would interfere with their livelihood of gathering NTFPs, and that many
members of the community turned against Herakles when they discovered that the
company had made promises that they did not intend to follow through on. He also
expressed his appreciation of the forest’s biodiversity that he believed should be
maintained for posterity:
If we can compare palms with the forest, we don’t have njansanga
there, we don’t have poga tree, we don’t have mango tree there. . .
. So that sort of thing we don’t want. That is what we can do for
conservation. We want our land to remain with us in this way.
While we make our small small farms, our little one’s generation –
it may be [that] Fabe in 100 years is not our Fabe – all of us are
gone, dead, rotted. But these young men . . . are the future of
Cameroonians for tomorrow. They might do better than what we
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are trying to do. So if [REDD+] will come and assist us to
conserve our area more, we will be happy, rather than destroying.
As stated above, the community of Mosongiseli has not received royalties from
Pamol for use of the village’s communal lands, instead offering only a modest oil palm
plantation as compensation. Moreover, some segments of the community were not happy
that Pamol did not follow the expected norms for companies that come in to use a
village’s land. As Respondent 6 explained, through translation from the Pidgin,
“Normally [we] will be hearing that they bring things, they see the village, they explain
what they are trying to do.” But Pamol neglecting these actions prompted the youth and
women to organize against the company at first, until the DO came in to resolve the
dispute. Since that time there has not been considerable tension between the community
and Pamol. Despite these issues, Respondent 5 and Respondent 8 maintained that the
community has the intention to allow Herakles to return and use part of their land if the
national government decides to approve the company’s paperwork.21 According to
Respondent 8, support for Herakles comes from the many promises that the company
made to the community, and this respondent is confident that Herakles will indeed fulfill
these pledges because of the agreement that the community signed with them.
4.2.2.3. REDD+ and conservation. Both REDD+ and conservation are addressed
together in this section because of the overlapping nature of REDD+, as a form of ICDP,
and potential similarities to past and current measures taken by the Korup Project in its
conservation initiatives. Several mechanisms of benefit sharing have been proposed for
REDD+ in Cameroon. Fobissie et al. (2012) briefly evaluate the AFF tax, community
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I did not ascertain what groups within the community were for or against this
plan, if not the “whole village” as claimed by Respondent 8.
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forestry, payment for environmental services (PES) projects, and land fees from
agricultural concessions. Assembe-Mvondo et al. (2013) also investigate the agricultural
land fees for use of communal lands that was established by Article 17 of Decree No. 76166 of 27 April 1976. This law is similar to the AFF fee but is applied to agro-industry
and stipulates shares of 40%, 40%, and 20% to the national government, local council,
and village, respectively. Freudenthal et al. (2011) discuss the benefit sharing
mechanisms advanced in Cameroon’s R-PIN that at the time proposed indirect payments
to communities based on the AFF, or direct payments to individuals for conducting what
they describe as essentially forestry work. In 2013, Cameroon’s R-PP proposed several
options, including the AFF, and, vaguely, PES as well as “revenue sharing mechanisms
in other sectors (mining, for example),” that may include options such as the agricultural
land fees (FCPF, 2013a, p.72). In this light, respondents were asked about their
preferences for benefit sharing, specifically how likely they would be to reduce the area
of their farm in the forest in exchange for either indirect community benefits or direct
financial benefits. Examples given for community benefits included infrastructural
improvements such as roads, schools, or pipe-borne water, similar to the benefits that
should be obtained through royalties from the AFF tax or agricultural land fees. Financial
benefits were described as payments directly to the owner of the farm. Responses were
only recorded for those participants who had stated earlier in the survey that they grew
crops in the forest (Table 4.18).
Around half of these respondents said they would be “very likely” to reduce the
size of their farm for community benefits. Similarly, approximately half of respondents in
each village stated they would be “very likely” to reduce the area of their farm in the
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forest for direct financial benefits. The percentage was slightly higher (around 55% in
each case) in Fabe for community benefits and in Mosongiseli for direct financial
benefits. The other three answer choices had roughly similar percentages of responses in
each village for each of the two different benefit sharing scenarios, generally ranging
from 12% to 22% of respondents. One exception was the low percentage in Mosongiseli
that would be “not at all likely” to reduce the area of their farm in exchange for direct
financial benefits (6.5%), suggesting that this option is potentially more acceptable to
respondents sampled in Mosongiseli.
For those who would be “not at all likely” to reduce their farm area under each
scenario, the next question asked to state their opinion for this (albeit hypothetical)
intention. Most responses indicated a concern for loss of livelihood (specifically food or
money) due to reduced crop output, and problems that this might create, such as
increasing hunger for their family or the community as a whole, and difficulties paying
for their children’s education. Several responses framed this as an issue of equitability,
particularly for those who only had a small area that they cultivated, and who could not
afford to reduce the area without potentially serious consequences for their family’s
livelihood. Regarding community benefits, one respondent stated that these things will
not provide them with money, pointing to the local importance of the cash economy, as
was found earlier in the survey with the high percentage of respondents who sold NTFPs
and crops. A respondent in Fabe was concerned that funds for community benefits may
not be managed properly, which is indeed frequently the case among various benefit
sharing mechanisms in Cameroon, including the AFF tax, agricultural land fees, and
community forestry. On the other hand, one person in Mosongiseli preferred community
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benefits over direct financial benefits because “money can be spent or misused quickly”
by individuals. A concern was voiced regarding community benefits that “the forest can
be taken without any arrangement”, but it is not clear if this was viewed as specific for
community benefits.
In discussing the issue with interview respondents, views in both communities
were mixed. One person in each village (Respondent 4 and Respondent 7) stated a
preference for community benefits because these were seen as more durable compared to
financial compensation. On the other hand, Respondent 5 doubted whether benefits
distributed to the entire community would be substantial enough to offset costs incurred
by those who participate in the program, whereas he viewed monetary benefits paid to
individuals as more likely to fully compensate them, and more likely be accepted by the
community. Respondent 1 preferred the direct financial mechanism because he believed
that infrastructure like roads were the responsibility of the government. Both Respondent
3 and Respondent 5 brought up the problem of different layers of ownership of forest
land. In the local conceptualization, virgin primary forest is viewed as belonging to the
community as a whole, while cultivated secondary forest belongs to the individual who
holds customary ownership of that land. This then becomes problematic for REDD+
because the community can decide how to use their communal lands, but individuals
locally have the right to decide what happens with their own land. Thus there could be a
difference between the willingness of the community to use their land for REDD+ and
that of individuals with farms in the forest. For this reason, Respondent 3 stated that he
could not take a position on which type of benefit to prefer, instead the issue would have
to be decided by the community as a whole, at least for the communal forest land.
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When survey respondents were asked about how REDD+ might impact the
community, several of the negative responses were similar to opinions that had been
expressed as to why they would not be willing to reduce the area of their farm for
benefits. These included agricultural concerns about reduced crop yield and damage from
wild animals, societal concerns such as conflicts over benefit sharing and the desire to
pass their farm on to their children, as well as concerns about the way that REDD+ might
be implemented, including the potential for arbitrary appropriation of land by the
government and skepticism that benefits will actually be delivered. For example, one
response from the survey mentioned that Pamol had made promises to the Mosongiseli
community to bring light, employment, and a hospital, but that these were not delivered.
This respondent did view REDD+ favorably, but only in the case that benefits are
actually delivered if promised. Interview respondents from both villages expressed
similar concerns, particularly regarding livelihoods from agriculture. These respondents
also conveyed a certain degree of apprehension based on their experiences with external
institutions. In Mosongiseli, Respondent 5 specifically related the program to his
community’s interactions with KNP and the peripheral zone issue, fearing that REDD+
could interfere with the geographical expansion of the village. He explained his
reasoning, saying “It is just like conservation with Korup National Park. But what I will
say is, if such a forest is quite near a community, and in future the community is
developing – they want more buildings – will such a forest stand in the center of the
town?” Respondent 4 in Fabe seemed to draw on his community’s experiences with
Herakles Farms, communicating that the contract under REDD+ will likely be for a
lifetime (as is the case of the 99-year contract granted by the government to Herakles
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Achobang et al., 2013), and that the community will need to carry out some kind of costbenefit analysis before committing to such an agreement. He also believed that the
community would need outside assistance to conduct this analysis.
Despite these concerns, most survey respondents and all the interview
respondents expressed at least qualified approval of the program, if not unequivocal
acceptance. Support for REDD+ was largely communicated as a desire for socioeconomic development, whether from improvements in infrastructure or monetary
benefits. A few survey respondents stated that reducing the size of their farm would also
have benefits of its own, like spending less time for cultivation or allowing them to
diversify their livelihood with other activities. Several respondents from both villages
stated that they liked the idea that REDD+ could compensate them for reducing their
impact on the forest, creating a balance between conservation and development. This
result is interesting since it is supposed to be precisely the goal of the Korup Project in its
role as an ICDP. When asked about their experiences with forest conservation, no survey
respondents conveyed that the Korup Project had played a part in enhancing their quality
of life though development or infrastructural improvements. In fact, one respondent in
Mosongiseli specifically articulated the view that his community had not received any
significant benefits from the project.
Several respondents voiced their qualified support for REDD+ on the condition
that the program does follow through with any promised benefits, indicating that they
were not entirely confident that the program would deliver on promises of development
or ecological goals. Sometimes this was explicitly based on experiences with other forest
policies or projects, specifically the Korup Project and Herakles Farms in the case of
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interview respondents, although survey respondents did not generally specify the source
of their skepticism. The major concern was that REDD+ would not provide benefits that
would adequately compensate for the loss of livelihood from reduced crop output. Others
simply stated that they would have to see how the program performs before they could
judge it.
Many survey and interview respondents had a favorable outlook for REDD+ to
contribute to beneficial environmental effects. This included increasing the number and
maintaining the biodiversity of trees and animals in the forest, improving stream flow,
reducing erosion, and mitigating climate change. An overwhelming number of survey
responses communicated an appreciation for conservation for reasons similar to the
positive impact that REDD+ could have on the forest. Several respondents in both
communities framed these as benefits for future generations that could enjoy the forest
and its resources. Improving the ecology of the forest would be of value, they said, in
large part because it would preserve forest resources like medicinal plants as well as
plants and animals for food. Other responses included the hope that it would bring
tourism, and boost the morale of the community. Only one respondent was able to
identify a potential negative impact to the forest, saying that reducing the size of her farm
could require her to clear more land if the soil becomes exhausted.
4.2.3. Empowerment
4.2.3.1. Local decision-making institutions. Decision-making within each
community was largely based on traditional institutions, with the chief at the top of the
local decision-making hierarchy, followed by the chief councilor. The village council is
made up of several councilors, who are rotated every few years, and in Mosongiseli
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respondents specifically stated that councilors are elected to this body. The village
assembly is composed of everyone in the community, including women, youth, and
allogenes, whereas allogenes are not allowed to sit on the village council. One survey
respondent from Fabe noted that some decisions are made in Bima clan meetings, which
include members of the Bima clan from many different villages in the area. Other
decision-making structures were brought up in the interviews. In instances where a
dispute cannot be resolved within local institutions, the leadership may take the matter to
the Ndian Division administration in Mundemba. Both communities also have village
forest management committees (VFMCs), that have been instituted by KNP. These eightmember committees are headed by the cluster facilitator, who provides a monthly report
to the conservator of the park. In Fabe, Respondent 3 stated that the VFMC is important
for deciding how the village uses the forest. Respondent 5, who is the cluster facilitator
for the VFMC in Mosongiseli, said that the Korup authorities direct the VFMC on forest
issues. The committee can serve as a two-way line of communication between the park
and the village, however, as it was through his role as the cluster facilitator that the letter
regarding the Peripheral Zone was delivered to the Conservator. KNP also provides
opportunities for involvement in decision-making in the form of community meetings
such as the one in Fabe in which the village rated the park and the park rated the village
on elements of the CDA. Mosongiseli’s community forest executive committee,
MBABCIG, has an elected board of members, but it does not appear that this institution
plays much of a role in forest usage at the moment because the community forest will not
be operational until the FMC is obtained.
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4.2.3.2. Forest access and usage. Villagers were asked about two principal ways
that their community decides on forest usage. These included decisions affecting
individuals or families, and those affecting the whole community or most members of it.
The former refers mainly to access to forest land to grow crops, and the latter to
commercial logging or industrial agriculture. Both communities observe the traditional
axe law for indigenes, who typically are allowed to clear any virgin forest in the village
territory and begin cultivating the land. Allogenes usually have to buy their land and, in
Mosongiseli in particular, provide some food to the chief or the village as a whole.
Respondents in Fabe noted that indigenes sometimes sell their land to allogenes, while in
Mosongiseli payment normally goes to the village council. In both communities,
allogenes must also inform the traditional village authorities of their desire to obtain land.
Malleson (2001) comments that, in the study area, the practice of selling land to allogenes
can complicate issues of land tenure, because the land is not recognized by either formal
or customary laws as belonging to the new tenant. In some instances, this has led to
allogenes and relatively poor indigenes being dispossessed when relatively wealthy elites
claim a formal title to the land that has been paid for. This is a problem to look out for,
but it did not come up in any interviews or surveys, so there is no evidence from the
present study to indicate that this has been an issue in the two study communities.
The two villages appear to have somewhat different understandings and
experiences of decision-making regarding commercial operators. In Fabe, several
respondents stated that NGOs were an important part of decision-making, specifically in
relation to the issue with Herakles Farms. In Mosongiseli, the process for commercial
logging or industrial agriculture is similar to that for an allogene asking for personal
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farmland, in that they must meet with the traditional council and provide payment for the
land. Several respondents described the process as beginning with the commercial
operator approaching the chief, who then assembles the village (not including allogenes),
and the village collectively makes the decision whether or not to allow the activity.
4.2.3.3. Decision-making involvement. A majority of respondents in both
communities stated that they had been involved in decision-making in the last year. In
Fabe, 8 out of 20 allogenes, 7 out of 20 women, and 4 out of 14 youths said they had not
participated in decision-making. Three respondents (comprising 3 allogenes, 2 women,
and 1 youth) had only been involved regarding the SGSOC issue, which, in light of a
comment noted for one respondent, probably referred to a meeting that was held in 2011.
While participation in this meeting is significant given the importance of the SGSOC
issue to the community and its use of the forest, it lies outside the one-year window the
question asked about, suggesting that these respondents have not been involved in day-today decision-making for the village. In Mosongiseli, 8 out of 10 allogenes, 5 out of 9
women, and 3 out of 10 youths who gave a response to this question said they had not
been involved in decision-making in the last year. From this sample, it appears then that
allogenes and women both tended to have lower rates of participation in each village,
while youths are relatively involved. Allogenes in particular were not involved in
decision-making, especially in Mosongiseli. Most respondents in each village had not
seen their role in decision-making change in the last year.
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Chapter 5. Discussion
This chapter begins with an analysis of the hypotheses presented in the
Introduction. These are important for analyzing the theoretical objective, guided by the
first research question, that asks how societal integration is related to collective agency
towards current forest policies. The next section examines some practical implications of
integration and disparities among demographic groups for implementation of REDD+ in
the study area. It focuses on two aspects of REDD+, one of conservation and one of
commodification of the forest, with analysis informed by the insights of professionals
working in development and conservation organizations.
5.1. Relationship of Integration to Collective Agency
While some differences exist in their degree of integration (Figure 1.1), I cannot
make a definitive distinction between the two communities. There are several reasons for
this, which are discussed in the Conclusions chapter (Limitations section). Both
communities share many of the patterns of diversity and integration to a similar extent.
For instance, each sample population was similarly diverse in clan group. Given the
strong association between clan group and place of origin, this likely indicates a similar
diversity in place of origin as well. Community celebrations create a space for processes
of integration in both communities. Both community showed disparities between
demographic groups in terms of education, with women having lower levels of
educational attainment compared to men, and youths having higher levels compared to
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non-youths. This indicates a low degree of agency-based integration in the factor of
knowledge.
There do appear to be some differences in the degree of diversity and integration
between the two communities, and in a majority of these cases Fabe was identified as the
more integrated community, but the actual states or processes of integration remain
hypothetical to a large extent. Fabe is probably more integrated geographically according
to location of residence within the village, as allogenes in the sample population were
found to live more in peripheral quarters in Mosongiseli. The study revealed processes of
social integration in both communities. Fabe showed more potential for social integration
according to occupation, because a similar proportion of youths and the older population
were farmers, and also the farmer’s field school operated by the Korup Project likely
provides a means of integration between indigenes and allogenes. The Diyala society in
Fabe could also provide a setting for integration between women of different origin,
although the data did not specifically indicate the demographic composition of this social
group. On the other hand, Mosongiseli is probably more socially integrated in their
monthly cleanup campaigns compared to Fabe, the latter of which apparently relies more
on women to accomplish this task. Fabe appears to be more integrated hierarchically. In
this village, women have their own elite society, Ekpa, in addition to the men’s Motamo
society. Although genders are not integrated within each individual social group, the
presence of a secret society for women, as well as for men, suggests that the community
affords a certain hierarchical status to women. In addition, Fabe has a higher degree of
religious diversity, and given that all religious minorities in the sample population were
indigenes this probably enhances the hierarchical integration in terms of religion.
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Regarding agency-based factors, the survey indicated that Fabe is likely more
integrated in terms of access to decision-making, because a somewhat higher percentage
of indigenes and women in Fabe reported involvement in decision-making. Mosongiseli
is probably more integrated in the agency-based factor of knowledge, as allogenes in the
village sample population had equivalent or even higher levels of education compared to
indigenes, whereas those in Fabe had lower levels of education. Fabe may be less
integrated in terms of attitudes, specifically towards industrial agriculture, as interview
respondents indicated that there had been divisions between some elders and other parts
of the community on the Herakles issue. Yet respondents also stated that different
demographic groups did not necessarily have cohesive opinions; instead, opinions were
held mainly as an individual choice. Moreover, the disagreement could easily be an effect
of the socially corrosive nature of Herakles’s actions more than any latent difference in
opinions on the matter of allowing industrial operators access to communal lands.
The modes of collective action for each community are categorized in Table 5.1
into qualities of acceptance or rejection and active or passive roles in the interactions.
But the responses were not always coherent throughout the community, and I found that
the ways in which communities asserted their agency varied over time and in response to
different aspects of the policy. The duration of the fieldwork and complexity of the
interactions limited the information available to make a clear assessment in every case.
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Table 5.1. Modes of interaction with forest policies.
Policy
Fabe

Mosongiseli

Forest conservation

Active rejection

Passive acceptance

 Community works with CDA;  Community wrote letter in
appreciation of modest benefits opposition to Peripheral Zone
received
Industrial agriculture Mixed: Passive acceptance
followed by active rejection

Mixed: Active rejection
followed by passive acceptance

 Elites accepted Herakles; other  Youth and women organized
members of community
against Pamol; community
worked with NGOs in
then accepted the company
opposition
 Previously signed agreement
with Herakles
Community forestry Passive acceptance
 Some community members
worked with a local NGO to
establish, but not widely
known

Active acceptance
 14-year attempt by
management committee to
establish, with eventual aid
from international development
agency, despite many
difficulties and setbacks

The first hypothesis was that a greater degree of societal integration results in
collective action that embodies more diverse interests and involves the perspectives of
multiple demographic groups. Addressing this hypothesis is limited by not knowing
precisely what the interests of different segments of the communities were. A more
detailed understanding of socio-economic circumstances would be needed. For example,
there are differences between the two villages in response to industrial agriculture, but
there could also be differences between the villages regarding where local farming
activities take place relative to where the plantations were established. If many
community members in Fabe had farms where land was being set aside for Herakles this
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would significantly disadvantage these families, but if the Pamol plantation in
Mosongiseli was not where most farms were located then this could explain the different
responses more than societal integration and the recognition of different interests during
processes of decision-making.
The second hypothesis proposed that a greater degree of integration results in
stronger responses to forest policies. In this case, it appears that Mosongiseli has taken
more active roles in policy interactions, especially in response to the Korup Project and in
pursuing community forestry. Even regarding industrial agriculture, segments of the
community actively organized against Pamol when the company first came into the
village. It is not clear, however, whether these responses followed from social
interactions between different demographic groups, creating common goals and
motivating action. While integration was observed in more dimensions for Fabe (see
Figure 1.1 for dimensions of agency), Mosongiseli pursued more active roles, in contrast
to the research hypothesis. On the other hand, there is a large amount of uncertainty about
whether the states and processes of integration found in the study actually constituted
integration. Moreover, information on the processes by which collective actions were
taken was not sufficient to make a definitive statement that integration or segregation of
demographic groups led to the policy responses.
5.2. Implications for REDD+
Implications of the institutional analysis for REDD+ implementation in the area
are analyzed in the following sections according to the two frames discussed in the
Introduction chapter: ICDP-related issues, and those associated with monetary or

160

commercial aspects of REDD+. Even though REDD+ is supposed to serve mainly as a
carbon mitigation strategy, for the forest communities most directly impacted by it the
program will probably operate like an integrated conservation and development project
(ICDP) (Blom et al., 2010). ICDPs, including the Korup Project, have caused significant
difficulties for forest communities because of top-down efforts to enforce conservation
goals through resettlement of local populations and livelihood restrictions. This
constitutes the first frame of challenges that forest communities face from REDD+. The
second frame comes from the large amounts of money at stake, as the funding
mechanism for REDD+ is tied in with the international carbon market. This raises
questions about what actors will control the production of carbon, and the distribution of
money from the sale of carbon credits or receipt of REDD+ funds. What mechanism
should be used to distribute benefits from REDD? How should these benefits be shared
within the relevant communities, if the money even reaches down to the local level? If
the communities do receive benefits, will there be conflicts over ownership and
distribution? These issues are addressed in the discussion on carbon commodity issues,
although it is beyond the scope of this work to examine the role of actors outside of the
local or national context, such as investment firms and multilateral institutions.
5.2.1. Forest conservation
Recent trends of decentralizing forest management and investing local
communities with these responsibilities have been motivated in large part by the expense
of centralized approaches to forest conservation (Phelps et al., 2010). To counter this,
there has been a move toward community-based conservation measures. ICDPs were
promoted as a means of encouraging both local participation in conservation measures
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and compensating these communities for costs they were being required to bear in order
to comply with the rules established by the projects (Blom et al., 2010). The Korup
Project has had mixed success in both compensating communities for livelihood
restrictions and its efforts to relocate communities living within park boundaries, which
have been largely unsuccessful in meeting conservation goals while also far outspending
its estimated budget (Diaw & Tiani, 2010; Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). With REDD+, both
the prospects for beneficial outcomes and risks of detrimental effects are increased as
potentially much greater funding is introduced compared to current conservation
spending (Phelps et al., 2010).
5.2.1.1. Conservation, development, and livelihood restrictions. Both of the
study communities exist within the Korup Project Support Zone, so they currently
interact with the park as the principal agent of forest conservation policy. Korup does not
seem to actively restrict farming activities in the two villages, although park authorities
are threatening to enforce the 3km Peripheral Zone in Mosongiseli. In Fabe, Korup
programs helped improve farming techniques, and the road the project partially financed
has brought about livelihood benefits because it facilitates access to markets for locallygrown crops.
When Mosongiseli was faced with restrictions in crop production, the community
possessed the agency to take an active approach to their concerns. While these concerns
have not yet been addressed, there was both the channel to transmit the village attitudes,
as well as organization within the community to take such a coordinated action. This
suggests that the means of communication through the VFMC to the park management
should be a minimum requirement for any similar REDD+ project as a way for
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communities to express their disagreement. The fact that no response has been given
regarding the letter does not, however, bode well for REDD+ implementation. The
community has continued to farm in the area, so the intended conservation goals are not
being met. At the same time, there has been no resolution of the matter, leaving the
community in a position of uncertainty. On the other hand, the park has not taken forceful
or intimidating measures in order to enforce the Peripheral Zone – enforcement that could
be disastrous for both the community and future conservation efforts if not carried out
with a large amount of assistance and compensatory funding. It is important that this
dispute is resolved, and the solutions devised primarily by the community (Agrawal &
Gibson, 1999). Because the local people were not involved to a significant extent when
the rules were developed and the CDA was signed (Schmidt-Soltau, 2004), this would be
a good opportunity to engage the community in participatory decision-making.
Organization 2 has been heavily involved with the Korup Project. The respondent
from this organization expressed the view that the communities have signed the CDA,
and in exchange for receiving development assistance from the project they must respect
the rules and the boundaries of the park. While conservation along with socioeconomic
development may be the project’s intention, benefits to the villages do not appear to be
very substantial. This was particularly the case in Mosongiseli, where the community is
also now being told not to carry out farming and other activities in their traditional
location. A cost-benefit analysis would indicate that complying with this demand requires
considerably greater compensation than the community currently receives from the
Korup Project in development benefits.
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This study did not ask villagers about hunting activities because these are not the
major focus of REDD+, but this is an issue of concern to the Korup Project. Moreover,
requirements for biodiversity safeguards, and the importance of multiple benefits stressed
by UN-REDD (Dickson et al., n.d.), suggest that hunting restrictions are not out of the
question for REDD+ projects. Adequate compensation for opportunity costs could reduce
the pressure for villagers to hunt in support of their livelihood. Also, reducing the size of
farms could allow more time for villagers to undertake other livelihood activities, as
suggested by the survey respondent who stated that he would start a poultry farm if he
were able to spend less time farming. Another option is to encourage partnerships in
which smallholders can harvest abandoned palm plantations, as Organization 1 is
working towards. If REDD+ funds are invested in the capacity to process cash crops
locally, farmers could also make more money for a given amount of farmland, further
reducing deforestation and hunting pressures.22
5.2.1.2. Local participation. While the Korup Project is seeking to increase the
participatory role of local communities, these communities were not substantially
involved in the processes that established the rules that they are now expected to obey
(Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). The meeting in Fabe that I observed looks like a step in the right
direction by involving large parts of the communities in the social processes of
implementing park rules. But the project should also draft new rules with the
communities in which it seeks to work. This would ensure that the rules are accepted by
the current generation of villagers and community leaders, and increase their legitimacy
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Karsenty, Vogel, and Castell (2012, p. 4) refer to this secondary effect as a
potential “benefit” from REDD+ projects, as opposed to financial “rents” gained from
sales of carbon credits.
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for standards of free, prior, and informed consent. These rules should be developed by the
communities themselves in order to be appropriate for the local context and local values,
or risk creating rules that are not followed because they are seen as unreasonable. The
communities should then be invested with the principal authority to implement the rules
(with guidance and assistance from the park and civil society), and resolve problems
arising from the implementation (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). A similar approach is
needed in future REDD+ projects.
It will not be feasible for entire communities to be directly involved in the
national REDD+ process, although representatives from villages should have a direct
role. These representatives need to be from a diversity of demographic groups, and not
only include local or economic elites. The same would be true for sub-national REDD+,
at the regional, divisional, and sub-divisional levels. The conservator of KNP explained
that there are also plans to expand the Korup Project into a landscape-level project,
similar to the TRIDOM landscape in the southern part of the country, by expanding its
range in the north to Takamanda and across the border into Nigeria. Something like the
VFMCs established by Korup for each community could be an option for coordinating
with these larger scales of implementation. Villagers stated that VFMCs are elected and
consist of men, women, youth, and elders. To ensure that all local interests are
recognized, they should also include members who are from a minority clan in their own
communities. However, as noted by Oyono, Ribot, and Larson (2006), the interests of
entire villages should not be condensed into one committee, neglecting the diversity of
views and needs of each community. Moreover, it is important that local committees are
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actually elected by the community, and that women and local minorities are encouraged
to participate in the elections (Oyono et al., 2006, p. 59).
The respondent from Organization 3 says his NGO uses a procedure for
consulting with villages that is similar to the meeting observed in Fabe, and they take the
additional step of ultimately addressing different demographic groups individually. This
method would be helpful in ensuring that segments of the population with lower
participation rates, such as women and allogenes, are included in the discussion and
sensitization. Although the process used in the Korup meeting allowed interactions
between each of the three demographic groups – men, women, and youths – the meeting
that I observed was conducted in a room that was completely full, indicating that smaller
groups would be appropriate for some meetings.
REDD+ projects will need to be formulated on a local scale, probably separately
for each community, with coordination at the divisional, regional, and landscape levels.
The rules for these projects, and also their implementation and resolution of disputes,
should be determined by the communities themselves (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999), not
solely by a government ministry or conservation organization, and then simply presented
to community leaders for their signature. This is not to say that government ministries
and conservation organizations should not play an important role in facilitating the rulemaking process (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). These external actors have the initial
information and capacity to put in place a REDD+ project, and communities will need
candid advice and guidance from them in developing the terms of their local REDD+
project. But the communities involved need to have considerable information on both the
opportunities and the full range of possible risks from participation. Government
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ministries, and particularly civil society organizations, can play a vital role in helping
communities understand the risks they may be exposed to, and how to get the best out of
the project. This information must be provided by organizations that are both
knowledgeable about the local situation, and also have nothing to gain or lose from the
community’s involvement in the project (Vickers, Trines, & Pohnan, 2012, p. 157).
Discussions about REDD+ should include all members of the community in the
processes of decision-making, implementation, and resolving disputes (Agrawal &
Gibson, 1999). In both communities, allogenes were not involved in all levels of
decision-making, and were also disadvantaged in access to forest land and resources.
Both women and allogenes report lower rates of participation in decision-making
compared to youths in both communities. Despite their vital contributions to the cultural
and economic life of the village, women appear to have social barriers to decisionmaking, evidenced for example as their hesitance to provide opinions to the survey.
Allogenes also play a role as stakeholders in the community, so discussions need to
include them. Villagers with very small farms or no land at all need to have opportunities
to contribute, as well, because they are particularly at risk from loss of livelihood and
exclusion from benefits. Women’s relatively weak involvement in decision-making
means that their input should be actively encouraged. Both allogenes and women were
involved in the Herakles discussion, probably through meetings held by the local NGO,
which suggests this could also be an effective model to use in facilitating REDD+
conversations.
Considering voluntary carbon markets, Vickers et al. (2012) urge that community
members need to “learn together” about potential projects, and they should “speak as a
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group” in order to carry more weight when addressing external actors (p. 157). These
recommendations would be effective in negotiating REDD+ projects as well. Youth and
other highly educated community members should be both encouraged and assisted in the
opportunity to learn – in-depth – about the program, and then to share their knowledge
about it with other members of the community. Local youth associations would be
effective venues for this process to take place, if these organizations are mindful to
include women and minority clan groups in order to make the most of the social
resources within the community. Women’s groups, such as Diyala in Fabe, could also
help by providing the setting for these discussions and information sharing. Coordination
and advice from local and national NGOs, such as SEFE and CED, would likewise
strengthen the villages’ capacity in negotiating successful REDD+ policies. Importantly,
the communities must be aided in conducting a thorough cost-benefit analysis before
signing any contracts or agreements. Initial REDD+ funds, as well as grants from NGOs
and development agencies, would be particularly valuable for this purpose.
According to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), “those interested in community-based
conservation should seek to implement reasonable processes of decision-making rather
than focus upon guarantees about outcomes” (p. 641). The authors continue by defining
the characteristics of these “reasonable processes”, including acknowledging the interests
of different segments of the local population. The organizations and government
ministries involved in the rule-making process need to accept the decisions made by the
communities (in collaboration with these external actors). Doing otherwise defeats the
purpose of community-based forest conservation, and will likely be ineffective and
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inefficient for the same reasons that non-participatory approaches to impose conservation
were phased out in the first place (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).
5.2.2. Carbon commodification
While both villages have experienced impacts from conservation, specifically the
Korup Project, the more troubling threats to these communities seem to have come from
industrial agriculture. The companies, aided by state actions, have used oppressive
measures to coerce the communities into accepting appropriation of their land with little
to no compensation. Community members in Fabe stated that Herakles had made many
false promises, and in Mosongiseli, Pamol has refused to pay royalties, claiming that the
company is state-owned and therefore is not required to compensate communities.23 The
report by Achobang et al. (2013) details how Herakles Farms has violated FPIC
principles, operated illegally in the country, and with assistance from government
authorities has harassed and detained those who disagree with its actions. Also, one
respondent mentioned the use of gendarmes in Mosongiseli when the community
complained about Pamol.
Given the contentious nature of disputes over commodified land, it is important to
look at the concerns about REDD+ as it functions as a market for carbon credits. Large
amounts of money are potentially at stake from the sale of credits, and control over this
revenue, as well as the production of credits through ownership of land and carbon rights,

According to the company’s website, the national government has 79.53%
ownership (Pamol, n.d.).
23
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could easily prove as problematic as control of the land for large-scale forest concessions
and agricultural plantations.
5.2.2.1. Issues of free, prior, and informed consent. Any REDD+ projects
implemented in the area must comply with standards of free, prior, and informed consent,
which Mahanty and McDermott (2013) describe as “the central social safeguard” for
protecting the rights and interests of forest communities (p. 407). This means that
methods of intimidation and heavy-handed coercion reported in imposing industrial
agriculture on communal lands in the study villages is in violation of the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, against REDD+ Decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC,
2011), and contrary to the goals Cameroon has committed to in its own R-PP. Detaining
dissidents and bringing in the gendarmes implies that the choice of the communities to
allow the appropriation of their land was far from free, even if the decision was
eventually accepted by the community. Manipulative promises given by the agricultural
companies also violate the principles of freedom from coercion and informed consent.
Moreover, suddenly establishing a large oil palm plantation, as was the case in
Mosongiseli, does not satisfy prior notice for the community to decide whether or not to
accept the project. It is not clear that either community was genuinely given the option to
withhold their consent to Herakles or Pamol, although the community of Fabe did seem
to manage to do so, with assistance from several local, national, and even international
NGOs.
According to the survey results, most people in the study villages have not been
given information yet about REDD+. This situation is the same as that reported for nine
REDD+ projects in Cameroon assessed by Freudenthal et al. (2011), including the one
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planned for KNP, which found that community sensitization was not undertaken.
Villagers will need to be educated about the program, including possible benefits and
risks from involvement in it. This process will need to be undertaken in (Pidgin) English
and local dialects. Given that almost no respondents spoke French, educating villagers in
this area using French would be entirely inappropriate. Moreover, important documents
must be published and available in English. The communities must also be given the
option not to participate, at both the village level as well as that of individual community
members and their families.
Because of fears that villagers will not accept their work, Organization 3
apparently avoids informing villagers that REDD+ could create any limitations for them.
Warning villagers of the risks might not be the best way to begin the conversation, but
involvement in REDD+ projects could have major livelihood impacts, so these issues
need to be discussed. Survey results from the study villages indicated that most
community members rely heavily on farms in the forest, and reducing the area of these
farms could adversely affect their livelihood. On the other hand, most survey respondents
were at least open to the idea of REDD+, even given the recognition that it may require a
reduction in farm area. Moreover, Respondent 5 believed that the villagers in his
community would accept REDD+ if they are sensitized about the program. Therefore,
neglecting to inform villagers of potential risks is both a breach of FPIC standards, and
would also be unnecessary to avoid hostility from community members in the study area
during the sensitization process.
Organization 3 tries to minimize the potential impact of reducing farm sizes by
teaching villagers how to intensify their crop production. This is similar to the approach
171

currently being implemented in Fabe by Organization 2 that teaches villagers how to
improve cocoa harvests, which appears to be valued by the community. Yet the
percentage surveyed in each village who said they would not even consider reducing the
size of their farm for benefits from REDD+ (between 6.5% and 19.4%, Table 4.18)
suggests that a significant number of community members would be severely impacted if
they were required to do so by REDD+. Before any REDD+ project is implemented in
the area, rules need to be established to address this problem in order to ensure that these
families are not dispossessed by the project.
While FPIC is a useful concept to meet minimum standards of fair treatment for
local communities and vulnerable populations, it suffers from a conflict between the need
to secure property rights on the one hand (particularly against powerful state and market
actors), versus relatively informal and communal tenure arrangements on the other.
Mahanty and McDermott (2013) explain that formalizing ownership rights can
disadvantage those who lack even customary land tenure. The results of the survey did
not find any association between demographic group and those with no land ownership.
But it is important not to exclude individuals who do not own land from the REDD+
process and benefit sharing mechanism, whatever segments of the population they may
be from.
5.2.2.2. Benefit distribution options. Organization 3’s “collaborative
framework” works with the government, private companies, NGOs, and local
communities to achieve conservation goals. Cameroon’s R-PP describes the role of
similar players in the country’s REDD+ process. While all stakeholders need to be
involved in order to ensure that the relevant actors are in agreement, it is important that
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powerful commercial interests like mining, timber, and industrial agriculture are not
allowed to have undue influence on the process, excluding the rights of local
communities. The respondent from Organization 4 used the metaphor of a cake to
describe forest and land policy in Cameroon. In this analogy, the forest is divided up into
pieces by the government, with different sectors receiving bigger or smaller portions
depending principally on the amount of money they have to influence government
officials holding the knife in the allocation process. In his assessment, loggers receive the
largest piece, followed by conservation. Local communities typically receive the smallest
share. Cameroon’s R-PP is ambiguous on the actual role that private entities will play in
the REDD+ process, but does state that “the private sector, not only logging, but also
mining and petroleum, agriculture, etc., may seize the REDD+ [sic] as a business
opportunity” (FCPF, 2013a, p. 15). Local communities, which are often the least
powerful actors in land and forest issues, could lose out in power struggles that are not
closely monitored by civil society organizations.
What are some possibilities for handling REDD+ funds, and the mechanism of
REDD+ benefit distribution? One option proposed in Cameroon’s R-PP is to use the
model of the AFF tax established by the 1994 Law, which allocates 50% of annual timber
concession fees to the national government, 40% to the village councils and FEICOM,
and a final 10% to the communities on whose communal land the concession is located.
Unfortunately, as currently applied in the forestry sector, this system has been regrettably
inadequate in delivering even the meagre 10% of revenues to the local communities that
bear the greatest burden in hosting the timber companies (Fomété, 2001). Moreover, the
respondent from Organization 4 stated that a new finance law that supersedes the 1994
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Law has changed the distribution so that the 10% no longer goes to local communities
but instead to tax officials.24
Another option is the land rent model established by Decree 76-166 of 27 April
1976, used in the case of industrial agriculture concessions on national lands (AssembeMvondo et al., 2013). In similar proportions to the AFF, this system distributes 40% of
land rents to the national government, 40% to village councils, and 20% to local
communities. The analysis of Assembe-Mvondo et al. (2013) shows that typically these
rents are either not paid by the industrial operators, or the funds are lost to corruption
within the Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure. The law also has never
established the minimum or maximum fees that companies must pay per hectare, and
lacks the record-keeping requirements of the AFF (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2013). It
seems clear that both of these mechanisms (the AFF and agricultural land fees) as they
currently function will not meet the goals of Cameroon’s R-PP in respecting local rights,
livelihoods, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Of course,
these mechanisms only distribute the fees per area of land, not the revenue derived from
the business operation itself. Even assuming that actual REDD+ funds received in either
of these scenarios, and not merely land fees, are distributed in their respective
proportions, they would not compensate for the opportunity costs calculated by Lyonga
(2012) for the study area, who found that 80% of the value of carbon credits would need
to reach local communities.

24

The argument for this change is that it will provide motivation for these
employees to collect tax revenue and not succumb to corruption.
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In either case, it is a dangerous option for REDD+ to operate through companies,
whether government owned, parastatal, or private enterprises, where these companies,
and not the local communities, own the carbon rights themselves. This could be a disaster
because it would completely disenfranchise communities from REDD+ benefits while
still appropriating village land and imposing livelihood restrictions. In fact, the
Establishment Convention signed between Herakles Farms and the national government
gives that company all carbon rights on the land allotted to it, in addition to complete
usage rights and the authority to alienate those rights from local communities (Achobang
et al., 2013). Moreover, communities would have no incentive to reduce their
deforestation activities. It is therefore critical that civil society organizations ensure that
this method of REDD+ implementation is avoided.
PES is one system mentioned in Cameroon’s R-PP as a tool with “great
potential” for the implementation of REDD+ (FCPF, 2013a, p. 70). The respondent from
Organization 4 described PES projects that were recently implemented in the South and
East Regions in the context of community forestry (an early review of these projects is
detailed in Awono et al. [2014]). He stated that this system has brought in two and a half
times the maximum amount of money the respondent was aware of any community forest
receiving from logging. The project was sponsored by funds from a bilateral development
agency. Rules were established in cooperation with the relevant communities. A certain
amount of money was guaranteed to the communities per year, depending on the extent
to which conservation goals were achieved, as assessed together by the organization and
the communities. If a certain percentage of the goals were not reached then a
corresponding amount of money was withheld, but still available for the next year. The
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respondent stated that there was also the option for a REDD+ project, but it was not
implemented for two reasons. First, because of concerns the large amounts of money that
could be given to the communities would cause internal conflicts. Second, the
communities might be held financially responsible to investors for losses of carbon or
failure to meet goals, as opposed to the PES system in which full payment was only
withheld until goals were achieved.
Community forestry essentially sets aside a piece of forest to be used by the
community for some purpose, potentially forest conservation, while the rest of the
communal land is available for other uses. The separation of conservation areas from
those where socioeconomic development takes place was proposed by some villagers as a
way to reconcile the conflicting needs of protecting the forest while improving living
conditions. It is also similar to what Organization 3 is recommending to a community
forest in the TRIDOM area, where they are encouraging the village to divide their
community forest into separate areas for agriculture, non-commercial uses, and REDD+.
Applying a PES-type project to community forestry therefore sounds like a
suitable mechanism for benefit distribution under REDD+, particularly if performance is
de-linked from liability to investors. It would also be an improvement on the current use
of community forests, enhancing conservation goals, and providing more income to the
community. The respondent form Organization 4 stated that community forests in
Cameroon are currently designed mainly to support timber operations, and described how
communities have to acquire the same technical capacity of logging companies in order
to process timber and make use of their community forest. In contrast to the activities of
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industrial agriculture operations and top-down conservation projects, the community
could decide where to locate the forest in order to best avoid livelihood restrictions.
To support this effort, villages must be allowed to collectively decide where this
forest area is located, and the decision should not be allowed to be taken by a small group
within the village, like the situation in Fabe where most of the village was not involved in
the negotiations with Herakles Farms. In another example, a chief and two council
members from a village in the northeastern area of the Herakles concession met with
members of the government and the company through the land consultative board, as
required by Cameroonian law for gaining access to communal lands. In this case, the
village representatives all came from the same family, and lived in the same village
quarter. They agreed on the land to give to Herakles, which was in a different quarter,
without informing those residents or involving them in the discussions (Organization 4
respondent). These instances are from dealings with agro-industry, but Fobissie et al.
(2012) mention several problems that have arisen specifically for community forests in
Cameroon. These include issues of elite capture, “conflicts between individual and
collective interests,” and “conflicts between customary and modern laws” (p. 15). Oyono
(2005) and Djeumo (2001) have found similar problems in the implementation of
community forestry. Furthermore, the process of establishing a community forest also
needs improvement so that communities are not forced to wait over a decade for their
PMC only to have the possibility of losing the community forest if they cannot find a
commercial operator before it expires.
Organization 2 is exploring a “corridoring” approach that would use community
forests to connect conservation areas to one another. This initiative could be a motivation
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for Organization 2 to provide assistance in helping communities pursue community
forestry, as in the case of PSMNR-SWR in Mosongiseli. Directly providing technical
assistance to communities to help elaborate their management plan, possibly with a
participatory approach to the enumeration, could also reduce the potential for
mismanagement of funds. In implementing this approach, it is important that the
community be given the final say in deciding where the community forest should be, for
reasons stated above, rather than strategically placing the forests along corridors without
considering the diversity of interests within the community.
5.2.2.3. Intra-community benefit sharing. Respondents expressed similar
preferences for community benefits and direct benefits (Table 4.18). Community benefits
were slightly more favored in Fabe, whereas direct benefits were slightly more favored in
Mosongiseli. There appeared to be less opposition to livelihood changes if direct benefits
were received compared to community benefits, especially in Mosongiseli. This result is
in agreement with the respondent from Organization 2, who believed there must be a
“direct link between conservation and revenue”, and recommended some kind of
monetary benefits, whether cash disbursements or employment from tourism, to create
that connection. The respondent did not view community benefits as providing as good of
a connection.
Another perspective comes from Fobissie et al. (2012), who note that
communities often prefer financial compensation, but the authors recommend community
benefits because of their greater durability. This advantage was acknowledged by some
survey respondents, as well. Community benefits may also be more appropriate for
intergenerational equity, as described by Assembe-Mvondo et al. (2013) for the use of
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revenues from land rent fees. Another concern is that direct financial benefits will not be
distributed equitably within the community.
In his analysis, Lyonga (2012) found that subsistence farms in the southern part of
the KNP buffer zone had the highest financial yield at 50% canopy cover. Given the
2008-2009 value for carbon credits at US$10 per tonC, REDD+ would come close to
compensating for opportunity costs in a scenario where 80% of revenues (US$8 per
tonC) reach local farmers with percentages of canopy cover higher than 50%. In the case
that only 25% of revenues (US$2.5 per tonC) reach local farmers, the system would fail
to offset reductions in crop output at canopy cover higher than 50%. If farmers are
currently operating with less than 50% canopy cover, significant financial gains could be
possible by increasing the canopy cover to 50% and receiving 80% of revenues from
carbon credits.
Because many farmers will not be working at the most income-efficient canopy
density, REDD+ will likely work only by using a fairly straight route between REDD+
and local communities. Indirect channels through government ministries and state or
private enterprises will almost certainly run the risk of reducing the efficiency of benefits
to the extent that opportunity costs for participating in REDD+ are not balanced by
financial gains in the communities. Another option is entrusting civil society or
international development agencies with a history of reliability to handle the funds, as in
the PES system described above.
Lyonga’s (2012) finding that 50% canopy cover produced the highest income for
farmers in the area suggests that the initiative of the Korup Project to teach sustainable
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farming methods is probably valuable for increasing crop revenues, reducing impacts on
the forest, and potentially for generating income from REDD+ benefits. The focus on
efficient farming techniques is also the major goal of Organization 3’s work in the
southern part of the country. This is one of several ways that community benefits could
help to provide important infrastructure and services, while also improving villagers’
financial situation.
According to the respondent from Organization 4, cocoa harvests in the area often
spoil before they can reach markets, meaning that farmers are not paid what they could
potentially earn for their crop. One reason for this is because the roads leading out of the
villages are very poor. Another way that income could be increased is by improving the
processing capacity in the villages themselves. Electrical drying ovens would be
particularly helpful for this purpose, but this would probably also require providing
electricity to the communities. Either of these options could improve the money earned
per area of farm for many villagers, which would both reduce the pressure for
deforestation and improve livelihoods. Applying REDD+ benefits to education, in the
form of schoolhouses, educational materials, and scholarships, could also have beneficial
effects for both the forest and livelihoods. Materials written by Cameroonian authors,
with a shift in focus away from a European or American outlook towards local
perspectives would be especially valuable (Mbaku, 2005).
5.2.2.4. Intra-community conflict. While this study did not find any major
discord currently existing between demographic or social groups, the entrance of
Herakles Farms into Fabe created divisions there, and evidently Pamol was a source of
social disruption when the company first established in Monsongiseli. Tensions in Fabe
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were mainly between community elites and much of the rest of the village, but there was
no evidence that this conflict was rooted in any particular demographic differences
between the two sides. In Monsongiseli there are even a number of Nigerians and newly
arrived allogenes, but indigenes do not appear to harbor any animosity towards either
group. Still, allogenes are significantly disadvantaged in decision-making and forest
access. This situation is similar to the problems described by Geschiere and Nyamnjoh
(2000) in relation to the historical process of migration followed by exclusion of
immigrants from power, driven largely by industrial agriculture.
One difference, however, is that the results did not find that immigrants were
specifically excluded from power because of the actions of political intrusion into
decision-making processes. The case could be made that this type of interference did
occur indirectly, though. Some allogenes in Fabe reported involvement in decisionmaking only in relation to the Herakles issue, albeit through meetings held by SEFE,
despite opposition from the company and government.25 Secondly, financial gains from
carbon credits will probably not rely on introducing labor from outside the village.
Because of this, community disputes arising from REDD+ will likely result from
structural disenfranchisement of allogenes, (and to an extent, women), rather than active
socio-political conflicts between members of the community.

25

The civil society organization’s director was physically assaulted by Herakles
workers in 2011, followed by his detention, the detention of several other SEFE
organizers, and continued legal action in 2015 (Achobang et al., 2013; Worldwide
Movement for Human Rights [FIDH], 2015, https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/humanrights-defenders/cameroon-continued-judicial-harassment-against-mr-nasako-besingi).
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Attempts at establishing community forests have not been a significant source of
conflict in the study villages. The Korup Project also has not caused major social
disruptions there. But the communities’ experiences with industrial agriculture show that
there is the potential for conflicts to emerge, particularly between those with greater
traditional authority in decision-making, although this power is checked to some extent
through social organization by women and youths. That Herakles has claimed carbon
rights in its Establishment Convention gives clear evidence that private entities could be
involved in the region’s carbon market, to the exclusion of local communities. The
destructive effects the company has had on Fabe Village and other communities
(Achobang et al., 2013; Organization 3 respondent; Organization 4 respondent) could
very well be transferred over into REDD+ activities if the REDD+ mechanism is allowed
to operate using this model.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
6.1. Findings
Most women, youth, and allogenes in the sample were farmers, and made
extensive use of NTFPs. Community members widely reported using NTFPs for a
number of practical and cultural purposes. The forest itself also had socio-cultural value
for most respondents. Both NTFPs and crops were extremely important for livelihoods.
The communities were fairly heterogeneous according to clan, with several different clan
groups represented in the sample population. There was a low degree of religious
heterogeneity in both community samples.
Respondents mentioned certain local institutions that could potentially foster
processes of societal integration. These included occupational interactions while learning
farming techniques at the Farmer’s Field School in Fabe, community clean-up campaigns
in Mosongiseli, and community-wide celebrations in both villages. It is unclear from the
data whether these have contributed to generalized understandings leading to collective
action. Women, and especially youths, were understood by community members as
having a high degree of social organization, and this has, to some extent, provided these
groups a means of asserting their collective agency.
The data uncovered differences in educational attainment, with youth tending to
have higher levels of education and women having lower levels. The results for allogenes
were mixed, with these community members having lower levels of education in Fabe,
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but equivalent or higher levels in Mosongiseli. These educational differences could limit
the information available to women, allogenes, and older community members needed
for discussions related to REDD+, if they are unable to read documents pertaining to the
conditions of the agreement. It may also discourage participation in discussions, like the
Korup Project meeting I observed in Fabe, where the ability to read the slides would
likely be helpful in engaging in the conversation. At this meeting, I estimated about 85%
of those in attendance to be men. Social organization of women, such as through the
Diyala society in Fabe, could provide a means for information sharing that may help
compensate for lower educational levels.
Whether due to educational disadvantages, socio-cultural pressure on some
women to refrain from decision-making, or other unidentified barriers, women did report
lower levels of involvement in decision-making relative to youths. Allogenes reported
even lower levels of decision-making involvement than women, and were also barred
from participation in important local decision-making institutions such as the village
council. In addition, allogenes had obstacles to accessing forest land and resources.
Respondents described both communal and individual levels of forest ownership
in these communities. While most respondents were supportive of REDD+, there was a
significant proportion of respondents (6.5-19.4%) who would not accept reducing the size
of their farm for either community or direct benefits. Moreover, some community
members owned no land, including customary tenure, which places them in danger of
their rights and interests not being recognized. These individuals and their families could
be subject to loss of livelihood, then, if REDD+ projects fail to take their interests into
account.
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Out of the benefit distribution mechanisms proposed in Cameroon’s R-PP, PES
combined with community forestry appears to have the best potential for equitable
REDD+ project implementation. Community forestry would allow communities to
choose the conservation area having the lowest impact on livelihoods. While still in the
early stages of implementation, PES projects have demonstrated that ability for
appropriate community involvement, while avoiding the problem of financial liability to
carbon investors.
6.2. Limitations
Analysis of the hypotheses, and to an extent the implications for REDD+
implementation, was limited by the timeframe and the number of villages that could be
studied. First, the data do not comprise entirely parallel information, especially between
the two villages. For example, the youth association in Fabe was exclusively composed
of members of the majority clan group in that village, but it was not clear whether the
association also excluded women, as did the youth association in Mosongiseli. Secondly,
the data do not directly show connections to collective agency arising from states and
processes of integration or segregation. To illustrate, the Diyala society in Fabe is where
women can gather to socialize and educate themselves. This setting could foster
processes of integration between women of different origin, and if so it would be useful
to see if integration through this community institution contributed to collectively buying
the grinding machine mentioned in one of the interviews. Specifically, respondents could
be asked how the idea for the purchase started, why they saw a need for the machine, and
if women coming from different backgrounds all had a use for it. Greater depth of
information on topics like this would provide more information on the processes of social
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interactions that connect characteristics of a village and its institutions with specific
outcomes.
The difficulty in determining relationships between integration and collective
action reflects the comments of Poteete and Ostrom (2004), who discourage “further
contests over the effect of group heterogeneity and size of group” (p. 454). They instead
view these factors as potential “challenges or opportunities” (Poteete & Ostrom, p. 454)
that communities face, and stress the importance of local institutions as well as
considering local context when developing conservation programs. A reformulation of
the research question from a variance-oriented framework to a process-oriented one
(Maxwell, 2013) would be more useful to future research. Questions that focus on
processes in which integration influences collective action could improve understandings
of the nature of social interactions in directing the development of local institutions. They
could also help researchers and conservation organizations have a better grasp of
conservation outcomes, and design more appropriate projects that recognize the realities
and agency of the relevant populations. The social factors that contribute to more
effective collective agency could be supported by civil society organizations. This would
allow communities to take the lead in developing conservation strategies that are
successful and suitable to the local context, while helping to reduce the risk of
contributing to violations of FPIC and the rights of indigenous peoples.
Time constraints also prevented better identification of actors and interests within
the communities. A longer duration of fieldwork could potentially allow greater access
by enhancing rapport. This in turn could have increased the depth and reliability of

186

responses. Regarding the quantitative component, a random sample would have improved
the validity of the results, while reducing uncertainty.
Another limitation to the study was the language barrier. I only understood a
small amount of Pidgin English, and no French or local dialects. Because of this,
interviews in these languages were conducted through interpreters (see Methods chapter).
This could have prevented the most accurate understanding of participants’ responses,
grounded in their precise meaning. The study also suffered from a lack of clear
definitions of demographic groups grounded in the local understandings. The concepts of
“indigene” and “allogene” would have particularly benefited from knowing more
precisely what qualifies a community member as a “native” or “citizen” versus a
“stranger” or “foreigner.” Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) describe the situation in
Cameroon, and the Southwest specifically, as one where “strangers” may be those who
immigrated to their current location generations before. Yet it is not clear to what degree
this same situation exists in the study villages.
A better understanding of the local historical context outside of environmental
policies could only improve future work, if not hindered by widening the scope of the
research too much. An important factor not considered was the Bakassi conflict between
Cameroon and Nigeria. Fongot (2013) has written about the troubles for natives of
(traditionally Nigerian) Efik and Ibibio ethnicity living on the Bakassi peninsula, which is
not especially far from Mosongiseli on the Ndian mainland. Cameroon has denied
citizenship to many of these people, despite their family lineage going back several
generations in Bakassi. Tensions in the area between the governments of Cameroon and
Nigeria, and Cameroon’s treatment of people living in the Bakassi area, cast suspicion on
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activities carried out by the national administration (Fongot, 2013, p. 131). It is not
unrealistic to consider that forest policies in the area could be strongly influenced by this
situation.
6.3. Future Research
Further studies could investigate different categories as primary demographic
characteristics, such as clan group and other forms of heterogeneity. For instance,
differing levels of wealth and distance to the forest resource are discussed as types of
heterogeneity by Poteete and Ostrom (2004). Another factor to explore in greater depth is
the role of civil society, NGOs, and foreign development agencies in modulating the
agency of forest communities. What segments of the population benefit from these
interactions, and who has access to various organizations could have important
implications for their outcomes.
In this study, I only explored the influence of integration through the fieldinteractional perspective, which proposes that collective action comes about by
generalizing the interests of others in the community through social interactions, resulting
in common understandings. This proposition does not necessarily involve the presence of
ethnic diversity, only that those members of the community with differing interests are
involved in social interactions, especially during institutional processes. But there could
be other possible contributions to collective agency and collective action that come out of
integration, such as the inclusion of ideas that are not part of the dominant way of
thinking and offer alternative solutions to how the situation can be managed most
effectively. There could also be an effect of generalized tolerance that carries over into an
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atmosphere of unity. In these cases, ethnic, racial, cultural, or geographic diversity would
be an important factor, along with integration of the different groups.
6.4. Reflections
While local people do contribute to deforestation, the impact of subsistence
farming is relatively temporary (FCPF, 2013a, p. 38). Cameroon’s R-PP notes that the
dynamic nature of subsistence farming methods, in which forest area is cleared, then
allowed to regenerate for several years, creates a prospect for REDD+ (FCPF, 2013a).
This fact could prove to be a mixed blessing by providing forest communities with
opportunities to benefit from REDD+, but also creating a motivation to enforce
livelihood restrictions without fair compensation or respecting the rights of villagers.
Given the large number of projects authorized and encouraged by the
Cameroonian government that clear-cut astonishingly large areas of forest for plantations,
dams, and other projects (Organization 4 respondent), where should efforts to reduce
deforestation be focused? Subsistence agriculture does contribute to deforestation and
carbon emissions. Yet these communities are not directly involved in bulldozing
thousands of hectares of forest land in order to plant a permanent monocrop with very
little biodiversity or other ecological benefits. I believe that a far greater emphasis should
be placed on preventing large scale clear-cutting projects, rather than focusing on
restricting the traditional cultivation of forest land. To this effect, conservation areas in
the permanent forest domain could best be used as a tool for designating places that are
permanently off-limits to industrial operations. Moreover, many local communities and
civil society organizations will no doubt be prepared to collaborate in efforts to control
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the expansion of projects that typically acquire their traditional land with little to no
compensation.
Many conservation organizations were involved in the Herakles issue, and
through laudable efforts the area of the concession was reduced from 73,000 ha to 20,000
ha (Organization 2 respondent, Organization 4 respondent). Similar action should be used
to enforce Cameroon’s land use laws that require the consultation of local communities
and their compensation whenever projects take place in communal forests on national
lands. Efforts to strengthen existing laws could considerably improve both local
livelihoods and forest conservation goals. One important step would be to stipulate the
range of fees per hectare required to be paid for the use of national lands, as was required
by Decree 76-166 of 27 April 1976 (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2013).
The people who live in these communities value the forest not only because of
their strong dependence on its natural products, but they also appreciate the forest for a
variety of social and cultural reasons. If the communities are allowed to benefit from the
forest without transforming it into timber or an industrial plantation (whether by choice,
force, or deception), the data from this study suggest they will likely implement effective
conservation measures to preserve their heritage for themselves and future generations.
On the other hand, it seems unrealistic to expect any people to make sacrifices for the
sake of abstract ideas such as park boundaries when struggling to meet their immediate
and vital needs. REDD+ does offer the possibility of filling this livelihood gap, if
implemented in a way that respects the realities of forest societies and the basic
necessities of life.
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In conclusion, I stop short of recommending against developing REDD+ in the
country, because so many of the respondents were hopeful about the program, and have a
tremendous need for socio-economic development. Moreover, the program could result in
considerable ecological and environmental gains. But the potential for harm to the local
populations is serious and should not be diminished. If social safeguards cannot be
assured, then the REDD+ process should not go forward. This must include active
oversight by the UN, World Bank, international development agencies, as well as
conservation and human rights NGOs. The Cameroonian leadership in MINEPDED,
MINFOF, and the REDD+ Steering Committee should take this opportunity to
courageously design and implement the program in the most far-sighted and equitable
form possible.
While Cameroon is seen as a leader in forest policy reforms (Djeumo, 2001;
Fobissie, 2014), the content of these reforms was largely dictated by the World Bank as
conditions for obtaining structural adjustment credits, and were not “home-grown”
solutions (Mbatu, 2009; Topa et al., 2009). This remnant of colonialism may be part of
the reason why these policies have largely failed (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012). Taking bold
initiatives of its own accord to implement REDD+ in a way that protects the rights of
indigenous people and local communities would likely help to maintain social, economic,
and ecological sustainability, providing far better long-term gains for the country than
implementing projects without these guarantees. Already host to COMIFAC, and an
economically important country in Central Africa, the appropriate design and
implementation of REDD+ would heighten Cameroon’s status as a leader in the region.
As the ecological beauty and ethnic diversity of Cameroon exemplifies Africa in
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miniature, if done right, the country’s REDD+ program could serve as a model for the
rest of the continent.
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Appendix A
Appendix A: Survey Instrument
Forest Community Integration and Collective Action in Korup National Park, Cameroon: Interactions with
Forest Policies and the REDD+ Mechanism
Adam Flanery, Principal Investigator; Dr. Richard S. Mbatu, Co-Principal Investigator
My name is ______________. I’m assisting in research being conducted for the Environmental Science and
Policy program at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg, in the United States. The title of the
research is called “Forest Community Integration and Collective Action in Korup National Park, Cameroon:
Interactions with Forest Policies and the REDD+ Mechanism”. The purpose of the research is to understand
how local communities in the area could be affected by a forestry program that the Government of
Cameroon is developing, called REDD+. The answers you give in this survey will be kept confidential. The
information will not include your name, and will only be used for academic purposes. You might feel that
some of the questions are of a sensitive nature, so remember you can skip any questions you do not wish
to answer. Your participation in this survey is appreciated, but completely voluntary, and no negative
consequences will occur to you if you choose not to participate.
Survey # …………….
1.

Date: …………………………………

Village: …………………………………………..

Sex of the respondent:
□ Female □ Male

2.

How old are you? ……………….. years old

3.

What is your occupation? …………………………………………………..

4.

What is your highest level of education? ………………………………………………………………

5.

What is your religion?
□ Christian □ Muslim □ Traditional religion

6.

Which of the following best describes your land ownership?
□ Own a land title □ Own a land certificate □ Rent land □ No land ownership

7.

Are you originally from this village? (If NO, continue to #8, If YES, skip to #9)
□ Yes □ No

8.

Where are you originally from? ………………………………………………………………………………

9.

Where in this village do you live? ............................................................…………………………………….
……………………………………………………….................................................................................................

10. What clan do you consider yourself? ……………………………………………………
11. What languages do you speak? ................................................................
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Thank you. Now I’d like to ask about how you and your community use the forest land and resources.
12. In which of the following ways is the forest important to you, if any? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
□ Cultural and religious practices □ Recreational activities □ Learning activities
□ Resolving conflicts or improving friendships □ Beauty of the forest □ Food
□ Other: ………………………………………………………..
13. In the past year, have you used plant or animal products from the forest? (If YES, continue to #14.
If NO, skip to #16)
□ Yes □ No
14. What have you used these plant or animal products for? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
□ Food or drink □ Medicine □ Construction materials □ Tools □ Fragrances □ Food for
livestock
□ Ornaments or decorations □ Fuel wood □ Other fuels □ Other: ………………………………………
15. How have you used these plant or animal products for your livelihood? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
□ Subsistence □ To trade □ To sell □ Other: …………………………..
16. In the last three years have you grown any crops in the forest? (If YES, continue to #17. If NO, skip
to #19)
□ Yes □ No
17. In the last three years, what are the main crops you have grown in the forest?
…………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
18. How have you used these crops for your livelihood? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
□ Subsistence □ To trade □ To sell □ Other: …………………………..
19. How does this village make decisions for how to use the forest?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
20. In the last year, have you been involved in deciding how this village uses the forest?
□ Yes □ No
21. Compared to the last year, has your role in decision making changed?
□ Yes □ No
Now I’d like to ask you about a forest policy the Government of Cameroon is developing.
22. Have you heard of the program called REDD, or REDD+? (If Yes, continue to #23, if NO, skip to #24)
□ Yes □ No
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23. Where do you get your information about REDD+? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
□ NGO workers □ Korup Park staff □ Other government staff □ Government publications
□ Radio □ Television □ Internet □ Newspaper □ Books □ Word of mouth □ Community
leaders □ Other sources: ………………………………………………………………….
The program called REDD+ (“R.E.D.D. plus”) stands for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation. The Government of Cameroon is working on REDD+ with
international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank. Basically, it proposes to put a
price on the amount of biomass in the forest (for example, the weight of the plants and trees there - but
not removing them from the forest). Then the government receives money in exchange for how much
there is. This money will come from selling the value of the biomass (the weight of plants and trees left in
the forest) to international buyers. The government will then distribute the money to local communities.
24. How do you think REDD+ will impact your community?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
25. How do you think REDD+ will impact the forest?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
(If answered YES to #16 continue to #26. If answered NO to #16, skip to #30.)
Some ways that are being considered to implement REDD+ are by providing benefits when farmers reduce
the size of their farms in the forest. One way of providing these benefits is by giving money to the
community for village improvements, and another is to give money directly to farmers who participate in
the program. In the next few questions I’d like to ask what you think about these ideas.
26. How likely would you be to reduce the area of your farm in the forest in exchange for community
benefits like electricity, pipe-borne water, or hospitals? (If NOT AT ALL LIKELY continue to #27.
Otherwise skip to #28)
□ Very likely □ Likely □ Somewhat likely □ Not at all likely
27. What is the most important reason why you would not reduce the size of your farm in exchange
for these community benefits?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
….……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….......
28. How likely would you be to reduce the area of your farm in the forest in exchange for financial
benefits directly to you? (If NOT AT ALL LIKELY continue to #30. Otherwise skip to #31.)
□ Very likely □ Likely □ Somewhat likely □ Not at all likely
29. What is the most important reason why you would not reduce the size of your farm for financial
benefits directly to you?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

208

Appendix A (Continued)

30. Is there anything else you would like to add about your experiences with forest conservation?
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Thank you for your time and willingness to participate in this survey. Your input is very important for this
research and is sincerely appreciated.
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